Cat-Calls and Culpability: Investigating the Frequency and Functions of Stranger Harassment

Stranger harassment is defined as experiencing unwanted sexual attention from strangers in public contexts. We conducted two studies investigating the person and situation factors of U.S. undergraduate males that facilitate stranger harassment. Men from a large Midwestern university indicated their engagement in harassment both when alone and in groups, as well as their motives for this behavior in both settings. We also assessed their Likelihood to Sexually Harass (LSH). We predicted that high LSH men would be most likely to report engaging in harassment when in groups, compared to when alone. We also predicted these group behaviors would be motivated by anonymity and group bonding. Results support our hypotheses about the predictors and motives of stranger harassment in college men.     

Even frequent and expected words are not identified without spatial attention

Previous studies have disagreed about the extent to which people extract meaning from words presented outside the focus of spatial attention. The present study examined a possible explanation for such discrepancies inspired by attenuation theory: Unattended words can be read more automatically when they are expected within a given context (e.g., due to frequent repetition). We presented a brief prime word in lowercase, followed by a target word in uppercase. Participants indicated whether the target word belonged to a particular category (e.g., “sports”). When we used a visual cue to draw attention to the location of the prime word, it produced substantial priming effects on target responses (i.e., especially fast responses when the prime and target words were identical or from the same category). When prime words were not attended, however, they produced no priming effects. This finding replicated even when there were only four words, each repeated 160 times during the experiment. It appears that very little word processing is possible without spatial attention, even for words that are expected and frequently presented.     

Knowing That P without Believing That P

Most epistemologists hold that knowledge entails belief. However, proponents of this claim rarely offer a positive argument in support of it. Rather, they tend to treat the view as obvious and assert that there are no convincing counterexamples. We find this strategy to be problematic. We do not find the standard view obvious, and moreover, we think there are cases in which it is intuitively plausible that a subject knows some proposition P without—or at least without determinately—believing that P. Accordingly, we present five plausible examples of knowledge without (determinate) belief, and we present empirical evidence suggesting that our intuitions about these scenarios are not atypical.     

Working Memory Demands and Semantic Sensitivity for Prose in Mild Alzheimer's Disease

The debate continues with regard to whether degradation of semantic knowledge or deficits in information processing lead to impaired memory performance in patients with Alzheimer's disease (AD). This study examined the effects of semantic content and working memory demands on the recall and recognition abilities of patients with mild AD. Nineteen patients with probable AD and 19 demographically matched normal control participants were asked to remember prose passages that varied in semantic content (high, medium, and low level of idea importance) and working memory demands (narrative and expository passages). Compared to the controls, patients with mild AD lost the ability to recall prose in a manner consistent with the semantic structure of the passages as the demands on working memory increased. Furthermore, as the demands on working memory increased, patients recognized information in a manner that suggested their initial processing was of isolated details rather than by semantic structure. This study provides support for the hypothesis that information processing deficits contribute to impaired semantic processing in patients with mild AD.     

Hobbes and the Imitation of God

This note discusses the implications of an incorrect quotation that appeared in Ted H. Miller's article, 'Thomas Hobbes and the Constraints that Enable the Imitation of God', from Inquiry42.2 (1999). Although surely inadvertent, this error is significant because the author uses it to support the thesis that Hobbes envisions philosophers imitating God by creating order out of chaos. The correct quotation from Leviathandoes not support such a thesis, and the paragraph in Leviathanfrom which it is taken actually runs counter to it. The correct quotation, taken in its context, and a passage from De Corporecited by Professor Miller reveal that Hobbes encourages philosophers to imitate God by following the order of creation in contemplation. In other words, philosophers imitate God by imitating the creation.     

Repetition and Lag Effects in Movement Recognition

Whether repetition and lag improve the recognition of movement patterns was investigated. Recognition memory was tested for one repetition, two-repetitions massed, and two-repetitions distributed with movement patterns repeated at lags of 3, 5, 7, and 13. Recognition performance was examined both immediately afterwards and following a 48 hour delay. Both repetition and lag effects failed to be demonstrated, providing some support for the claim that memory is unaffected by repetition at a constant level of processing (Craik & Lockhart, 1972). There was, as expected, a significant decrease in recognition memory following the retention interval, but this appeared unrelated to repetition or lag.     

Rapid facial reactions to emotional facial expressions in typically developing children and children with autism spectrum disorder

Typical adults mimic facial expressions within 1000 ms, but adults with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) do not. These rapid facial reactions (RFRs) are associated with the development of social-emotional abilities. Such interpersonal matching may be caused by motor mirroring or emotional responses. Using facial electromyography (EMG), this study evaluated mechanisms underlying RFRs during childhood and examined possible impairment in children with ASD. Experiment 1 found RFRs to happy and angry faces (not fear faces) in 15 typically developing children from 7 to 12 years of age. RFRs of fear (not anger) in response to angry faces indicated an emotional mechanism. In 11 children (8-13 years of age) with ASD, Experiment 2 found undifferentiated RFRs to fear expressions and no consistent RFRs to happy or angry faces. However, as children with ASD aged, matching RFRs to happy faces increased significantly, suggesting the development of processes underlying matching RFRs during this period in ASD.     

Anti-egalitarians for Obama? Group-dominance motivation and the Obama vote

The election of the first Black president was a watershed moment in American race relations, and many Obama voters saw their choice as affirming and furthering the dream of racial equality. However, the present study provides evidence that Obama also garnered votes from an unlikely source: those wishing to maintain racial disparities. Data from a longitudinal study of the election suggest that, while some anti-egalitarian voters opposed Obama due to his perceived “foreignness,” others voted for him in order to underwrite the hierarchy-enhancing claim that US racism has been eliminated. Anti-egalitarianism was only associated with an increased tendency to vote for Obama among individuals who claimed that his victory signals the end of racism.     

The involvement of bottom-up saliency processing in endogenous inhibition of return

Participants are faster at detecting a visual target when it appears at a cued, as compared with an uncued, location. In general, a reversal of this cost-benefit pattern is observed after exogenous cuing when the cue-target interval exceeds approximately 250?ms (inhibition of return [IOR]), and not after endogenous cuing. We suggest that, usually, no IOR is found with endogenous cues because no bottom-up saliency-based orienting processes are claimed. Therefore, we developed an endogenous feature-based split-cue task to allow for endogenous saliency-based orienting. IOR was observed in the saliency-driven endogenous cuing condition, and not in the control condition that prevented saliency-based orienting. These results suggest that usage of saliency-based orienting processes in either endogenous or exogenous orienting warrants the appearance of IOR.     

Causal imprinting in causal structure learning

Suppose one observes a correlation between two events, B and C, and infers that B causes C. Later one discovers that event A explains away the correlation between B and C. Normatively, one should now dismiss or weaken the belief that B causes C. Nonetheless, participants in the current study who observed a positive contingency between B and C followed by evidence that B and C were independent given A, persisted in believing that B causes C. The authors term this difficulty in revising initially learned causal structures "causal imprinting." Throughout four experiments, causal imprinting was obtained using multiple dependent measures and control conditions. A Bayesian analysis showed that causal imprinting may be normative under some conditions, but causal imprinting also occurred in the current study when it was clearly non-normative. It is suggested that causal imprinting occurs due to the influence of prior knowledge on how reasoners interpret later evidence. Consistent with this view, when participants first viewed the evidence showing that B and C are independent given A, later evidence with only B and C did not lead to the belief that B causes C.