A longitudinal investigation of the relationship between maternal mind‐mindedness and theory of mind

Data are presented from a longitudinal investigation examining the relationship between maternal mind‐mindedness (MM) in infancy and socio‐cognitive development in childhood. We revisited children (n = 18) who had taken part in a longitudinal study as infants. MM had been assessed at 10, 12, 16, and 20 months of age. We followed up these children at 5–6 years of age to test their higher order theory of mind (ToM) (using the strange stories task). The convergent validity, temporal stability, and predictive validity of the construct of MM were examined in a longitudinal data set. The five measures of MM were not significantly correlated. Mother's production of appropriate mind‐related comments (but no other measures) showed evidence of temporal stability throughout infancy. Thus, MM (as measured by appropriate mind‐related comments) was confirmed as a stable construct. Children's ToM at 5–6 years of age was significantly predicted by their mother's MM up to 4 years earlier, with MM accounting for 40% of the variance of the strange stories task scores. These findings identify a relationship between MM across a protracted period of infancy and socio‐cognitive development at 5–6 years of age.     

Schema‐driven source misattribution errors: remembering the expected from a witnessed event

When recollection is difficult, people may use schematic processing to enhance memory. Two experiments showed that a delay between witnessing and recalling a visual sequence increases schematic processing, resulting in stereotypic memory errors. Participants watched a slide show of a man and a woman performing stereotype‐consistent and stereotype‐inconsistent actions, followed by an immediate or delayed memory test. Over a two‐day delay, stereotype‐inconsistent actions were increasingly misremembered as having been performed by the stereotype‐consistent actor (Experiment 1). All the source errors increased, regardless of stereotype consistency, when the wrong actor was suggested. When we merely suggested that ‘someone’ performed an action (Experiment 2), only stereotype‐consistent source errors were increased. Although visual scenes are typically well remembered, these results suggest that when memory fades, reliance on schemata increases, leading to increased stereotypic memory errors. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Some sociopsychological factors in attempted suicide among urban black males.

This study tests three hypotheses relating to suicidal behavior among urban black males: that black consciousness and group cohesiveness will be lower and depression will be higher. Inner-city, young adult black males with a suicide attempt in the last 6 months, and matched controls were examined. Hypothesis was one supported; the other two received partial support. The validity of the theory of black self-hatred as the basic cause of suicidal behavior among blacks is questioned. Atwo-factor theory of suicide, focusing on forces moving the person away from suicide toward positive subgroup ties, is proposed.     

Undermining the axiological solution to divine hiddenness

Lougheed (Ratio 31:331–341, 2018) argues that a possible solution to the problem of divine hiddenness is that God hides in order to increase the axiological value of the world. In a world where God exists, the goods associated with theism necessarily obtain. But Lougheed also claims that in such a world it’s possible to experience the goods of atheism, even if they don’t actually obtain. This is what makes a world with a hidden God more valuable than a world where God is unhidden (where it’s impossible to experience atheistic goods), and also more valuable than an atheistic world with no God (and hence no theistic goods). We show that Lougheed never considers the comparison between a world where God hides and an atheistic world. We argue that it’s possible for a person to experience theistic goods in a world where God does not exist, a possibility Lougheed never considers. If this is right it undermines his axiological solution to divine hiddenness. We conclude by showing how our discussion of the axiology of theism connects to the existential question of whether God exists; that is, we show that the axiological question is (partly) dependent on the existential question.