Rotting with their rights on: why the criteria for ending commitment or restraint of liberty need not be the same as the criteria for initiating commitment or restraint of liberty, and how the restraint may sometimes justifiably continue after its prerequisites are no longer satisfied

That coerced treatment must end when the criteria for initiating coerced treatment cease to apply appears to be universally accepted by courts and commentators.2 Moreover, the consensus appears to be justified by a steel-trap argument. If coercion is justified only when the patient is mentally ill and incapable, because then the patient lacks autonomous capacities, or lacks practical reasoning abilities that undercut autonomous capacities, then these justifications have no force when the patient either is not mentally ill or is capable. A parallel claim holds for civil commitment. This received wisdom, or in = out thesis, rests upon a conceptual confusion: a failure to distinguish the criteria for initiation of intervention, those for cessation of intervention, and the purpose of the commitment or coerced treatment. If the criteria for commitment were mental illness and dangerousness, and the criteria for release were the same, then the purpose of commitment would be to restore persons to the point where they are either just barely not mentally ill, or just barely not dangerous. That is a silly and self-defeating purpose for that large class of patients who, because of lack of insight, or otherwise, do not become treatment compliant until they are substantially healthier than being barely not mentally ill or barely not dangerous. It sets them up to become revolving-door patients. The purpose of commitment is rather to maximize the patient's mental health, and minimize her dangerousness without unduly burdening her liberty. If society is going to violate a patient's liberty, it should do so in a way that will resolve the problem that justified the restriction on liberty in the first place, so long as the restriction of liberty is not too great in relation to the expected gains from the intervention. The criteria for releasing a patient from commitment are in this way responsive to the purpose of the commitment. For some revolving-door patients, this entails that the criteria for their release from commitment should be stricter than the criteria for initiating commitment in the first place. The criteria for release from commitment for revolving-door patients should be that the criteria for initiation for commitment is not met plus it being more likely than not that the patient will be treatment compliant after release, assuming the additional restriction on liberty is less than the gains from the additional restraint, and the restriction is not unduly burdensome. Spelling this out, the criteria for release should be either not mentally ill, or else not dangerous, or capable, and more likely than not to be treatment compliant after release. For those patients for whom such a test is overly optimistic, we might substitute that there is a reasonable probability of treatment compliance after release, or that the probability of treatment compliance has been enhanced. These criteria are to be thought of as rough and ready rules of thumb, and not as analytically precise tests.     

Cross-sectional and longitudinal relations among peer-reported trustworthiness, social relationships, and psychological adjustment in children and early adolescents from the United Kingdom and Canada

Trustworthiness was examined in children and early adolescents from two countries. In Study 1,505 children in the fifth and sixth school years in the United Kingdom (mean age = 9 years 7 months) were tested across an 8-month period. In Study 2,350 sixth- through eighth-grade Canadian children and early adolescents (mean age = 12 years 11 months) were tested across a 1-year period. Participants completed measures assessing trustworthiness (ratings of promise and secret keeping by peer group and also by best friend in Study 1), assertiveness (Study 1), prosocial behavior (Study 2), social relationships (friendships and peer preference), and psychological adjustment (self-esteem, depressive symptoms, and loneliness). Peer-reported trustworthiness was positively associated with, and predicted changes across time in, the number of friendships. The observed relations were found to be statistically independent of peer preference and peer-reported assertiveness or prosocial behavior. Trustworthiness was found to be positively associated with peer preference (Study 1 and Study 2) and psychological adjustment (Study 1).     

Efficient visual search without top-down or bottom-up guidance

Two types of mechanisms have dominated theoretical accounts of efficient visual search. The first are bottom-up processes related to the characteristics of retinotopic feature maps. The second are top-down mechanisms related to feature selection. To expose the potential involvement of other mechanisms, we introduce a new search paradigm whereby a target is defined only in a context-dependent manner by multiple conjunctions of feature dimensions. Because targets in a multiconjunction task cannot be distinguished from distractors either by bottom-up guidance or top-down guidance, current theories of visual search predict inefficient search. While inefficient search does occur for the multiple conjunctions of orientation with color or luminance, we find efficient search for multiple conjunctions of luminance/size, luminance/shape, and luminance/topology. We also show that repeated presentations of either targets or a set of distractors result in much faster performance and that bottom-up feature extraction and top-down selection cannot account for efficient search on their own. In light of this, we discuss the possible role of perceptual organization in visual search. Furthermore, multiconjunction search could provide a new method for investigating perceptual grouping in visual search.     

Is there a geometric module for spatial orientation? squaring theory and evidence

There is evidence, beginning with Cheng (1986), that mobile animals may use the geometry of surrounding areas to reorient following disorientation. Gallistel (1990) proposed that geometry is used to compute the major or minor axes of space and suggested that such information might form an encapsulated cognitive module. Research reviewed here, conducted on a wide variety of species since the initial discovery of the use of geometry and the formulation of the modularity claim, has supported some aspects of the approach, while casting doubt on others. Three possible processing models are presented that vary in the way in which (and the extent to which) they instantiate the modularity claim. The extant data do not permit us to discriminate among them. We propose a modified concept of modularity for which an empirical program of research is more tractable.     

Analyzing the factors underlying the structure and computation of the meaning of chipmunk,cherry, chisel,cheese, and cello (and many other such concrete nouns)

Seven trends regarding the categories that tend to be impaired/preserved in category-specific semantic deficits were identified. The authors hypothesized that these trends arise despite the multiple sources of variation in patient testing because numerous factors that structure semantic memory probabilistically converge to make some categories of knowledge more susceptible to damage than others. Analysis of semantic feature norms and corpus data for 541 concepts revealed that differences in the distribution of knowledge types across categories are sufficient to explain 6 of the trends and are necessary to explain loss of knowledge about nonliving things. Feature informativeness, concept confusability, visual complexity, familiarity, and name frequency contributed to this patterning and provide insight into why knowledge about living things is most often impaired.     

Normativity and Interpersonal Reasons

What is one who takes normativity seriously to do if normativity can neither be discovered lurking out there in the world independently of us nor can it be sufficiently grasped from a merely explanatory perspective? One option is to accept that the normative challenge cannot be met and to retreat to some form of moral skepticism. Another possibility has recently been proposed by Christine Korsgaard in The Sources of Normativity where she aims to develop an account of normativity which is grounded in autonomy. Furthermore, she argues that on her account reasons are "essentially public" and that this captures how it is that we can obligate one another. In this paper I argue that there is a serious tension between her account of normativity and the publicity of reasons-namely, that if reasons are essentially public, then it is not possible for individuals to legislate laws for themselves. However, I then argue that if we revise her conception of normativity such that it is understood to involve collective rather than individual legislation that it may then be possible to account for interpersonal reasons.     

Psychosocial functioning in families of Australian adolescent schoolchildren involved in bully/victim problems

The paper examines the relationship between family functioning and the involvement of adolescent schoolchildren in bully/victim problems at school. Australian high school students between the ages of 13 and 16 years completed a Family Functioning in Adolescence Questionnaire (FFAQ) as a measure of the psychosocial well-being of their families. Students were also categorized on the basis of self-reports as bullies (9%), victims (11%), bully/victims (2%) and others (78%). The families of adolescent bullies were found to be functioning less well than others on the FFAQ, as also were the families of female but not male victims. Results for sub-groups of schoolchildren are examined with respect to specific dimensions of family functioning, and the implications of differences for family therapy are discussed.