Depictions of motion devised by a blind person

A blind man (E.A.) was asked to draw pictures suggesting wheels in various kinds of motion. Six pictures were drawn by E.A. The pictures were shown to sighted subjects, who were asked to assign labels to the pictures, in a multiple-choice format. The labels were assigned at a rate above chance. We argue that the pictures are metaphoric and that pictorial metaphor relies on common properties of the static picture and the kinetic referent.     

Cavanagh and Leclerc shape-from-shadow pictures: do line versions fail because of the polarity of the regions or the contour?

Shape-from-shadow perception fails when the contour bordering a shadowed area is reduced to a black line, and the shadow area becomes white. It might be that the polarity of the shadowed and illuminated areas has to be from dark on the shadowed side to light on the illuminated side for successful perception. Or it may be that the line, which has two contours, has one too many for shape-from-shadow processing. Alternatively, the problem might be that one of the contours of the line is incorrectly polarised. To test these explanations, three shape-from-shadow figures were prepared, each depicting the same referent--an elderly person. All three figures had two correctly polarised areas. One figure had a correctly polarised contour at the border between the areas. One had two correctly polarised contours. The other had one correctly polarised contour and one incorrectly polarised contour. The referent of the figure with one incorrectly polarised contour was the one difficult to make out. The result has implications for several theories, including an account of a demonstration by Hering involving penumbra.     

Synchronous change and perception of object unity: evidence from adults and infants.

Adults and infants display a robust ability to perceive the unity of a center-occluded object when the visible ends of the object undergo common motion (e.g. Kellman, P.J., Spelke, E.S., 1983. Perception of partly occluded objects in infancy. Cognitive Psychology 15, 483-524). Ecologically oriented accounts of this ability focus on the primary of motion in the perception of segregated objects, but Gestalt theory suggests a broader possibility: observers may perceive object unity by detecting patterns of synchronous change, of which common motion is a special case. We investigated this possibility with observations of adults and 4-month-old infants. Participants viewed a center-occluded object whose visible surfaces were either misaligned or aligned, stationary or moving, and unchanging or synchronously changing in color or brightness in various temporal patterns (e.g. flashing). Both alignment and common motion contributed to adults' perception of object unity, but synchronous color changes did not. For infants, motion was an important determinant of object unity, but other synchronous changes and edge alignment were not. When a stationary object with aligned edges underwent synchronous changes in color or brightness, infants showed high levels of attention to the object, but their perception of its unity appeared to be indeterminate. An inherent preference for fast over slow flash rates, and a novelty preference elicited by a change in rate, both indicated that infants detected the synchronous changes, although they failed to use them as information for object unity. These findings favor ecologically oriented accounts of object perception in which surface motion plays a privileged role.     

Defending the Possibility of Knowledge

In this paper, I propose a solution to Fitch’s paradox that draws on ideas from Edgington (Mind 94:557–568, 1985), Rabinowicz and Segerberg (1994) and Kvanvig (Noûs 29:481–500, 1995). After examining the solution strategies of these authors, I will defend the view, initially proposed by Kvanvig, according to which the derivation of the paradox violates a crucial constraint on quantifier instantiation. The constraint states that non-rigid expressions cannot be substituted into modal positions. We will introduce a slightly modified syntax and semantics that will help underline this point. Furthermore, we will prove results about the consistency of verificationism and the principle of non-omniscience by model-theoretical means. Namely, we prove there exists a model of these principles, and delineate certain constraints they pose on a structure in which they are true.     

Spatiotemporal competition and task-relevance shape the spatial distribution of emotional interference during rapid visual processing: Evidence from gaze-contingent eye-tracking

People’s ability to perceive rapidly presented targets can be disrupted both by voluntary encoding of a preceding target and by spontaneous attention to salient distractors. Distinctions between these sources of interference can be found when people search for a target in multiple rapid streams instead of a single stream: voluntary encoding of a preceding target often elicits subsequent perceptual lapses across the visual field, whereas spontaneous attention to emotionally salient distractors appears to elicit a spatially localized lapse, giving rise to a theoretical account suggesting that emotional distractors and subsequent targets compete spatiotemporally during rapid serial visual processing. We used gaze-contingent eye-tracking to probe the roles of spatiotemporal competition and memory encoding on the spatial distribution of interference caused by emotional distractors, while also ruling out the role of eye-gaze in driving differences in spatial distribution. Spontaneous target perception impairments caused by emotional distractors were localized to the distractor location regardless of where participants fixated. But when emotional distractors were task-relevant, perceptual lapses occurred across both streams while remaining strongest at the distractor location. These results suggest that spatiotemporal competition and memory encoding reflect a dual-route impact of emotional stimuli on target perception during rapid visual processing.