Priming of pop-out: II. The role of position

In an earlier paper (Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1994) we showed that repetition of an attention-driving feature primes the deployment of attention to the same feature on subsequent trials. Here we show that repetition of the targetposition also primes subsequent trials. Position priming shows a characteristic spatial pattern. Facilitation occurs when the target position is repeated on subsequent trials, and inhibition occurs when the target falls on a position previously occupied by a distractor. Facilitation and inhibition also exist, though somewhat diminished, for positions adjacent to those of the target and distractors. Assessing the effect of a single trial over time, we show that the characteristic memory trace exerts its strongest influence on immediately following trials and decays gradually over the succeeding, approximately five to eight, trials. Throughout this period, target-position facilitation is always stronger than distractor-position inhibition. The characteristics of position priming are also seen under conditions in which the attention-driving feature either stays the same or differs from the previous trial, suggesting that feature and position priming operate independently. In a separate experiment, using the fact that position priming is cumulative over trials, we show that position priming is largely object- or landmark-centered.     

Physical Attractiveness and Altruism in Two Modified Dictator Games

Several studies find that male individuals are more altruistic toward attractive women, suggesting altruism may serve as a courtship display. Many studies exploring this phenomenon have used vignettes and facial images. We tested the sexual selection hypothesis as an explanation for altruistic behavior, where players played the dictator game with “live” participants. Two studies were conducted (Study 1, n = 212; Study 2, n = 188) where we manipulated stakes and anonymity between participants to explore the relationship between the dictator’s allocations and their perceived attractiveness of the recipient. We found no relationship between attractiveness and altruism. Dictators were consistently fair when allocating stakes, irrespective of the recipients’ attractiveness.     

Judgment of blame in teenagers with Asperger's syndrome

The judgment of blame was studied in a group of 28 teenagers, 14 with Asperger syndrome (AS) and 14 typically developed. Teenagers in each group were matched by age, cognitive development and academic level. They were presented with 12 short vignettes in which they had to judge an action according to the intent of the actor (deliberate and accidental), the consequences of the action (presence and absence) and the seriousness of the situation (low, medium and high). Results showed a significant difference in the patterns of judgment of both groups. The AS group judged the action according to the physical consequence of the action more than the intent of the actor; the opposite was observed with the control group. In addition, the AS teenagers were less capable than the control group of grading injury to a person when apportioning blame especially when they were not familiar with the social situations. This result suggests that the judgement of the seriousness of the outcome of the social interaction is linked with its level of familiarity. Furthermore, result are congruent with the assumption that two different cognitive structures, deontic reasoning and perspective taking, are involved in the judgment of blame.     

Regional brain activity during face and word discrimination: simultaneous recording of event-related potentials and positron emission tomography

In order to clarify the brain mechanisms involved in the recognition of faces, words, and figures, spatiotemporal analyses were carried out with event-related potentials (ERPs) and positron emission tomography (PET) in normal subjects. In the first experiment, we analyzed the ERPs of eight normal subjects under a passive habituation paradigm using pictures of faces and letters. In the second experiment, regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF) measured using PET was obtained simultaneously with the ERP recordings during a continuous performance task (CPT) in 12 normal subjects. This required the active discrimination of famous people's faces, meaningful words consisting of two Japanese hiragana characters, and simple geometric figures. There were similar deflections in the global field power (GFP) in the first 200 ms of the passive and active tasks, regardless of type of stimuli. This suggests a common time course in the visual information processing mechanisms during the preattentive stage. Mesiotemporal activity, dominant on the right, was seen during the face discrimination task in both the PET results and the ERP topographies. In the word task, activity that was clearly dominant on the left was observed at around a 160 ms latency in the posteriotemporal region of the ERP topography and this again coincided well with the PET data. The spatiotemporal resolution of the analyses was improved by combining PET and topographic ERP studies, and this provided additional neurophysiological information concerning cognitive processing.     

Probabilistic Measures of Coherence and the Problem of Belief Individuation

Coherentism in epistemology has long suffered from lack of formal and quantitative explication of the notion of coherence. One might hope that probabilistic accounts of coherence such as those proposed by Lewis, Shogenji, Olsson, Fitelson, and Bovens and Hartmann will finally help solve this problem. This paper shows, however, that those accounts have a serious common problem: the problem of belief individuation. The coherence degree that each of the accounts assigns to an information set (or the verdict it gives as to whether the set is coherent tout court) depends on how beliefs (or propositions) that represent the set are individuated. Indeed, logically equivalent belief sets that represent the same information set can be given drastically different degrees of coherence. This feature clashes with our natural and reasonable expectation that the coherence degree of a belief set does not change unless the believer adds essentially new information to the set or drops old information from it; or, to put it simply, that the believer cannot raise or lower the degree of coherence by purely logical reasoning. None of the accounts in question can adequately deal with coherence once logical inferences get into the picture. Toward the end of the paper, another notion of coherence that takes into account not only the contents but also the origins (or sources) of the relevant beliefs is considered. It is argued that this notion of coherence is of dubious significance, and that it does not help solve the problem of belief individuation.     

Baumann on the Monty Hall problem and single-case probabilities

Peter Baumann uses the Monty Hall game to demonstrate that probabilities cannot be meaningfully applied to individual games. Baumann draws from this first conclusion a second: in a single game, it is not necessarily rational to switch from the door that I have initially chosen to the door that Monty Hall did not open. After challenging Baumann’s particular arguments for these conclusions, I argue that there is a deeper problem with his position: it rests on the false assumption that what justifies the switching strategy is its leading me to win a greater percentage of the time. In fact, what justifies the switching strategy is not any statistical result over the long run but rather the “causal structure” intrinsic to each individual game itself. Finally, I argue that an argument by Hilary Putnam will not help to save Baumann’s second conclusion above. See Moser and Mulder (1994, pp. 115–116, 118).     

Investigating the Awareness of Remembering

ABSTRACT— There is a marked lack of consensus concerning the best way to learn how conscious experiences arise. In this article, we advocate for scientific approaches that attempt to bring together four types of phenomena and their corresponding theoretical accounts: behavioral acts, cognitive events, neural events, and subjective experience. We propose that the key challenge is to comprehensively specify the relationships among these four facets of the problem of understanding consciousness without excluding any facet. Although other perspectives on consciousness can also be informative, combining these four perspectives could lead to significant progress in explaining a conscious experience such as remembering. We summarize some relevant findings from cognitive neuroscience investigations of the conscious experience of memory retrieval and of memory behaviors that transpire in the absence of the awareness of remembering. These examples illustrate suitable scientific strategies for making progress in understanding consciousness by developing and testing theories that connect the behavioral expression of recall and recognition, the requisite cognitive transactions, the neural events that make remembering possible, and the awareness of remembering.     

Modeling the Bullying Prevention Program Preferences of Educators: A Discrete Choice Conjoint Experiment

We used discrete choice conjoint analysis to model the bullying prevention program preferences of educators. Using themes from computerized decision support lab focus groups (n = 45 educators), we composed 20 three-level bullying prevention program design attributes. Each of 1,176 educators completed 25 choice tasks presenting experimentally varied combinations of the study’s attribute levels. Latent class analysis yielded three segments with different preferences. Decision Sensitive educators (31%) preferred that individual schools select bullying prevention programs. In contrast, Support Sensitive educators (51%) preferred that local school boards chose bullying prevention programs. This segment preferred more logistical and social support at every stage of the adoption, training, implementation, and long term maintenance processes. Cost Sensitive educators (16%) showed a stronger preference for programs minimizing costs, training, and implementation time demands. They felt prevention programs were less effective and that the time and space in the curriculum for bullying prevention was less adequate. They were less likely to believe that bullying prevention was their responsibility and more likely to agree that prevention was the responsibility of parents. All segments preferred programs supported by the anecdotal reports of colleagues from other schools rather than those based on scientific evidence. To ensure that the bullying prevention options available reflect the complex combination of attributes influencing real world adoption decisions, program developers need to accommodate the differing views of the Decision, Support, and Cost Sensitive segments while maximizing the support of parents and students.