Driven,Distracted, or Both? A Performance‐Based Ex‐Gaussian Analysis of Individual Differences in Anxiety

Since the inception of the empirical study of personality, and even before it, individual differences in anxiety and distress have been viewed as key predictors of behavioral performance. Yet such literatures have always entertained 2 perspectives, one contending that anxious individuals are "driven" and the other contending that anxious individuals are "distracted." The present 3 studies (total N=289) sought to reconcile such discrepant views according to an ex-Gaussian parsing of reaction time performance tendencies in basic cognitive tasks. As hypothesized, a particular pattern marked by faster responding on the preponderance of trials (in terms of the ex-Gaussian μ parameter) in combination with slower responding on other trials (in terms of the ex-Gaussian τ parameter) was predictive of higher levels of anxiety. Implications for understanding neuroticism, distress, the anxiety-performance interface, and cognitive models of personality processes are discussed.     

Response speed as an individual difference: Its role in moderating the agreeableness-anger relationship

Anger is an emotion that is precipitated by hostile attitudes and high arousal. The trait of agreeableness is a moderately inverse predictor of hostile attitudes and anger. Relations between agreeableness and anger are likely to be stronger to the extent that the person can be characterized as high in dispositional arousal. Arousal-related manipulations speed responses in cognitive tasks. Thus, individual differences in response speed may be informative concerning general tendencies toward aroused states. In three studies (N = 319) individual differences in response speed in basic choice tasks interacted with agreeableness to predict state-related experiences of anger. Specifically, the highest levels of anger were observed among fast/disagreeable individuals. The utility of this probe in future studies is discussed.     

Mood as a Result of Temperament Profile: Predictions from the Regulative Theory of Temperament

The paper examines the relationship between three dimensions of mood and temperament traits according to the Regulative Theory of Temperament (RTT). The theory emphasises the role of temperament in meeting environmental requirements and implies that temperamental traits influence mood. The results showed that subjective level of energy was linked most strongly to activity (undertaking behaviours providing intense stimuli). It is questioned whether energy should be considered as a result or a cause of high activity. The best predictor of tense arousal and hedonic tone proved to be emotional reactivity. The former mood dimension was positively related to emotional reactivity, whereas the latter was negatively linked to this trait. The results are consistent with previous investigations on neuroticism and extraversion and widen the knowledge on temperamental predictors of mood by showing associations between briskness and all three mood dimensions. Moreover, the results showed that advantageous mood profile was associated with advantageous temperamental structure which corroborates the relevance of RTT.     

Context Matters: Promises and Concerns Regarding Nanotechnologies for Water and Food Applications

Expectations in the form of promises and concerns contribute to the sense-making and valuation of emerging nanotechnologies. They add up to what we call ‘de facto assessments’ of novel socio-technical options. We explore how de facto assessments of nanotechnologies differ in the application domains of water and food by examining promises and concerns, and their relations in scientific discourse. We suggest that domain characteristics such as prior experiences with emerging technologies, specific discursive repertoires and user-producer relationships, play a key role in framing expectations of nanotechnology-enabled options. The article concludes by suggesting that domain-specific discourses may lead to undesirable lock-ins into specific de facto assessments pre-structuring anticipatory strategies of actors.     

Humor, Kreditierung und Vertrauensaufbau in einem Erstgespräch nach Suizidversuch

Starting from the analysis of a seemingly irritating intervention of the therapist in the first encounter with a patient after an attempted suicide, the authors examine the question of the humorousness of this intervention and of the significance of such a potentially risky intervention for the development of the relationship. On the basis of the conversation-analytical examination of this particular episode, the article concerns itself with the conceptual relationship between the humorous attitude of Freud and the modern technical concept of giving credit. The concept of giving credit refers to a development-encouraging therapeutic attitude based on a benevolent but demanding attitude towards the patient. Humor in therapy may be seen as the manifestation of such a benevolent but demanding stance towards the patient as it offers the patient an alternative positioning of himself. The impertinent aspect of humor may be seen as a playful therapeutic invitation to try a different self-state. Theoretical and technical considerations on the relationship of the concept of giving credit and the classic concept of the humorous attitude are discussed.     

Lack of Inhibition: A Motivational Deficit in Children With Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder and Children With Traumatic Brain Injury*

Recent research has demonstrated that both brain-injured children and children with attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) suffer from response inhibition deficits. To investigate whether these deficits can be influenced by motivational factors, the stop-signal task was performed with and without reward contingencies for successful inhibition. Three groups of children between 8 and 12 years of age, participated in the study: 31 children with ADHD, 37 with traumatic brain injuries (TBI), and 26 normal controls. Results indicated that, although all groups showed comparable learning effects, reward contingencies had different effects on the groups. Whereas the performance of children with ADHD under reward contingencies were brought up to the performance level of normal controls, rewards were found less effective at improving response inhibition in children with TBI. The results further support a motivational/energetic explanation of the inhibitory deficit in children with ADHD, and of a primary response inhibition deficit due to structural brain damage in children with TBI.     

Suicide attempts as social goal-directed systems of joint careers, projects, and actions

In the present study we examined to what extent persons who attempt suicide describe their attempt in terms of social, joint processes. Psychotherapists interviewed 40 patients hospitalized in a general hospital for a few days after an attempted suicide. The content of the interviews was analyzed for the level of systemic processes the patients referred to (that is, action, project, and career). The most common processes to which the patients referred were relationship careers and projects and conflicts and argumentative actions. Our analysis indicates that a social process can be found at all levels of the patient's organization of the suicide attempt, within a system of goal-directed action, project, and career.     

Metaphilosophy of Mind: how Do Minds Investigate Minds? Refutation of the Theocentric View

I shall propose metaphilosophy of mind as the philosophy of mind investigating mind. That is to say, I pose the question of how knowledge of mind provided by cognitive science, broadly construed, is constrained by the epistemic position of the knower, i.e. by the very fact that it is undertaken by a mind. Here I would like to propose a minimal framework, based on two distinctions: (i) the standard one between empirical and conceptual analysis; (ii) a new one, between the internal questions of mind and the boundary questions of mind. I shall then combine these distinctions to arrive at several ways of investigating the mind, the brain and cognition. On this ground, I will discuss the notion of epistemological theocentrism as outlined by Henry Allison and argue against the perspective I call theocentric philosophy of mind. From this angle I will be able to address skepticism which cannot be defeated but actually can be, as I put it, disarmed. Finally, metaphilosophy of mind based on the abovementioned distinctions elicits a perspective that is not sufficiently delineated by cognitive scientists and philosophers: empirical way of addressing the boundary questions of mind.