Evidence for an addition to the reading scan hypothesis

Letters were tachistoscopically presented in pairs to the left or right of fixation for 40 msec. The pair consisted of a target letter (B, D, P, or T) and a noise letter (all other letters of the alphabet except I), with the noise letter appearing either to the inside or the outside of the stimulus letter. S’s task was to report verbally the target letter as fast as possible. Reaction times and number of errors indicated that there was more interference when the noise letter occurred further from the fixation point than the target letter for both the left and right visual field. Since a reading scan cannot account for the results in the right visual field, an outside-toward-fixation scan is proposed. An analysis of the different kinds of errors indicated that the outside to fixation scan is more primitive than the reading scan in that it produces less detailed information about the letters than does the reading scan.     

Successive vs simultaneous processing of superimposed visual stimuli

A visual analogue of Savin’s (1967) auditory task was used to examine preferred order of recall and order of recall accuracy for two pairs of visually superimposed digits. Savin (1967) and Rollins, Everson, and Schurman (1972) found that Ss preferred to recall simultaneous auditory information in successive order, even though the information was presented over a single channel. In the present experiments, Ss were found to prefer strongly to recall visual information in simultaneous order. On the other hand, the results of Rollins et al (1972), that Ss are equally accurate when forced to recall simultaneous auditory information in either the preferred or nonpreferred mode, were replicated for this visual task. The results of these experiments, together with the experiment reported by Rollins et al (1972), indicate that verbal information is processed differently by these two sensory systems.     

Are moods cognitive?: A critique of Schmitt on Heidegger

Conclusion If, as Schmitt suggests, Heidegger bases the claim that moods are cognitive on the philosophical distinction between theoretical and non-theoretical knowing, then much of what Heidegger says in this connection turns out to be either unclear, trivially true, or else false. Yet Schmitt himself only occasionally seems to recognize how dubious this account really is. Moreover, in attempting to help Heidegger say what he means, Schmitt's interpretation in Chapter 5 falters. It falters because(1) the emphatic likening of moods to skills,(2) the introduction of the bizzare notion knowing how occurrently, and (3) the misconceiving of self-deception, are not to be found in Sein und Zeit. They represent, rather, an imposition upon Sein und Zeit from without. This fact means either that Schmitt's interpretation is faulty or else that it is as much reconstructive as explicative. And if reconstructive, then several conceptual mistakes are attributable to him more than to Heidegger. In spite of these difficulties Martin Heidegger on Being Human is a prize book. It attempts to understand a thinker better than he understood himself. And according to Schleiermacher this is the goal of every hermeneutic.In contrast to the successful parts of the book, the chapter on moods fails to make sense out of Heidegger's view - one reason being, I would guess, that Heidegger is, after all, equivocating on the German word Stimmung. Sometimes he uses it to refer specifically to states such as being depressed, being serene, being anxious. At other times he uses it to refer vaguely to Dasein's attunement to the world. If the human being is always already (immer schon) attuned to the world, and if such a posture toward the world is also considered a mood, then in some imprecise way one's being in a mood might be a necessary condition for any belief to affect him emotionally. But, of course, mood in this broad sense would indicate an ontologically, and not a causally, necessary condition. And so, it would not follow that every belief which affected one emotionally need have some specific mood (e.g., depression, serenity, anxiety) as its necessary causal antecedent. Nor would it follow that, as a matter of fact, a change of belief could not effect a specific change of mood.I fear that with regard to some topics the sense in which one understands Heidegger better than he understood himself may well be the original Socratic sense: one knows what Heidegger himself does not know, viz., that the conceptions of Sein und Zeit are not always intelligible. And one wonders whether any philosophical midwifery can really be of aid - at least with respect to the claim that moods are cognitive.     

Schedule control of the vocal behavior of Cebus monkeys

The vocal behavior of three Cebus monkeys was maintained by fixed-ratio schedules of response dependent reinforcement at values between fixed-ratio 1 and fixed-ratio 15. In one monkey that was exposed to variable-interval, fixed-interval, and conjunctive fixed-ratio fixed-interval schedules of reinforcement, vocal responding occurred at a low rate, but schedule-appropriate patterns were maintained. The rates and patterns of responding engendered indicated that the vocal operant can be brought under schedule control in the monkey by the use of response-dependent reinforcement.     

Positive interaction (induction) in multiple variable-interval, differential-reinforcement-of-high-rate schedules

The effect of increases in the rate of responding in one component of a multiple schedule upon the rate of responding in a second component was investigated. Pigeons were exposed to a multiple schedule where both components were initially variable-interval schedules having the same parameter value. After rate of key pecking stabilized, one component was changed to a schedule that differentially reinforced high rates of responding. Rate of reinforcement in this varied component was adjusted to remain equal to rate of reinforcement in the constant (variable-interval) component. Four of five pigeons showed a maintained increase in rate of responding during both the constant and varied components, even though rates of reinforcement did not change.     

Fixed-interval limited-hold avoidance with and without signalled reinforcement

Rats trained to lever press on a fixed-interval limited-hold avoidance schedule maintained a pattern of responding similar to that maintained by fixed-interval limited-hold schedules of positive reinforcement. But this positively accelerated pattern of behavior was maintained only when the occurrence of reinforcement was signalled by the presentation of a brief flash of light. This result suggests that the discriminative function of the reinforcer in avoidance is less pronounced than the discriminative function of the reinforcer in escape or positive reinforcement. It also suggests that the distinction between positive reinforcement and avoidance is not superfluous. Although the schedule of reinforcement is an important variable in determining the pattern of behavior, other variables, such as the nature (i.e., stimulus presentation, termination, or omission) of the reinforcer, are also potent determinants of behavior.