Interculturalism: A new diversity ideology with interrelated components of dialogue,unity, and identity flexibility

Increased cultural diversity has led to considerable debate on how to best promote intergroup harmony within pluralistic nations. In the current research, we consider the nature of interculturalism, a new diversity ideology extensively discussed by political philosophers and policy-makers in Europe and beyond. Interculturalism consists of three interrelated components of dialogue, unity, and identity flexibility. Using data (N = 2,364) from three national surveys in two ethnically diverse nations (Netherlands and USA), we test a new measure of interculturalism and establish its independence from multiculturalism and assimilation. We then demonstrate that interculturalism predicts positive intergroup outcomes, over and above multiculturalism, and is in a theoretically meaningful way related to various criterion measures. Collectively, these studies establish the uniqueness of interculturalism from multiculturalism and demonstrate its promise for improving intergroup relations in culturally diverse nations.     

Bullying in elementary school, high school, and college

This study investigated the continuity in being a bully, victim, or bully-victim from elementary school through college in 119 undergraduates. Of 25 who bullied in college, 18 (72%) had been bullied in high school and elementary school. Of 26 bullies in college, 14 (53.8%) had been bullies in high school and elementary school. Of 12 bully-victims in college, 5 (41.6%) had been bully-victims in high school and elementary school. There were significant positive correlations between being a bully in college, high school, and elementary school, and being bullied in college and high school, and high school and elementary school, and between being both a bully and victim in elementary school, a bully and victim in high school, and a bully and victim in college.     

Suicidal behavior among urban,African American young adults

The objectives of the present study were four-fold. First, to determine the lifetime, last year, and 6-month prevalence and demographic correlates of suicidal behavior in a defined population of urban, African American young adults. Second, to determine the degree of mental health service utilization among attempters. Third, to study the comorbidity between mental disorders and suicidal behavior, along with the variation in the numbers and types of psychiatric disorders associated with attempts versus ideation only. Fourth, to examine gender differences in the psychiatric diagnoses associated with attempts and ideation. Data relevant to each of these objectives were gathered through structured interviews of 1,157 economically disadvantaged, African American young adults. Lifetime, last year, and 6-month prevalence rates for attempts were 5.3%, 1.2%, and 0.4%, respectively, whereas the lifetime and 6-month prevalence of ideation were 14% and 1.9%, respectively. Approximately two thirds of those who reported lifetime ideation, and a similar proportion of those who reported lifetime attempts, had a history of at least one lifetime psychiatric disorder. There were no gender differences in terms of the degree of risk for suicidal behavior (ideation or attempts) associated with any of the comorbid psychiatric diagnoses assessed. Despite the severity of most attempts, few attempters received mental health services in their lifetime or at the time of their most recent attempt.     

Imagination inflation is a fact, not an artifact: A reply to Pezdek and Eddy

Pezdek and Eddy (2001) claim to prove that imagination inflation is a spurious effect caused by regression to the mean (RTM). They make four predictions about what patterns of data would demonstrate a genuine effect for imagination versus those that would be explainable by RTM. We review each of those predictions, and demonstrate significant problems with them. We conclude that imagination inflation is a genuine effect, and that Pezdek and Eddy’s work has contributed to the growing research showing that when people imagine fictitious events from long ago, they become more confident that those false events were genuine experiences.     

Irrelevant singletons in pop-out search: attentional capture or filtering costs?

The aim of the present study was to investigate whether costs invoked by the presence of an irrelevant singleton distractor in a visual search task are due to attentional capture by the irrelevant singleton or spatially unrelated filtering costs. Measures of spatial effects were based on distance effects, compatibility effects, and differences between singleton and nonsingleton target trials. The results show that the distractor only regularly captures attention when it is nonpredictive of the target position and unpredictably changes its features. When the distractor is antipredictive of the target position and the irrelevant features of target and distractor remain constant throughout the experiment, spatially unrelated filtering costs prevail. Further experiments showed that filtering costs accrue from distractor inhibition or target activation processes, which in turn can be modeled as instances of priming of pop-out. The present study thus clarifies the notion of filtering costs and modifies present accounts of the distraction effect. Moreover, the results also relate to research of intertrial priming by showing that priming affects the stage of attentional selection and depends on top-down attentional control settings.     

Preschoolers monitor the relative accuracy of informants

In 2 studies, the sensitivity of 3- and 4-year-olds to the previous accuracy of informants was assessed. Children viewed films in which 2 informants labeled familiar objects with differential accuracy (across the 2 experiments, children were exposed to the following rates of accuracy by the more and less accurate informants, respectively: 100% vs. 0%, 100% vs. 25%, 75% vs. 0%, and 75% vs. 25%). Next, children watched films in which the same 2 informants provided conflicting novel labels for unfamiliar objects. Children were asked to indicate which of the 2 labels was associated with each object. Three-year-olds trusted the more accurate informant only in conditions in which 1 of the 2 informants had been 100% accurate, whereas 4-year-olds trusted the more accurate informant in all conditions tested. These results suggest that 3-year-olds mistrust informants who make a single error, whereas 4-year-olds track the relative frequency of errors when deciding whom to trust.     

Business owners' action planning and its relationship to business success in three African countries

A model of business success was developed with motivational resources (locus of control, self-efficacy, achievement motivation, and self-reported personal initiative) and cognitive resources (cognitive ability and human capital) as independent variables, business owners' elaborate and proactive planning as a mediator, and business size and growth as dependent variables. Three studies with a total of 408 African micro and small-scale business owners were conducted in South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Namibia. Structural equation analyses partially supported the hypotheses on the importance of psychological planning by the business owners. Elaborate and proactive planning was substantially related to business size and to an external evaluation of business success and was a (partial) mediator for the relationship between cognitive resources and business success. The model carries important implications for selection, training, and coaching of business owners.     

False memories for end-of-life decisions

OBJECTIVE: To examine people's false memories for end-of-life decisions. DESIGN: In Study 1, older adults decided which life-sustaining treatments they would want if they were seriously ill. They made these judgments twice, approximately 12 months apart. At Time 2, older adults and their self-selected surrogate decision makers tried to recall the older adults' Time 1 decisions. In Study 2, younger adults made treatment decisions twice, approximately 4 months apart. At Time 2, younger adults tried to recall their Time 1 decisions. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Percentage of participants who falsely remembered that their original treatment decisions were the same as their current decisions. RESULTS: In Study 1, older adults falsely remembered that 75% of their original decisions were the same as their current decisions; surrogates falsely thought that 86% of older adults' decisions were the same. In Study 2, younger adults falsely remembered that 69% of their original decisions were the same as their current decisions. CONCLUSION: Age alone cannot account for people's false memories of their end-of-life decisions; we discuss other mechanisms. The results have practical implications for policies that encourage people to make legal documents specifying their end-of-life treatment decisions.