Letter legibility and visual word recognition

Word recognition performance varies systematically as a function of where the eyes fixate in the word. Performance is maximal with the eye slightly left of the center of the word and decreases drastically to both sides of thisoptimal viewing position. While manipulations of lexical factors have only marginal effects on this phenomenon, previous studies have pointed to a relation between the viewing position effect (VPE) and letter legibility: When letter legibility drops, the VPE becomes more exaggerated. To further investigate this phenomenon, we improved letter legibility by magnifying letter size in a way that was proportional to the distance from fixation (e.g., TABLE). Contrary to what would be expected if the VPE were due to limits of acuity, improving the legibility of letters has only a restricted influence on performance. In particular, for long words, a strong VPE remains even when letter legibility is equalized across eccentricities. The failure to neutralize the VPE is interpreted in terms of perceptual learning: Since normally, because of acuity limitations, the only information available in parafoveal vision concerns low-resolution features of letters; even when magnification provides better information, readers are unable to make use of it.     

The Yale-Brown Obsessive-Compulsive Scale: Confirmatory Factor Analytic Findings

The psychometric properties of the Yale-Brown Obsessive-Compulsive Scale (Y-BOCS) have recently been heavily examined. Specifically, a number of researchers have been interested in determining the factor structure of this scale to find whether it best forms a one, two, or three factor model. The present study continued this examination by considering different scaling models using confirmatory factor analysis with a sample of individuals diagnosed with Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD). One hundred and forty-six individuals diagnosed with OCD participated and were administered the Y-BOCS and scales measuring depression (Hamilton Depression Rating Scale) and anxiety (Hamilton Anxiety Rating Scale). It was found that the Y-BOCS forms two different two-factor models. One model consisted of an obsessions and compulsions factor; the other composed of disturbance and symptom severity factors. It was likewise found that depression and anxiety were related to both factors in one model (disturbance and symptom severity). The finding that depression was related to obsessions and anxiety to compulsions was found, as in a previous factor analysis of the Y-BOCS. These findings suggest that OCD may be best characterized as a multidimensional syndrome that may not be adequately examined by a single unitary factor as described in the Y-BOCS.     

Issues surrounding the cognitive neuroscience of obsessive-compulsive disorder

Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) has been studied extensively in recent years, with increased emphasis on understanding OCD’s biological substrates. There has been significant progress in documenting abnormal brain function in OCD patients, particularly in the orbitofrontal cortex, basal ganglia, and thalamus. Similar progress has broadened our understanding of the cognitive and behavioral manifestations of the disorder, including deficits in set shifting, hyperattention, and visuospatial construction abilities. Unfortunately, these results have not been replicated consistently. This report comprises a review of previous attempts to characterize the neurobiology and neuropsychology of OCD, and a discussion of several factors in OCD research that can help to explain previous inconsistencies.     

A simulation of memory for chess positions

This paper describes an information-processing model, MAPP, implemented as a computer program, that simulates the processes subjects use to remember and reproduce chess positions they have seen briefly. The model incorporates processes adapted from PERCEIVER, an information-processsing theory of eye movements in chess perception, and EPAM, a theory of rote verbal learning. The data from MAPP show good agreement with the performance of strong chess players in identical tasks.     

Willful ignorance and self-deception

Willful ignorance is an important concept in criminal law and jurisprudence, though it has not received much discussion in philosophy. When it is mentioned, however, it is regularly assumed to be a kind of self-deception. In this article I will argue that self-deception and willful ignorance are distinct psychological kinds. First, some examples of willful ignorance are presented and discussed, and an analysis of the phenomenon is developed. Then it is shown that current theories of self-deception give no support to the idea that willful ignorance is a kind of self-deception. Afterwards an independent argument is adduced for excluding willful ignorance from this category. The crucial differences between the two phenomena are explored, as are the reasons why they are so easily conflated.