A matter of design: No representational momentum without predictability

When observers are asked to localize the final position of a moving target, a forward shift of the judged final position is observed. So far, the forward shift has been attributed to the influence of mental continuation of the final target position (representational momentum). However, studies investigating forward displacement have used highly predictable target motion. The direction of target motion and the final target position were often varied between subjects. Thus, observers may have expected the target to travel in a particular direction or vanish at a particular location before a given trial started. In this study, direction of motion and final position were treated as fixed or random factors. The forward shift and the reversal of the shift with time (memory averaging) were absent when both factors were randomized. Thus, the forward shift with implied motion is restricted to repeatedly observed motion sequences that allow for pre-trial motion prediction.     

Misleading postevent information and working memory capacity: an individual differences approach to eyewitness memory

The present study examines how individual differences in working memory capacity relate to the effect of misleading postevent information on memory for the original event. Participants were shown a film of a crime event and were then asked to unscramble a narrative that included misinformation regarding some of the film's details. Additionally, the working memory capacity of the participants was measured using the operation‐word span task. Finally, in a free recall test, participants recalled fewer correct details in the misinformation condition compared to the control condition. This effect was negatively correlated with working memory capacity. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Das Ontologische Dilemma der Normativen Ethik

The Ontological Dilemma of Normative Ethics. This paper pursues two goals. The first is to show that normative ethics is confronted with the following dilemma: to be coherent, this discipline is ontologically committed to acknowledge the existence of objective values, but, to be scientifically respectable, it is committed to repudiate such values. The second goal is to assess the possible solutions to this dilemma. To this end, the following strategies are discussed: Kant’s constructive objectivism, Jürgen Habermas’ “epistemic ersatzism”, Franz von Kutschera’s “confirmation pragmatism”, and David Brink’s “objectivist tour de force”. The paper’s conclusion is that the dilemma cannot be solved because it rests on a clash of intuitions none of which can be given up. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

What is learned in concept identification: Evidence for Two-Stage theories from an analysis of response subsequences

Direct tests of One-Stage and Two-Stage theories of discrimination learning and concept identification by means of shift experiments yield ambiguous results due to interpretational problems. These difficulties can be avoided by analysing the original acquisition data. A test of the theories is suggested for concept identification experiments which is based on an analysis of the dependence between appropriately constructed response subsequences. Predictions for the theoretical alternatives are derived from a generalized all-or-none model. Results from a concept identification study with adult subjects reject One-Stage theories and support Two-Stage theories.