Surprises: low probabilities or high contrasts?

Outcome expectations can be expressed prospectively in terms of probability estimates, and retrospectively in terms of surprise. Surprise ratings and probability estimates differ, however, in some important ways. Surprises are generally created by low-probability outcomes, yet, as shown by several experiments, not all low-probability outcomes are equally surprising. To account for surprise, we propose a contrast hypothesis according to which the level of surprise associated with an outcome is mainly determined by the extent to which it contrasts with the default, expected alternative. Three ways by which contrasts can be established are explored: contrasts due to relative probabilities, where the obtained outcome is less likely than a default alternative; contrasts formed by novelty and change, where a contrast exists between the obtained outcome and the individual's previous experience; and contrasts due to the perceptual or conceptual distance between the expected and the obtained. In all these cases, greater contrast was accompanied by higher ratings of surprise.     

Facilitating a benign interpretation bias in a high socially anxious population

Previous research has shown that high socially anxious individuals lack the benign interpretation bias present in people without social anxiety. The tendency of high socially anxious people to generate more negative interpretations may lead to anticipated anxiety about future social situations. If so, developing a more benign interpretation bias could lead to a reduction in this anxiety. The current study showed that a benign interpretation bias could be facilitated (or 'trained') in a high socially anxious population. Participants in the benign training groups had repeated practice in accessing benign (positive or non-negative) interpretations of potentially threatening social scenarios. Participants in the control condition were presented with the same social scenarios but without their outcomes being specified. In a later recognition task, participants who received benign interpretation training generated more benign, and less negative, interpretations of new ambiguous social situations compared to the control group. Participants who received benign training also predicted that they would be significantly less anxious in a future social situation than those in the control group. Possible implications of the findings for therapeutic interventions in social phobia are discussed.     

Framing, intentions, and trust–choice incompatibility

The present paper examines how framing of messages and the intentions inferred from different—positive vs. negative—framings, interact with the development of trust. Empirical evidence is presented showing that different, logically equivalent, frames are supposedly interpreted as implying different intentions. Next, the relationship between different frames (and the corresponding intentions reflected from these frames) and trust are explored. Finally, and most important, the relationship between the assessment of trust, inferred from different frames, and the corresponding choice behavior resulting from these frames, are investigated. Specifically, consider agents A and B offering to sell exactly the same commodity, except that one agent formulates it in a positive and the other in a negative frame. The different frames may lead to different assessments of the trustworthiness of the two agents. Following common wisdom, if agent A is trusted more than B, then one should prefer to conduct transactions with the former rather than with the latter agent. Several experiments are presented that are incompatible with this conjecture. For example, when faced with a choice between two butchers, whose ground beef is advertised as containing 25% fat (negative frame) or 75% lean (positive frame), respectively, most people have more trust in the former yet most indicate they would buy their meat from the latter butcher. This phenomenon, in which negative framing weighs more in trust assessments, and positive framing weighs more in choice, is labeled trust–choice incompatibility. The robustness of the phenomenon is further demonstrated in several experiments, and possible explanations for its occurrence are discussed.     

Order effects in sequentially judged options due to the direction of comparison

Many real-world judgment tasks present options in sequence. Typically, these judgments are made step-by-step, immediately after considering each option, or end-of-sequence, after all have been seen. We report similar order effects in both procedures, due to direction of comparison. It appears that judges form an impression of each new option by comparing it to those that preceded it. Using that option’s features as a “checklist,” more weight is given to unique ones than to ones shared with previous options. This unidirectional comparison process produces increasing ratings in options with unique positive features, and decreasing ratings when options have unique negative features. By manipulating the barriers to making multiple comparisons, we show that the direction-of-comparison effect is not limited to judgment tasks with sequential presentation. Even simultaneously presented options may show order effects, if they are judged one at a time—in sequence. Possible explanations and implications are discussed.     

On the positive and negative effects of self-efficacy on performance: Reward as a moderator

We address the controversy regarding the sign of the effect of self-efficacy on performance. We propose that when reward is high, self-efficacy has a positive effect on performance, whereas when reward is low, it has a negative effect. This hypothesis was tested in three experiments (with sample sizes of 76, 99, and 111) in which reward and self-efficacy were manipulated and performance was measured using different manipulations and tasks in both within-factor and between-factor designs. The results supported the hypothesis that reward moderates the effect of self-efficacy on performance. When reward was high, the effect of self-efficacy on performance was positive, whereas when reward was low, the effect of self-efficacy on performance was negative.     

Quantity recognition among speakers of an anumeric language

Recent research has suggested that the Pirahã, an Amazonian tribe with a number‐less language, are able to match quantities > 3 if the matching task does not require recall or spatial transposition. This finding contravenes previous work among the Pirahã. In this study, we re‐tested the Pirahãs’ performance in the crucial one‐to‐one matching task utilized in the two previous studies on their numerical cognition, as well as in control tasks requiring recall and mental transposition. We also conducted a novel quantity recognition task. Speakers were unable to consistently match quantities > 3, even when no recall or transposition was involved. We provide a plausible motivation for the disparate results previously obtained among the Pirahã. Our findings are consistent with the suggestion that the exact recognition of quantities > 3 requires number terminology.     

Resistance to extinction of human evaluative conditioning using a between‐subjects design

Surprise has been described in various contexts as a neutral, a positive, or a negative emotion. Six experiments are reported in which surprise ratings of unexpected positive and negative outcomes, with identical prior probabilities, were compared. For unexpected occurrences of events that are beyond the control of the protagonist, successes were consistently perceived as more surprising than failures. For unexpected action controlled outcomes for which the protagonist was partly responsible, failures were rated as more surprising than successes. The findings are interpreted as being due to an implicit contrast between out-of-control situations and success, in the first case, and between goal-directed efforts and failure, in the second.     

Two-Component Solutions of Repertory Grid Data: A Comparison of Three Methods

Abstract

Of the various ways in which repertory grid data can be summarized, the two-component plot has been the most popular method. These plots are derived in three main ways: (1) Slater's (1977) INGR1D program, (2) subprogram FACTOR in the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) (Nie, Hull, Jenkins, Steinbrenner, & Brent, 1975), and (3) Higgenbotham and Bannister's (1983) CAB program, little attempt has been made to compare the solutions produced by these programs despite widespread use. A small number of single case studies suggest that the solutions are comparable. This paper reports a study that compares the solutions derived from INGRID, SPSS, and CAB for a series of cases. The results show that correspondence was good for the first components, but for the second components the results were less satisfactory