A Choice of Alternative Strategies in Oligopoly Bargaining

Research in bilateral bargaining has shown reciprocal and tough strategies to be superior to soft strategies in producing favorable bargaining outcomes. However, previous research has not examined the effectiveness of opponent strategies in oligopoly bargaining. It was hypothesized that in oligopoly bargaining a soft reciprocal strategy would produce better outcomes than either tough reciprocal or tough strategies. Female students from introductory psychology classes bargained utilizing three programmed strategies. Subjects were afforded the opportunity to bargain with the strategy of their choice and to change opponents (strategies) as they wished. Results indicated that subjects (1) bargained more often with the soft reciprocity strategy than with either the tough reciprocity or tough strategy, (2) made more concessions to the soft reciprocity strategy, (3) reached more agreements with the soft reciprocity strategy. Furthermore, although the soft reciprocity strategy earned the lowest profit per agreement, it also earned the largest total profit by virtue of the greater number of agreements.     

Hue naming: A test of the validity of Werner and Wooten’s average observer

Fifteen subjects scaled monochromatic lights ranging from 460 to 640 nm by assigning percentages to the names blue, green, yellow, and red, representing the proportion of these hues perceived in the lights. The resulting hue-naming functions were compared to those predicted from the opponent-chromatic response functions of Werner and Wooten’s (1979b) proposed average observer. The agreement between the two sets of functions was reasonably good, which strengthens the validity of their average observer.