CRITICAL REMARKS ON THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF RELIGION

Cognitive explanations of religious beliefs propose an evolutionary past in which humans had to possess certain cognitive adaptations to survive. The aim of this article is to show that some cognitive accounts may overvalue the putative role of cognition. One such cognitive idea is an assumption that cognition has been evolutionarily shaped only, or most importantly, in the Pleistocene. This idea seems common among writers on the cognitive science of religion (CSR), but is mistaken. Cognition has been shaped throughout evolution. Another idea is that components of religion could not have been produced by natural selection (the hypothesis that religion is a by-product). But the article suggests that there are some domains in the field of religion and religious components that could be acquired and transmitted despite or even against alleged cognitive biases. The aim of this article is to argue for an extended approach that combines a cognitive account with functional naturalistic approaches, including an adaptationist one. Such distinction could imply that cognition is not functional. Obviously, this is not the case since cognition is the process of knowing, and surely knowledge is functional. However, the main argument for such a distinction lies in the key idea of the cognitive account that as far as cognition is functional and adaptive, religious components are not. Functionalism or “adaptivism” concerning cognition contradicts functionalism concerning religion. Numbers of scholars who consider themselves part of CSR seem also to consider both cognition and religion adaptive. However, in regard to components of religion, their adaptive, functional power is only secondary. The article concludes that the study of religion—as the study of cultural evolution in general—should include a pluralistic methodology combining cognitive and evolutionary accounts with the specificity of cultural evolution.     

Lack of inhibition: a motivational deficit in children with attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder and children with traumatic brain injury.

Recent research has demonstrated that both brain-injured children and children with attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) suffer from response inhibition deficits. To investigate whether these deficits can be influenced by motivational factors, the stop-signal task was performed with and without reward contingencies for successful inhibition. Three groups of children between 8 and 12 years of age, participated in the study: 31 children with ADHD, 37 with traumatic brain injuries (TBI), and 26 normal controls. Results indicated that, although all groups showed comparable learning effects, reward contingencies had different effects on the groups. Whereas the performance of children with ADHD under reward contingencies were brought up to the performance level of normal controls, rewards were found less effective at improving response inhibition in children with TBI. The results further support a motivational/energetic explanation of the inhibitory deficit in children with ADHD, and of a primary response inhibition deficit due to structural brain damage in children with TBI.     

Using motivational interviewing as a supplement to obesity treatment: a stepped-care approach.

OBJECTIVE: This investigation was designed to improve behavioral weight loss program (BWLP) treatment outcomes by providing stepped care (SC) to individuals experiencing difficulties with weight loss during treatment. SC entails transition to more intensive treatments when less intensive treatments fail to meet treatment goals. In a BWLP, motivational interviewing (MI) may increase participants' motivation toward behavioral change and thus complement the acquisition of behavioral change skills. It was hypothesized that BWLP+SC (MI) participants (i.e., participants who failed to meet weight loss goals and received MI) would demonstrate superior treatment outcomes when compared with BWLP (SC matched) participants (i.e., participants who failed to meet weight loss goals but did not receive MI). DESIGN: Fifty-five obese, sedentary adults were randomly assigned to a BWLP+SC or a BWLP. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Changes in weight, cardiorespiratory fitness, self-reported physical activity, and diet (i.e., calories, percentage daily intake of fat, protein, and carbohydrates) in response to treatment were assessed. RESULTS: Participants significantly decreased their weight, increased physical activity/fitness, and improved dietary intake (ps<.05). BWLP+SC (MI) participants lost more weight and engaged in greater weekly exercise than BWLP (SC matched) participants who did not receive MI (ps<.05). CONCLUSION: For individuals experiencing weight loss difficulties during a BWLP, MI may have considerable promise.     

In praise of "false" models and rich data

The authors argue that "true" models that aim at faithfully mimicking or reproducing every property of the sensorimotor system cannot be compact as they need many free parameters. Consequently, most scientists in motor control use what are called "false" models--models that derive from well-defined approximations. The authors conceptualize these models as a priori limited in scope and approximate. As such, they argue that a quantitative characterization of the deviations between the system and the model, more than the mere act of falsifying, allows scientists to make progress in understanding the sensorimotor system. Ultimately, this process should result in models that explain as much data variance as possible. The authors conclude by arguing that progress in that direction could strongly benefit from databases of experimental results and collections of models.     

A brief assessment tool for investigating facets of moral judgment from realistic vignettes

Humans make moral judgments every day, and research demonstrates that these evaluations are based on a host of related event features (e.g., harm, legality). In order to acquire systematic data on how moral judgments are made, our assessments need to be expanded to include real-life, ecologically valid stimuli that take into account the numerous event features that are known to influence moral judgment. To facilitate this, Knutson et al. (in Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 5(4), 378–384, 2010) developed vignettes based on real-life episodic memories rated concurrently on key moral features; however, the method is time intensive (~1.4–3.4 h) and the stimuli and ratings require further validation and characterization. The present study addresses these limitations by: (i) validating three short subsets of these vignettes (39 per subset) that are time-efficient (10–25 min per subset) yet representative of the ratings and factor structure of the full set, (ii) norming ratings of moral features in a larger sample (total N?=?661, each subset N?=?~220 vs. Knutson et al. N?=?30), (iii) examining the generalizability of the original factor structure by replicating it in a larger sample across vignette subsets, sex, and political ideology, and (iv) using latent profile analysis to empirically characterize vignette groupings based on event feature ratings profiles and vignette content. This study therefore provides researchers with a core battery of well-characterized and realistic vignettes, concurrently rated on key moral features that can be administered in a brief, time-efficient manner to advance research on the nature of moral judgment.     

Driven,Distracted, or Both? A Performance‐Based Ex‐Gaussian Analysis of Individual Differences in Anxiety

Since the inception of the empirical study of personality, and even before it, individual differences in anxiety and distress have been viewed as key predictors of behavioral performance. Yet such literatures have always entertained 2 perspectives, one contending that anxious individuals are "driven" and the other contending that anxious individuals are "distracted." The present 3 studies (total N=289) sought to reconcile such discrepant views according to an ex-Gaussian parsing of reaction time performance tendencies in basic cognitive tasks. As hypothesized, a particular pattern marked by faster responding on the preponderance of trials (in terms of the ex-Gaussian μ parameter) in combination with slower responding on other trials (in terms of the ex-Gaussian τ parameter) was predictive of higher levels of anxiety. Implications for understanding neuroticism, distress, the anxiety-performance interface, and cognitive models of personality processes are discussed.