Modulation of reflexive orienting to gaze direction by facial expressions

Facial expression and gaze perception are thought to share brain mechanisms but behavioural interactions, especially from gaze-cueing paradigms, are inconsistent. We conducted a series of gaze-cueing studies using dynamic facial cues to examine orienting across different emotional expression and task conditions, including face inversion. Across experiments, at a short stimulus–onset asynchrony (SOA) we observed both an expression effect (i.e., faster responses when the face was emotional versus neutral) and a cue validity effect (i.e., faster responses when the target was gazed-at), but no interaction between validity and emotion. Results from face inversion suggest that the emotion effect may have been due to both facial expression and stimulus motion. At longer SOAs, validity and emotion interacted such that cueing by emotional faces, fearful faces in particular, was enhanced relative to neutral faces. These results converge with a growing body of evidence that suggests that gaze and expression are initially processed independently and interact at later stages to direct attentional orienting.     

Some Reasons for Distinguishing Between “Non-normative Response” and “Irrational Decision”

Three concerns that limit the implications of normative decision research were described in this study. First, because there is no unequivocal way to determine whether any particular base rate is appropriate in a particular instance, the significance of the apparent base rate underutilization reported by a number of investigators is unclear. Second, because there are discrepancies between natural language and formal logic, word problems are an uncertain domain within which to gauge human inferential skills. Third, because different people will have different strategies and preferences, no single solution may be correct or optimal for all persons. In light of these limitations, a more functional approach to decision interpretation is discussed.     

Nonlinear Structured Growth Mixture Models in Mplus and OpenMx

Growth mixture models (GMMs; B. O. Muthén & Muthén, 2000; B. O. Muthén & Shedden, 1999) are a combination of latent curve models (LCMs) and finite mixture models to examine the existence of latent classes that follow distinct developmental patterns. GMMs are often fit with linear, latent basis, multiphase, or polynomial change models because of their common use, flexibility in modeling many types of change patterns, the availability of statistical programs to fit such models, and the ease of programming. In this article, we present additional ways of modeling nonlinear change patterns with GMMs. Specifically, we show how LCMs that follow specific nonlinear functions can be extended to examine the presence of multiple latent classes using the Mplus and OpenMx computer programs. These models are fit to longitudinal reading data from the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study–Kindergarten Cohort to illustrate their use.     

The combined effect of ratee's bodyweight and past performance information on performance judgments

Few studies have examined how various biases operate in combination to influence performance judgments. Along these lines, the current study used experimental methods to test four competing models of the combined influence of ratee's bodyweight and past performance information on performance judgments. Results were consistent with an additive model, such that ratee's bodyweight and information about ratee's past performance combined independently to affect performance judgments. Consistent with a double disadvantage effect, the least favorable performance judgments were made for an overweight ratee with poor previous performance. Finally, mixed evidence was obtained for the interaction of ratee's bodyweight and perceptions of ratee's physical attractiveness, such that high‐perceived attractiveness buffered against the otherwise negative performance ratings associated with overweight status.     

Two skeptical arguments or only one?

The first step in responding to the challenge of external world skepticism is to get clear on the structure of the skeptic’s argument. The most prominent varieties of skeptical arguments either rely on closure principles or underdetermination principles. The relationship between these two sorts of arguments is contentious. Some argue that these arguments can independently motivate skepticism. Others argue that they are really equivalent. I argue that although these two arguments are distinct, their independence is not as obvious as some have thought. The fact that these arguments are not equivalent is important because skeptical arguments that appeal to underdetermination principles cannot be refuted by simply denying closure. So, the strategy for responding to skepticism offered by Nozick/Dretske does not seem an adequate solution.     

Alienation and empathy as mediators of the relation between Social Dominance Orientation,Right-Wing Authoritarianism and expressions of racism and sexism

Prior research has established a link between Social Dominance Orientation (SDO), empathy, and generalized measures of prejudice. Whether empathy functions as a mediator for more specific forms of prejudice has not been studied. Furthermore, alienation and its role in predicting prejudice have been given little attention in the literature. Our results found that empathy functioned as a mediator for SDO, but only for sexism, not racism. Alienation was found to act as a mediator between SDO and both racism and sexism. The relation between Right-Wing Authoritarianism and racism and sexism was not mediated by alienation.     

Driving stimuli increases accessibility of aggression-related concepts in “angry” drivers

Stimuli present in aversive situations (even initially neutral stimuli) can become associated with aggressive feelings and thoughts become capable of acting as cues for aggressive thoughts. The present research examined whether driving stimuli can serve as triggers for aggression-related concepts for individuals predisposed to becoming angry while driving (i.e., high in self-reported trait driving anger). Using the General Aggression Model (Anderson & Bushman, 2002) as a guide, two studies demonstrated that participants high in trait driving anger responded more quickly to aggressive words when paired with driving than neutral stimuli. There were no differences in primes for nonaggressive words and nonwords. Study 2 also found that, for participants high in driving anger, increased accessibility of aggressive words following driving primes predicted self-reported anger in a provoking driving scenario.