The effects of exergaming on physical activity in a third-grade physical education class

We compared the effects of exergaming and traditional physical education on physical activity among 4 active children who were not overweight and who had experience with the exergaming activities prior to the study. Results showed that exergaming produced substantially higher percentages of physical activity and opportunity to engage in physical activity. In addition, an evaluation of the exergaming equipment showed that exergaming stations were associated with differential levels of physical activity across participants.     

The role of analytic thinking in moral judgements and values

While individual differences in the willingness and ability to engage analytic processing have long informed research in reasoning and decision making, the implications of such differences have not yet had a strong influence in other domains of psychological research. We claim that analytic thinking is not limited to problems that have a normative basis and, as an extension of this, predict that individual differences in analytic thinking will be influential in determining beliefs and values. Along with assessments of cognitive ability and style, religious beliefs, and moral values, participants judged the wrongness of acts considered disgusting and conventionally immoral, but that do not violate care- or fairness-based moral principles. Differences in willingness to engage analytic thinking predicted reduced judgements of wrongness, independent of demographics, political ideology, religiosity, and moral values. Further, we show that those who were higher in cognitive ability were less likely to indicate that purity, patriotism, and respect for traditions and authority are important to their moral thinking. These findings are consistent with a “Reflectionist” view that assumes a role for analytic thought in determining substantive, deeply-held human beliefs and values.     

Bigger Not Better: Unpacking Future Expenses Inflates Spending Predictions

People often underestimate their future personal spending. Across four studies we examined an “unpacking” intervention to reduce this bias. Participants predicted spending for an upcoming week (Study 1), a weekend (Study 2a), a vacation (Study 2b), and for weeks versus self-nominated events (Study 3), and subsequently reported actual spending. In each case, unpacking the details of expected expenses increased spending predictions. In contexts where predictions tended to be too low (Study 1, 3), unpacking eliminated underestimation bias. However, in contexts where predictions were already unbiased, unpacking introduced an overestimation bias (Study 2, 3). Unpacking appears to make predictions bigger, not necessarily better.     

Probability matching in risky choice: The interplay of feedback and strategy availability

Probability matching in sequential decision making is a striking violation of rational choice that has been observed in hundreds of experiments. Recent studies have demonstrated that matching persists even in described tasks in which all the information required for identifying a superior alternative strategy—maximizing—is present before the first choice is made. These studies have also indicated that maximizing increases when (1)?the asymmetry in the availability of matching and maximizing strategies is reduced and (2)?normatively irrelevant outcome feedback is provided. In the two experiments reported here, we examined the joint influences of these factors, revealing that strategy availability and outcome feedback operate on different time courses. Both behavioral and modeling results showed that while availability of the maximizing strategy increases the choice of maximizing early during the task, feedback appears to act more slowly to erode misconceptions about the task and to reinforce optimal responding. The results illuminate the interplay between “top-down” identification of choice strategies and “bottom-up” discovery of those strategies via feedback.     

Probability matching and strategy availability

Findings from two experiments indicate that probability matching in sequential choice arises from an asymmetry in strategy availability: The matching strategy comes readily to mind, whereas a superior alternative strategy, maximizing, does not. First, compared with the minority who spontaneously engage in maximizing, the majority of participants endorse maximizing as superior to matching in a direct comparison when both strategies are described. Second, when the maximizing strategy is brought to their attention, more participants subsequently engage in maximizing. Third, matchers are more likely than maximizers to base decisions in other tasks on their initial intuitions, suggesting that they are more inclined to use a choice strategy that comes to mind quickly. These results indicate that a substantial subset of probability matchers are victims of “underthinking” rather than “overthinking”: They fail to engage in sufficient deliberation to generate a superior alternative to the matching strategy that comes so readily to mind.     

Betrayal aversion: When agents of protection become agents of harm

A form of betrayal occurs when agents of protection cause the very harm that they are entrusted to guard against. Examples include the military leader who commits treason and the exploding automobile air bag. We conducted five studies that examined how people respond to criminal betrayals, safety product betrayals, and the risk of future betrayal by safety products. We found that people reacted more strongly (in terms of punishment assigned and negative emotions felt) to acts of betrayal than to identical bad acts that do not violate a duty or promise to protect. We also found that, when faced with a choice among pairs of safety devices (air bags, smoke alarms, and vaccines), most people preferred inferior options (in terms of risk exposure) to options that included a slim (0.01%) risk of betrayal. However, when the betrayal risk was replaced by an equivalent non-betrayal risk, the choice pattern was reversed. Apparently, people are willing to incur greater risks of the very harm they seek protection from to avoid the mere possibility of betrayal.     

People focus on optimistic scenarios and disregard pessimistic scenarios while predicting task completion times

Task completion plans normally resemble best-case scenarios and yield overly optimistic predictions of completion times. The authors induced participants to generate more pessimistic scenarios and examined completion predictions. Participants described a pessimistic scenario of task completion either alone or with an optimistic scenario. Pessimistic scenarios did not affect predictions or accuracy and were consistently rated less plausible than optimistic scenarios (Experiments 1-3). Experiment 4 independently manipulated scenario plausibility and optimism. Plausibility moderated the impact of optimistic, but not pessimistic, scenarios. Experiment 5 supported a motivational explanation of the tendency to disregard pessimistic scenarios regardless of their plausibility. People took pessimistic scenarios into account when predicting someone else's completion times. The authors conclude that pessimistic-scenario generation may not be an effective debiasing technique for personal predictions.     

Switching Sides: Exploring Violent Extremist Intergroup Migration Across Hostile Ideologies

Violent extremists and terrorists often abandon their associates to join like-minded groups (i.e., with the same ideology or cause) or leave violent activism altogether (i.e., disengage or deradicalize). Sometimes, however, militants might switch between groups with mutually exclusive and hostile ideologies (e.g., from left-wing to right-wing extremism or from right-wing extremism to Salafi-jihadism). To explain intergroup migration, social identity theory (SIT) stipulates individual mobility as a strategy for status enhancement. However, SIT's applicability to this highly specific scenario of intergroup migration across hostile ideologies has not previously been explored. Several theoretical caveats could limit SIT's explanatory value here, such as potential group impermeability, lack of realistic status enhancement, and high social identity salience with the original ingroup. To assess SIT's applicability, this article uses four well-documented individual case studies of violent extremist intergroup migration across hostile ideologies in Germany. The article shows that SIT's individual mobility strategy largely applies to this scenario, at least in the presented case studies.     

Judgments of Decision Effectiveness: Actor-Observer Differences in Overconfidence

Subjects playing the role of psychiatrists (actors) engaged in a simulated medical decision-making task in which they attempted to bring the value of a patient indicator variable into a desired range. For each treatment recommended by the actor, both the actor and an observer subject playing the role of a nurse assessed the probability that the treatment would be effective. Both actors and observers were overconfident. Actors were more confident in their treatment recommendations than were observers, but this difference was eliminated when observers were given the opportunity to offer their own alternative recommendation. Under the latter circumstances, actors and observers were equally confident in the actors' decisions but observers were more confident than actors in the observers' decisions. These findings suggest that while control over the outcome of the decision has little influence on actor-observer differences in confidence, feedback regarding this outcome plays a crucial role.