Metacognitions in proneness towards hallucinations and delusions

The objectives of the present study were to examine the degree of co-existence of hallucinations and delusions in the nonclinical population. In addition, we wished to investigate the role of metacognitions in hallucinations and delusions. Finally, we explored the relative roles of positive and negative metacognitive beliefs in proneness to hallucinations and delusions. Three hundred and thirty-one nonclinical participants completed instruments assessing: hallucination-proneness (Launay-Slade Hallucinations Scale; LSHS), delusion-proneness (21-item version of the Peters et al. Delusions Inventory; PDI-21) and metacognitive beliefs (Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire; MCQ). Participants were successively grouped according to their scores on the LSHS and the PDI-21. Results revealed that hallucination-proneness was positively and significantly associated with delusion-proneness. Furthermore, hallucination-prone and delusion-prone participants scored significantly higher on some sub-scales of the MCQ compared to non-prone participants. Finally, multiple regression analysis revealed that positive and negative beliefs were good predictors of proneness towards hallucinations and delusions.     

Causal attribution and hindsight bias for economic developments

Hindsight bias for economic developments was studied, with particular focus on the moderating effects of attitudes and causal attributions. Participants (N = 263) rated the likelihood of several economic developments 6 months before and 6 months after the euro introduction in 2002. Hindsight bias occurred selectively for attitude-consistent economic developments: Euro supporters showed stronger hindsight bias for positive developments than for negative ones; euro opponents showed the opposite pattern. Causal attribution further moderated the hindsight bias: participants who perceived a strong connection between the euro introduction and specific economic developments showed higher attitude-consistent hindsight bias than participants who perceived those developments as unrelated to the euro. It is argued that hindsight bias serves to stabilize subjective representations of the economy.     

Do People Know How Their Personality Has Changed? Correlates of Perceived and Actual Personality Change in Young Adulthood

Abstract How much do we think our personality changes over time? How well do our perceptions of change correspond with actual personality change? Two hundred and ninety students completed measures of the Big Five personality traits when they first entered college. Four years later, they completed the same measures and rated the degree to which they believed they had changed on each dimension. Participants tended to view themselves as having changed substantially, and perceptions of change showed some correspondence with actual personality change. Perceived and actual change showed theoretically meaningful correlations with a host of variables related to different aspects of college achievement and adjustment.     

Nonverbal behavior and the vertical dimension of social relations: a meta-analysis

The vertical dimension of interpersonal relations (relating to dominance, power, and status) was examined in association with nonverbal behaviors that included facial behavior, gaze, interpersonal distance, body movement, touch, vocal behaviors, posed encoding skill, and others. Results were separately summarized for people's beliefs (perceptions) about the relation of verticality to nonverbal behavior and for actual relations between verticality and nonverbal behavior. Beliefs/perceptions were stronger and much more prevalent than were actual verticality effects. Perceived and actual relations were positively correlated across behaviors. Heterogeneity was great, suggesting that verticality is not a psychologically uniform construct in regard to nonverbal behavior. Finally, comparison of the verticality effects to those that have been documented for gender in relation to nonverbal behavior revealed only a limited degree of parallelism.     

How General is Generalized Scientific Essentialism?

I look at a recent argument offered in defense of a doctrine which I will call generalized scientific essentialism. This is the doctrine according to which, not only are some facts about substance composition metaphysically necessary, but, in addition, some facts about substance behavior are metaphysically necessary. More specifically, so goes the argument, not only is water necessarily composed of H₂O and salt is necessarily composed of NaCl, but, in addition, salt necessarily dissolves in water. If this argument is sound, and if the statement that necessarily salt dissolves in water is a statement of a law of nature, then one conclusion of the argument is that there is at least one metaphysically necessary law of nature. My paper examines the extent to which this kind of argument could be generalized to provide a case for a full-blown scientific essentialism: the doctrine according to which all of the laws of nature are necessary. Or, in terms of dispositions, it is the doctrine according to which natural kinds have all of their powers, capacities and propensities as a matter of necessity.     

Reasoning about Sensing Actions in Domains with Multi-Valued Fluents

In this paper, we discuss the weakness of current action languages for sensing actions with respect to modeling domains with multi-valued fluents. To address this problem, we propose a language with sensing actions and multi-valued fluents, called AM_K, provide a transition function based semantics for the language, and demonstrate its use through several examples from the literature. We then define the entailment relationship between action theories and queries in AM_K, denoted by ⊧AM_K, and discuss some properties about AM_K.     

Mood-congruent attentional bias in dysphoria: maintained attention to and impaired disengagement from negative information

Attentional bias to negative information has been proposed to be a cognitive vulnerability factor for the development of depression. In 2 experiments, the authors examined mood-congruent attentional bias in dysphoria. In both experiments, dysphoric and nondysphoric participants performed an attentional task with negative, positive, and neutral word cues preceding a target. Targets appeared either at the same or at the opposite location of the cue. Overall, results indicate that dysphoric participants show maintained attention for negative words at longer stimulus presentations, which is probably caused by impaired attentional disengagement from negative words. Furthermore, nondysphoric participants maintain their attention more strongly to positive words. These results are discussed in relation to recent developments in the pathogenesis and treatment of depression.     

Update Semantics of Security Protocols

We present a model-theoretic approach for reasoning about security protocols, applying recent insights from dynamic epistemic logics. This enables us to describe exactly the subsequent epistemic states of the agents participating in the protocol, using Kripke models and transitions between these based on updates of the agents’ beliefs associated with steps in the protocol. As a case study we will consider the SRA Three Pass protocol and discuss the Wide-Mouthed Frog protocol.     

Effects of ontogeny on performance of rats in a novel object-recognition task

The current experiment investigated ontogenetic forgetting on a novel object-recognition task similar to that of Besheer and Bevins. 18-day-old pups (n = 49) and adult (n = 29) rats were tested at two retention intervals (1 min. or 120 min.). By employing exclusion criteria which demanded minimum amounts of object exploration at training and test, the performance of 18-day-old pups but not that of adults was significantly impaired at 120 min. relative to 1 min. Analysis indicated that the ontogeny of the learning and memory measured in novel object recognition follows a developmental trend similar to that of other forms of learning, with older animals remembering more and thus performing better than younger animals. Unfortunately, given the extreme variability inherent to the task and large N necessary to achieve significance, the use of this task in studies of learning, memory, and development is discouraged.     

Beliefs in personality disorders: a test with the personality disorder belief questionnaire

The hypothesis that each personality disorder (PD) is characterized by a specific set of beliefs was tested in a sample of 643 subjects, including non-patient controls, axis-I and axis-II patients, diagnosed with SCID-I and -II interviews. Beliefs of six PDs (avoidant, dependent, obsessive-compulsive, paranoid, histrionic, borderline) were assessed with the Personality Disorder Belief Questionnaire (PDBQ). Factor analyses supported the existence of six hypothesized sets of beliefs. Structural equation modeling (SEM) supported the hypothesis that each PD is characterized by a specific set of beliefs. Path coefficients were however in the medium range, suggesting that PDs are not solely determined by beliefs. Nevertheless, empirically derived cutoff scores of the six belief subscales were reasonably successful in classifying subjects, percentages ranging form 51% to 83%. It appeared that there was a monotonical increase in scores on each belief subscale from non-patient controls, to patients without any PD, to patients with PDs (other than the pertinent PD), to patients with the pertinent PD. This suggests that PD-related beliefs are at least partly associated with (personality) psychopathology in general. Another explanation is that many patients' position on the underlying dimensions is not high enough to lead to a DSM PD diagnosis, but high enough to lead to an elevated belief score.