Speed-accuracy tradeoff in double stimulation: Effects on the first response

A single-stimulation and two double-stimulation response conditions were compared using explicit payoff matrices to vary speed-accuracy tradeoff. Under accuracy payoff, response latency (RT(1)) to the first stimulus increased as ISI dropped but accuracy remained high and relatively constant. Under speed payoff, RT(1) was only slightly affected by ISI but accuracy dropped as ISI decreased. Transmitted information rates consistently reflected detrimental effects of short ISI. In double stimulation, but not in single stimulation, error response latency exceeded correct response latency. Furthermore, error response latencies were found to be far more variable and more sensitive to changes in speed-accuracy condition than were correct response latencies. Finally, under both speed and accuracy conditions, response latency to the first of two successive stimuli was faster if a response was also required to the second stimulus. Implications of the data for possible models of double-stimulation speed-accuracy tradeoff are considered.     

An experiment control computer system time shared by several laboratories

An experiment control computer system, operational for more than 2 years, is discussed. The system is multiprogammed, using a vendor supplied real-time operating system. Individual experiments employ multitasking—fast response functions are implemented in core resident tasks while interactive and other slow response functions are implemented in tasks that operate under time sharing. The areas of psychological research currently supported are concept formation studies, EEG evoked response studies, monitoring the autonomic nervous system, perception studies, and family interaction studies.     

Social motives among Anglo American and Mexican American children: Experimental and projective measures

The measurement approaches to social motives, cooperation-competition games and projective tests, have revealed apparently similar findings: Anglo American children are more competitive and higher in n Achievement compared to Mexican American children, who are more cooperative and higher in n Affiliation. The present experiment tested the extent to which (1) competitiveness is related to n Achievement, (2) cooperativeness is related to n Affiliation, and (3) the cultural differences in cooperation-competition are related to those in n Affiliation and n Achievement. Results indicate that social motives inferred from a cooperation-competition game have a meaningful relation to those inferred from a projective test, but that the cultural differences in cooperation-competition are larger and are not explained by cultural differences in n Affiliation and n Achievement. Social motives inferred from each measurement methodology, while somewhat related, are distinct.     

Confounding effects of individualism in children's cooperation — Competition social motive measures

The exact nature of cooperation — competition differences among children has remained obscure because the effect of individualistic motivation has important but unanalyzed influence on the frequency of cooperative and competitive responding. In order to clarify the nature of cultural differences in cooperation — competition, a novel social motive game was developed that provides distinct cooperative, competitive, and individualist alternatives. The measure was administered to 120 fourth-through sixth-grade Anglo-American and Mexican-American children of lower- and upper-middle-income levels. Consistent with previous research, Mexican-American children were generally more cooperative than Anglo-American children. Contrary to previous conclusions, however, individualism, not competition, was the strongest social motive among children, and Anglo-American children were generally more individualistic but not generally more competitive than Mexican-American children. Culture findings challenge both the methods and the results of previous cooperation — competition studies.The present research was partially supported by a University of California Intramural Research Grant No. 5-538404-19900-5. The authors are grateful to Jan Allison, Allen Binegar, and Robert Green for their assistance in the data collection.     

A Poetics of Psychological Explanation

Intentional, 'commonsense,' or 'folk' psychology is, as Jerry Fodor has remarked, ubiquitous. Explanations of what we say and do in terms of our reasons for acting are the stock in trade of intentional psychology. But there is a question whether explanations in terms of reasons are properly explanatory. Donald Davidson and Daniel Dennett, to name two, have defended intentional psychology and its reason-explanations. Still, many philosophers – including Fodor, Davidson and Dennett – fail to pay due attention to the narrative basis of such agent-centered accounts of action. In this paper, I argue that psychological explanation is an agent-centered, narrative-based interpretive practice. To make my case, I present a poetics of psychological explanation: seven elements which collectively describe what makes psychological explanations work. Narrative form allows us to represent the temporal arc of agents' actions – as well as the temporal arc of their reasoning about their actions, both prospective and retrospective. It allows us to negotiate between the canonical and the exceptional in human experience, and thus to account for actions that strike us as puzzling or unusual – whether the puzzle originates in our suboptimal understanding or the agent's suboptimal reasoning. And it allows us to juxtapose different perspectives on any action. Such juxtapositioning gives us a mechanism for coming to see how an action that strikes us as misguided might have been construed by the agent as reasonable given her understanding of her circumstances. After establishing the seven elements of the poetics, I address the objection that narrative-based accounts of intentional action are not properly explanatory.     

Cognitive control: dynamic, sustained, and voluntary influences

The cost of incongruent stimuli is reduced when conflict is expected. This series of experiments tested whether this improved performance is due to repetition priming or to enhanced cognitive control. Using a paradigm in which Word and Number Stroop alternated every trial, Experiment 1 assessed dynamic trial-to-trial changes. Incongruent trials led to task-specific reduction of conflict (trial n + 2) without cross-task modulation (trial n + 1), but this was fully explained by repetition priming. In contrast, an increased ratio of incongruent words did lead to sustained task-specific enhancement, above and beyond repetition priming (Experiment 2). Experiments 3 and 4 assessed the voluntary modulation of cognitive control: A cue predicted the congruency of the incoming trial, allowing participants to establish the correct mindset (Word Stroop in Experiment 3, Flanker task in Experiment 4). Preparing oneself to process an incongruent word (or flanker) enhanced conflict resolution in the subsequent Number Stroop, an example of cross-task modulation. Taken together, these experiments reveal the multifaceted aspects of conflict resolution: Trial-to-trial changes are often due to repetition priming; sustained modulations brought about by task demands are task specific; and voluntary modulations are task general.     

The development of idiom comprehension: an investigation of semantic and contextual processing skills

Two experiments compared 7- and 8-year-olds' and 9- and 10-year-olds' ability to use semantic analysis and inference from context to understand idioms. We used a multiple-choice task and manipulated whether the idioms were transparent or opaque, familiar or novel, and presented with or without a supportive story context. Performance was compared with that of adults (Experiment 1) and 11- and 12-year-olds (Experiment 2). The results broadly support Cacciari and Levorato's global elaboration model of figurative competence with a notable exception: Even the youngest children were able to use semantic analysis to derive the meanings of transparent idioms as well as being sensitive to meaning in context. The findings show that young children process language at both the small-grain phrase level and the discourse level to establish figurative meaning, and they demonstrate that the language processing skills that aid idiom comprehension, as well as idiom knowledge itself, are still not fully developed in 11- and 12-year-olds.