Is Folk Psychology Different?

In this paper, I seek to refute arguments for the idea that folk psychological explanation, i.e., the explanation of actions, beliefs and desires in terms of one another, should be understood as being of a different character than ordinary scientific explanations, a view defended most prominently in analytical philosophy by Donald Davidson and John McDowell. My strategy involves arguing both against the extant arguments for the idea that FP must be construed as giving such explanations, and also against the very notion of such a different kind of explanation. I argue first that the in some sense a priori and conceptual nature of folk psychological principles does not support the idea that these are other than empirical generalisations, by appeal to recent nativist ideas in cognitive science and to Lewis's conception of the meaning of theoretical terms. Second, I argue that there is no coherent sense in which folk psychological explanations can be seen as normative. Thirdly, I examine the putatively holistic character of the mental and conclude that that too fails to provide any cogent reasons for viewing folk psychological explanations as different from other kinds of explanation.     

Anticipation skill in a real-world task: measurement,training, and transfer in tennis

Anticipation skill in tennis was examined using realistic film simulations, movement-based response measures, and a portable eye movement recording system. Skilled players were faster than their less skilled counterparts in anticipating the direction of opponents' tennis strokes, with this superior performance being based, at least in part, on more effective visual search behaviors. The processes mediating superior performance were then modeled in groups of recreational tennis players using video simulation, instruction, and feedback. Players who received perceptual training improved their performance on laboratory- and field-based tests of anticipation when compared with matched placebo and control groups that did not receive any instruction regarding expert performance strategies. The approach used may have practical utility in a variety of performance contexts.     

Culture, education, and the attribution of physical causality

Two studies investigated the impact of culturally instilled folk theories on the perception of physical events. In Study 1, Americans and Chinese with no formal physics education were found to emphasize different causes in their explanations for eight physical events, with Americans attributing them more to dispositional factors (e.g., weight) and less to contextual factors (e.g., a medium) than did Chinese. In Study 2, Chinese Americans' identity as Asians or as Americans was primed before having them explain the events used in Study 1. Asian-primed participants endorsed dispositional explanations to a lesser degree and contextual explanations to a greater degree than did American-primed participants, although priming effects were observed only for students with little physics education. Together, these studies suggest that culturally instilled folk theories of physics produce cultural differences in the perception of physical causality.     

Present but invisible: Physical obscurity fosters social disconnection

Research suggests that we feel invisible and disconnected when others avoid our gaze. In three studies, we examine whether similar feelings may arise when others are unable to meet our gaze—when they are unaware of our presence altogether. We posit that feelings of loneliness and disconnection can arise when others are unable to sense one's physical presence. To test whether invisibility engenders loneliness, we primed participants with the invisibility construct (Studies 1 and 2) and manipulated actual visibility (Study 3) prior to assessing feelings of loneliness and isolation. Results revealed that being present, but unseen, is sufficient to induce loneliness. Findings are related to the ostracism and intersectional invisibility literatures, and the social costs of physical obscurity are discussed.     

Rortian Realism

This paper motivates and defends “Rortian realism,” a position that is Rortian in respect of its underlying philosophical theses but non‐Rortian in terms of the lessons it draws from these for cultural politics. The philosophical theses amount to what the paper calls Rorty's “anti‐representationalism” (AR), arguing that AR is robust to critique as being anti‐realist, relativist, or sceptical, invoking Rorty's historicism/ethnocentrism as part of the defence. The latter, however, creates problems for Rorty in so far as his reformative views on the nature of philosophical and academic activity are meant to be foisted on an academy that ex hypothesi holds views different from these. The paper suggests we can motivate a different conception of the consequences of AR more amenable to the academy: Rortian realism, a view that makes greater concessions to realism and a kind of scientific naturalism than Rorty would like, but that for those very reasons is more likely to allow AR to prevail.     

Assessment of disordered thinking in children and adolescents: the rorschach perceptual-thinking index.

The new Rorschach Perceptual-Thinking Index (PTI; Exner, 2000a, 2000b) was designed to assess thought disorders more accurately than the Schizophrenia Index (SCZI; Exner, 1993). Using a sample of child and adolescent inpatients, we examined the relation of Rorschach variables (PTI, SCZI, M-, and X- %) to thought disorder indexes on a behavior rating scale (Behavior Assessment System for Children; Reynolds & Kamphaus, 1992) and a self-report measure (Personality Inventory for Youth; Lachar & Gruber, 1995). Results indicate that, when used in a categorical manner, the PTI differentiated between those patients with and without elevated thought disorder scores on the other measures. Of all Rorschach variables, M- was most related to the other measures, indicating that this variable may be a particularly robust indicator of thought disorder among children and adolescents.     

Hoarding in obsessive-compulsive disorder: results from the OCD Collaborative Genetics Study

Hoarding behavior occurs frequently in obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). Results from previous studies suggest that individuals with OCD who have hoarding symptoms are clinically different than non-hoarders and may represent a distinct clinical group. In the present study, we compared 235 hoarding to 389 non-hoarding participants, all of whom had OCD, collected in the course of the OCD Collaborative Genetics Study. We found that, compared to non-hoarding individuals, hoarders were more likely to have symmetry obsessions and repeating, counting, and ordering compulsions; poorer insight; more severe illness; difficulty initiating or completing tasks; and indecision. Hoarders had a greater prevalence of social phobia and generalized anxiety disorder. Hoarders also had a greater prevalence of obsessive-compulsive and dependent personality disorders. Five personality traits were independently associated with hoarding: miserliness, preoccupation with details, difficulty making decisions, odd behavior or appearance, and magical thinking. Hoarding and indecision were more prevalent in the relatives of hoarding than of non-hoarding probands. Hoarding in relatives was associated with indecision in probands, independently of proband hoarding status. The findings suggest that hoarding behavior may help differentiate a distinct clinical subgroup of people with OCD and may aggregate in some OCD families. Indecision may be a risk factor for hoarding in these families.     

Collaborative Communication Between Psychologists and Primary Care Providers

Psychologists frequently collaborate in the care of patients managed in primary care. Communication with a patient’s primary care team is important to ensure coordination and continuity of care. The communication is far from seamless. Although The Health Information Privacy and Portability Act (HIPPA) is designed to promote sharing of clinical information while protecting patient confidentiality, unique problems arise when mental health records are included. Mental health records are subject to different regulations to protect the patient’s confidentiality. Thus, what is communicated and how it will be accomplished are challenges. Further, psychologists and primary care providers often view documentation differently, resulting in different styles of documenting that may also impede coordinated care. Increasingly, health care systems are moving toward electronic medical records, creating greater opportunities for an integrated record. Improved communication through the record can keep other providers abreast of the mental health care being provided as well as suggestions they can use to reinforce the mental health care treatment plan.     

Piagetian stage IV search errors with an object that is directly accessible both visually and manually

Previous work has shown that infants make the Piagetian stage IV error when the object is covered by a transparent occluder. However, it is not clear whether this happens because nine-month-old infants' failure to understand the identity of hidden objects extends to visible objects, or whether they are puzzled by object relationships involving transparency. Nine-month-old infants were presented with one of three different stage IV tasks in which the object was visible and uncovered at the second location. Stage IV errors were obtained with the object visible, but only when a covered place was provided at the first location. It is concluded that this result is stronger evidence that the stage IV error is not simply a hidden-object phenomenon, and that it may be best explained by taking account of infants' functional place knowledge, as well as their knowledge of object identity.     

Fundamental(ist) attribution error: Protestants are dispositionally focused

Attribution theory has long enjoyed a prominent role in social psychological research, yet religious influences on attribution have not been well studied. We theorized and tested the hypothesis that Protestants would endorse internal attributions to a greater extent than would Catholics, because Protestantism focuses on the inward condition of the soul. In Study 1, Protestants made more internal, but not external, attributions than did Catholics. This effect survived controlling for Protestant work ethic, need for structure, and intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity. Study 2 showed that the Protestant-Catholic difference in internal attributions was significantly mediated by Protestants' greater belief in a soul. In Study 3, priming religion increased belief in a soul for Protestants but not for Catholics. Finally, Study 4 found that experimentally strengthening belief in a soul increased dispositional attributions among Protestants but did not change situational attributions. These studies expand the understanding of cultural differences in attributions by demonstrating a distinct effect of religion on dispositional attributions.