Group performance and interpersonal evaluations as determinants of egotistical attributions in groups1

Group members often try to claim personal credit for the successes of their group while avoiding blame for group failures. Two experiments examined the effects of evaluations from their fellows on such egotism in groups. In Experiment 1, 96 subjects participated in four-person, problem-solving groups, and, after completing the group tasks, rated the competency and worth of each of the other group members. Subjects then received bogus written feedback indicating that the group had either succeeded or failed, and that the other members had considered them: (a) the most competent member of the group, (b) the least competent, or (c) of average competence. Group performance and personal evaluations interacted in influencing subjects' perceptions of their personal performances, relative responsibility for the group performance, and potency within the group, generally supporting predictions derived from self-esteem and equity theory. Subjects claimed more responsibility for success than for failure only when they were favorably evaluated by their peers, and claimed the least responsibility for group success when they were unfavorably evaluated. The latter acceptance of negative peer evaluations was examined in Experiment 2, which manipulated the consensus of the evaluations given 76 high or low self-esteem subjects. Regardless of their self-esteem or the consensus of the evaluations, subjects again seemed to accept unfavorable evaluations. High self-esteem subjects did, though, rate their personal performance and relative responsibility higher than low self-esteem subjects.     

Making Sense of Self-Esteem

Sociometer theory proposes that the self-esteem system evolved as a monitor of social acceptance, and that the so-called self-esteem motive functions not to maintain self-esteem per se but rather to avoid social devaluation and rejection. Cues indicating that the individual is not adequately valued and accepted by other people lower self-esteem and motivate behaviors that enhance relational evaluation. Empirical evidence regarding the self-esteem motive, the antecedents of self-esteem, the relation between low self-esteem and psychological problems, and the consequences of enhancing self-esteem is consistent with the theory.     

The Social Psychology of Tanning and Sunscreen Use: Self-Presentational Motives as a Predictor of Health Risk1

To the extent that many people seek and maintain a suntan because they believe it makes them more attractive, people who are particularly motivated to make good impressions on others or to be seen as physically attractive are at increased risk for skin cancer. This study examined cognitive, motivational, and attitudinal predictors of two factors that are associated with increased risk for skin cancer: engaging in behaviors that increase one's exposure to UV radiation and inadequate use of sunscreen. Self-presentational motives involving a concern for one's personal appearance and the belief that being tan enhances one's attractiveness were the strongest predictors of the degree to which respondents exposed themselves to natural and artificial sources of UV radiation. Sunscreen use was best predicted by knowing someone with skin cancer. Implications for attempts to promote safe-sun practices are discussed.     

In Defense of Practical Reasons for Belief

Many meta-ethicists are alethists: they claim that practical considerations can constitute normative reasons for action, but not for belief. But the alethist owes us an account of the relevant difference between action and belief, which thereby explains this normative difference. Here, I argue that two salient strategies for discharging this burden fail. According to the first strategy, the relevant difference between action and belief is that truth is the constitutive standard of correctness for belief, but not for action, while according to the second strategy, it is that practical considerations can constitute motivating reasons for action, but not for belief. But the former claim only shifts the alethist's explanatory burden, and the latter claim is wrong—we can believe for practical reasons. Until the alethist can offer a better account, then, I argue that we should accept that there are practical reasons for belief.     

Why might poor sleep quality lead to depression? A role for emotion regulation

Disordered sleep is strongly linked to future depression, but the reasons for this link are not well understood. This study tested one possibility – that poorer sleep impairs emotion regulation (ER), which over time leads to increased depressive symptoms. Our sample contained individuals with a wide range of depression symptoms (current depression, N?=?54, remitted depression, N?=?36, and healthy control, N?=?53), who were followed clinically over six months and reassessed for changes in depressive symptom levels. As predicted, maladaptive ER mediated both cross-sectional and prospective relationships between poor sleep quality and depression symptoms. In contrast, an alternative mediator, physical activity levels, did not mediate the link between sleep quality and depression symptoms. Maladaptive ER may help explain why sleep difficulties contribute to depression symptoms; implications for interventions are discussed.     

Defending internalists from acquired sociopaths

People who suffer brain damage to their ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VM patients) have a puzzling psychological profile: they seem to retain high intellect and practical reasoning skills after their brain injuries, but continually make poor decisions in many aspects of their lives. Adina Roskies argues that their behavior is explained by the fact that, although VM patients make correct judgments about what they ought to do, they are entirely unmotivated by those judgments. Roskies thus takes VM patients to be real-world counterexamples to motivational internalism: the thesis that, necessarily, if S judges that she ought to φ in circumstances C, then S is somewhat motivated to φ in C. In this paper, however, I argue that the neuropsychological evidence that Roskies appeals to does not actually show that VM patients are entirely unmotivated by their normative judgments. Rather, I argue, the evidence suggests that VM patients form weaker normative judgments than normals during practical deliberation. And this affords the internalist with a plausible explanation for VM patients’ behavior: because VM patients form weaker normative judgments than normals, they are less motivated by their normative judgments than normals, which allows their decision-making to be overruled by their standing desires for greater and more immediate rewards.     

Psychometric Analysis and Tentative Shortening of Survey of Personal Beliefs

The Survey of Personal Beliefs (SPB) is a frequently used measure of irrational beliefs, but can display less than ideal psychometric properties. In the first study of the present project, the five subscales of the SPB correlated as expected with higher levels of perfectionism, shame, and guilt. A confirmatory factor analysis, nevertheless, revealed that these subscales did not adequately describe responding on the SPB, and internal reliability for some subscales was poor. An abbreviated 12-item version of the SPB was more reliable than the subscales and generally as valid as the full 50-item instrument. With a second data set, the shortened version of the SPB was more consistent than the full 50-item scale in correlating positively with at least some measures of maladjustment that included depression, anxiety, neuroticism, and alexithymia. Future researchers may want to utilize the shorter 12-item version of the SPB as a more convenient and psychometrically acceptable measure of irrational beliefs.