Changes in Work Motivation During Transition: A Case from Slovenia

A longitudinal study of work motivation based on the VIE model was conducted in a Slovenian iron and steel organisation in five-year intervals from 1979 to 1994. During this period we can observe some changes in the importance of values and changes in the perceptions of the work environment. Results were interpreted as context-specific reflections of the macrosocietal changes that have occurred during the transition in Eastern and Central Europe. The results also indicate that meaningful changes in organizational culture and climate occurred long before the actual political and economic change happened. Limitations related to the nature of the research design and to the cross-level nature of transitional changes are discussed.     

Characterizing Pathological Narcissism in Terms of the HEXACO Model of Personality

This study investigated the grandiose and vulnerable subscales of the Pathological Narcissism Inventory (PNI; Pincus et al. (Psychological Assessment, 21, 365-379, 2009)) in the context of the HEXACO model of personality. Based upon previous research, we predicted that grandiose aspects of narcissism would be related to high extraversion, low emotionality, and low agreeableness, while vulnerable aspects of narcissism would be associated with low extraversion, high emotionality, and low agreeableness (Miller and Campbell (Journal of Personality, 76, 449-476, 2008)). We also examined whether the honesty-humility domain helped differentiate between the two aspects of narcissism. We predicted that grandiose aspects of narcissism would be related to low levels of honesty-humility because of a tendency to exploit others, while vulnerable aspects of narcissism would be unrelated to honesty-humility. Our predictions were supported for the vulnerable subscale of the PNI for both zero-order and partial effects. However, for the grandiose subscale, our predictions were only supported when controlling for covariance between the PNI subscales and the HEXACO domains.     

Nasal,retronasal, and gustatory perception: An experimental comparison

Four odor substances (lemon aroma, rum aroma, ethyl butyrate, and amyl acetate) in different concentrations were presented nasally and orally (retronasally) in a four-alternative forced-choice procedure (detection tasks). In a further experimental condition, sucrose was added to the stimuli. Finally, the taste properties of the (nonsugared) odor stimuli were judged on seven semantic scales. In the detection of odor-containing stimuli, there were no significant differences between nasal and retronasal stimulation. In the taste conditions, however, there was a significant decline of “hits” when the stimuli contained sucrose in addition to the odor substances. Furthermore, in semantic scaling of the taste stimuli, a new variant of the taste-smell illusion was observed, namely, a tendency to attribute “suited” basic taste categories (e.g., “sweet”) to pure (nongustatory) odor stimuli.     

Differential effects of social and non‐social reward on response inhibition in children and adolescents

An important issue in the field of clinical and developmental psychopathology is whether cognitive control processes, such as response inhibition, can be specifically enhanced by motivation. To determine whether non‐social (i.e. monetary) and social (i.e. positive facial expressions) rewards are able to differentially improve response inhibition accuracy in typically developing children and adolescents, an ‘incentive’ go/no‐go task was applied with reward contingencies for successful inhibition. In addition, the impact of children's personality traits (such as reward seeking and empathy) on monetary and social reward responsiveness was assessed in 65 boys, ages 8 to 12 years. All subjects were tested twice: At baseline, inhibitory control was assessed without reward, and then subjects were pseudorandomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions, including (1) social reward only, (2) monetary reward only, (3) mixed social and monetary reward, or (4) a retest condition without reward. Both social and non‐social reward significantly improved task performance, although larger effects were observed for monetary reward. The higher the children scored on reward seeking scales, the larger was their improvement in response inhibition, but only if monetary reward was used. In addition, there was a tendency for an association between empathic skills and benefits from social reward. These data suggest that social incentives do not have an equally strong reinforcing value as compared to financial incentives. However, different personality traits seem to determine to what extent a child profits from different types of reward. Clinical implications regarding probable hyposensitivity to social reward in subjects with autism and dysregulated reward‐seeking behaviour in children with attention‐deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) are discussed.     

CRITICAL REMARKS ON THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF RELIGION

Cognitive explanations of religious beliefs propose an evolutionary past in which humans had to possess certain cognitive adaptations to survive. The aim of this article is to show that some cognitive accounts may overvalue the putative role of cognition. One such cognitive idea is an assumption that cognition has been evolutionarily shaped only, or most importantly, in the Pleistocene. This idea seems common among writers on the cognitive science of religion (CSR), but is mistaken. Cognition has been shaped throughout evolution. Another idea is that components of religion could not have been produced by natural selection (the hypothesis that religion is a by-product). But the article suggests that there are some domains in the field of religion and religious components that could be acquired and transmitted despite or even against alleged cognitive biases. The aim of this article is to argue for an extended approach that combines a cognitive account with functional naturalistic approaches, including an adaptationist one. Such distinction could imply that cognition is not functional. Obviously, this is not the case since cognition is the process of knowing, and surely knowledge is functional. However, the main argument for such a distinction lies in the key idea of the cognitive account that as far as cognition is functional and adaptive, religious components are not. Functionalism or “adaptivism” concerning cognition contradicts functionalism concerning religion. Numbers of scholars who consider themselves part of CSR seem also to consider both cognition and religion adaptive. However, in regard to components of religion, their adaptive, functional power is only secondary. The article concludes that the study of religion—as the study of cultural evolution in general—should include a pluralistic methodology combining cognitive and evolutionary accounts with the specificity of cultural evolution.     

No pain,no change: Reductions in prior negative affect following physical pain

In general, organisms are motivated to avoid stimuli that induce pain. However, some individuals intentionally inflict pain on themselves (e.g., nonsuicidal self-injury) and report doing so for the perceived emotional benefits following the experience of pain. Two controlled laboratory studies sought to expand upon the relatively limited literature on the effects of pain on emotion. In Study 1, participants provided momentary affect ratings immediately before and after experiencing physical pain. Results demonstrated that both positive affect and negative affect (NA) decreased following the experience of pain. In the Study 2, we examined the effect that individual differences in emotional reactivity had on affective reactions to pain. Individuals high in emotional reactivity experienced larger decreases in NA following the experience of pain than individuals who were low in emotional reactivity. Our findings may potentially explain why some individuals intentionally seek out the experience of pain.