A cognitively-gated place? The role of need for closure in a biased perception of the place’s past

Biased memory of the past is often a starting point for intergroup conflicts. In three correlational studies, we examined the relationship between need for closure (NFC) and historical ethnocentric bias, a tendency to overestimate the role of one’s ethnic group in the multicultural history of the city of residence. In addition, we checked whether this relationship would be mediated by an individual preference for essentialist places. We found that higher NFC was related to increased historical ethnocentric bias. Moreover, this relation was mediated by preference for an essentialist type of a place. Our results may contribute to understanding the role of individual differences and preferred type of place in shaping a biased representation of the past. Furthermore, our research findings point to the importance of raising awareness of the multicultural past among high NFC individuals.

     

Would you be happier if you moved more? Physical activity focusing illusion

Current Psychology - Research shows that individuals who are more physically active also report greater happiness. However, subjective well-being is prone to cognitive biases. For instance, people...     

Shades of Awareness on the Mechanisms Underlying the Quality of Conscious Representations: A Commentary to Fazekas and Overgaard ()

Fazekas and Overgaard ( 2018 ) present a novel, multidimensional model that explains different ways in which conscious representations can be degraded. Moreover, the authors discuss possible mechanisms that underlie different kinds of degradation, primarily those related to attentional processing. In this letter, we argue that the proposed mechanisms are not sufficient. We propose that (1) attentional mechanisms work differently at various processing stages; and (2) factors that are independent of attentional ones, such as expectation, previous experience, and context, should be accounted for if we are aiming to construct a comprehensive model of conscious visual perception.     

The Method of Socratic Proofs for Modal Propositional Logics: K5, S4.2, S4.3, S4F,S4R,S4M and G

The aim of this paper is to present the method of Socratic proofs for seven modal propositional logics: K5, S4.2, S4.3, S4M, S4F, S4R and G. This work is an extension of [10] where the method was presented for the most common modal propositional logics: K, D, T, KB, K4, S4 and S5. Presented by Jacek Malinowski     

Left–right ideological differences in system justification following exposure to complementary versus noncomplementary stereotype exemplars

The capacity for victim‐derogating stereotypes and attributions to justify social inequality and maintain the status quo is well known among social scientists and other observers. Research conducted from the perspective of system justification theory suggests that an alternative to derogation is to justify inequality through the use of complementary stereotypes that ascribe compensating benefits and burdens to disadvantaged and advantaged groups, respectively. In two experimental studies conducted in Poland we investigated the hypothesis that preferences for these two routes to system justification would depend upon one's political orientation. That is, we predicted that the system‐justifying potential of complementary versus noncomplementary stereotype exemplars would be moderated by individual differences in left–right ideology, such that left‐wingers would exhibit stronger support for the societal status quo following exposure to complementary (e.g., “poor but happy,” “rich but miserable”) representations, whereas right‐wingers would exhibit stronger support for the status quo following exposure to noncomplementary (e.g., “poor and dishonest,” “rich and honest”) representations. Results were supportive of these predictions. Implications for theory and practice concerning stereotyping, ideology, and system justification are discussed. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.