Emotions,Attitudes, and Reasons

Our emotional faculties respond to successes, gains, advantages, threats, losses, obstacles, and other personally significant objects or situations, producing positive or negative evaluations of them according to their perceived import. Being an evaluative response is a feature that emotions share with paradigm attitudes (beliefs, intentions, judgments, etc.). However, recently philosophers have been reluctant to treat emotions as attitudes. The usual reasons given have to do with the automaticity of emotions and their occasional recalcitrance. In this article, I argue that these things shouldn't disqualify emotions from counting as genuine attitudes. Our emotions do bear the kind of relationship with our reasons that is characteristic of our attitudes.     

Subject–Aux Inversion in Children with SLI

Journal of Psycholinguistic Research - An elicited production study investigated subject–aux inversion in 5-year-old children with specific language impairment (SLI) and 2 control groups,...     

Distinct Activity Patterns of the Human Bed Nucleus of the Stria Terminalis and Amygdala during Fear Learning

Neuropsychology Review - The amygdala and, more recently, also the bed nucleus of the stria terminalis, have been widely implicated in fear and anxiety. Much of our current knowledge is derived...     

Self‐Priming in Production: Evidence for a Hybrid Model of Syntactic Priming

Syntactic priming in language production is the increased likelihood of using a recently encountered syntactic structure. In this paper, we examine two theories of why speakers can be primed: error‐driven learning accounts (Bock, Dell, Chang, & Onishi, 2007; Chang, Dell, & Bock, 2006) and activation‐based accounts (Pickering & Branigan, 1999; Reitter, Keller, & Moore, 2011). Both theories predict that speakers should be primed by the syntactic choices of others, but only activation‐based accounts predict that speakers should be able to prime themselves. Here we test whether speakers can be primed by their own productions in three behavioral experiments and find evidence of structural persistence following both comprehension and speakers’ own productions. We also find that comprehension‐based priming effects are larger for rarer syntactic structures than for more common ones, which is most consistent with error‐driven accounts. Because neither error‐driven accounts nor activation‐based accounts fully explain the data, we propose a hybrid model.     

Gods and REMS: The implications of recent dream research for the psychology of religion

Throughout history dreams have been primarily the province of religion. People in many cultures have looked to dreams as sources of spiritual insight and divine revelation. The relationship between traditional religious views of dreams and modern psychological views of dreams has long interested psychologists of religion—for dreams are a uniquely fertile subject for comparing religious and psychological understandings of human experience. In recent years there have been many revolutionary discoveries in dream research, discoveries that have taken us far beyond the seminal works of Freud, Jung, and the early sleep laboratory researchers. This essay describes the work of three leading contemporary dream researchers (neurophysiologist J. Allan Hobson, psychologist Stephen LaBerge, and anthropologist Barbara Tedlock) and evaluates the implications of their findings for our understanding of the religious dimensions of dreams. The essay concludes with some reflections on the valuable role of dream study in the psychology of religion. The primary claim is that recent dream research can make important contributions to current psychology of religion discussions about such issues as interdisciplinary inquiry, hermeneutics, the cross-cultural study of religious experience, the cultural and religious context of modern psychology, and the practical concerns of pastoral counselors.This essay is based on a paper presented on November 25 at the 1991 Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Religion, Kansas City, Missouri.     

Social Anxiety Disorder and Perceived Criticism in Intimate Relationships: Comparisons With Normal and Clinical Control Groups

Individuals with social anxiety disorder (SAD) have difficulties in their romantic relationships, including decreased satisfaction and intimacy, but the reasons for these difficulties are poorly understood. Because fear of negative evaluation is a cardinal feature of SAD, perceived criticism from a romantic partner may play a central role in socially anxious individuals’ relationships. In the present study, we compared levels of perceived, expressed, and observed criticism and reactions to criticism among individuals with SAD and their partners (n = 21), individuals with other anxiety disorders and their partners (n = 35), and couples free of psychopathology (n = 30). Participants rated both global criticism and criticism during a 10-minute problem-solving task, which was also coded for criticism by observers. Individuals with anxiety disorders showed elevated levels of interaction-specific perceived criticism, expressed criticism, and upset and stress due to criticism relative to normal controls; they also reported that the interaction was more stressful. However, there were no group differences on global measures of criticism, and the two anxious groups did not differ on any measures. Findings suggest that the high levels of criticism anxious individuals perceive and their corresponding negative reactions to criticism, though not specific to SAD, may account for some of the relationship difficulties that have been identified in SAD. Results also indicate that anxious individuals may contribute to their relationship difficulties by being highly critical themselves. Overall, our findings point to the need for a clinical focus on decreasing perceived criticism among individuals with anxiety disorders.     

Introducing a new age-and-cognition-sensitive measurement for assessing spatial orientation using a landmark-less virtual reality navigational task

Age-related impairments during spatial navigation have been widely reported in egocentric and allocentric paradigms. However, the effect of age on more specific navigational components such as the ability to drive or update directional information has not received enough attention. In this study we investigated the effect of age on spatial updating of a visual target after a series of whole–body rotations and transitions using a novel landmark-less virtual reality (VR) environment. Moreover, a significant number of previous studies focused on measures susceptible to a general decline in motor skills such as the spent time navigating, the distance traversed. The current paper proposes a new compound spatial measure to assess navigational performance, examines its reliability and compares its power with those of the measures of duration and traversed distance in predicting participants' age and cognitive groups assessed by Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MoCA) scores. Using data from 319 adults (20–83 years), our results confirm the reliability, the age sensitivity, and the cognitive validity of the designed spatial measure as well as its superiority to the measures of duration and traversed distance in predicting age and MoCA score. In addition, the results show the significant effect of age cognitive status on spatial updating.