Why are attitude–behaviour inconsistencies uncomfortable? Using motivational theories to explore individual differences in dissonance arousal and motivation to compensate

Using cognitive dissonance theories and self-determination theory, we explored the role of individual differences in global and contextual motivational orientations on dissonance arousal processes following spontaneous attitude–behaviour inconsistencies (ABIs). Study 1 (N = 382) showed that individual differences in global motivation relate to the frequency of ABIs and dissonance arousal across important life domains. Studies 2 (N = 282) and 3 (N = 202) showed that individual differences in contextual motivation toward the environment predict the relative frequency of ABIs and the quantity and quality of proximal motivation to compensate for ABIs in that context. Autonomous motivation was associated with a tendency to compensate for ABIs to both reduce dissonance and restore self-integrity. Controlled motivation disposed individuals to reduce dissonance to protect ego-invested self-structures, and to be indifferent to non self-threatening ABIs. Amotivation left people indifferent to ABIs. Individual differences in motivational orientations could explain why ABIs are uncomfortable and motivate people to compensate differently when they face ABIs.     

Meta‐Analysis of Counseling Outcomes for the Treatment of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder

This meta‐analysis of 152 published posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) clinical trials from 1990 to 2012 concluded that counseling generally produced a small to large effect of treatment across all comparison conditions at termination (d+ = 0.30 to 0.89). These gains were maintained at longest follow‐up (d+ = 0.58 to 0.86) for the wait‐list, treatment‐as‐usual, and single‐group comparisons, but not for the follow‐up placebo comparison (d+ = 0.15), probably because of the low power (j = 3 placebo studies). Clinical trial findings were synthesized using a random‐effects model. No effects of publication bias or moderating variables were evident. No difference was found between trauma‐focused and non‐trauma‐focused approaches. Implications for counseling practice and future PTSD outcome research are addressed.     

Integration of spatial information across vision and language

Three experiments investigated whether spatial information acquired from vision and language is maintained in distinct spatial representations on the basis of the input modality. Participants studied a visual and a verbal layout of objects at different times from either the same (Experiments 1 and 2) or different learning perspectives (Experiment 3) and then carried out a series of pointing judgments involving objects from the same or different layouts. Results from Experiments 1 and 2 indicated that participants pointed equally fast on within- and between-layout trials; coupled with verbal reports from participants, this result suggests that they integrated all locations in a single spatial representation during encoding. However, when learning took place from different perspectives in Experiment 3, participants were faster to respond to within- than between-layout trials and indicated that they kept separate representations during learning. Results are compared to those from similar studies that involved layouts learned from perception only.     

Menstrual Reactivity: The Role of Gender-Specificity,Anxiety Sensitivity,and Somatic Concerns in Self-Reported Menstrual Distress

To determine the impact of gender roles, anxiety sensitivity, and somatic concerns on self-reported menstrual distress, two studies were conducted. In the first study using 278 primarily Caucasian college females, anxiety-sensitivity level, not current menstrual cycle phase, influenced reports of menstrual symptom severity and depression. Regardless of cycle phase at the time of self-report, women high in anxiety sensitivity reported significantly more depressed mood, trait anxiety, and retrospective menstrual symptoms. In the second study of 158 primarily Caucasian college females varying in anxiety sensitivity levels, adherence to sex role stereotypes, feminist beliefs, and illness attitudes were examined. Participants also completed measures of general premenstrual, most-recent premenstrual, and current menstrual symptoms. Women high in anxiety sensitivity reported the highest levels of sex-specificity, feminist embeddedness, and illness attitudes, with sex-specificity accounting for significant variance in current menstrual symptoms. Results are discussed within the context of the menstrual reactivity hypothesis, which proposes that beliefs surrounding the menstrual cycle and body sensations expectancies contribute to self-reports of greater menstrual distress. Women high in anxiety sensitivity appear to represent one subgroup vulnerable to menstrual reactivity.     

Belief Change as Propositional Update

This study examines the problem of belief revision, defined as deciding which of several initially accepted sentences to disbelieve, when new information presents a logical inconsistency with the initial set. In the first three experiments, the initial sentence set included a conditional sentence, a non-conditional (ground) sentence, and an inferred conclusion drawn from the first two. The new information contradicted the inferred conclusion. Results indicated that conditional sentences were more readily abandoned than ground sentences, even when either choice would lead to a consistent belief state, and that this preference was more pronounced when problems used natural language cover stories rather than symbols. The pattern of belief revision choices differed depending on whether the contradicted conclusion from the initial belief set had been a modus ponens or modus tollens inference. Two additional experiments examined alternative model-theoretic definitions of minimal change to a belief state, using problems that contained multiple models of the initial belief state and of the new information that provided the contradiction. The results indicated that people did not follow any of four formal definitions of minimal change on these problems. The new information and the contradiction it offered was not, for example, used to select a particular model of the initial belief state as a way of reconciling the contradiction. The preferred revision was to retain only those initial sentences that had the same, unambiguous truth value within and across both the initial and new information sets. The study and results are presented in the context of certain logic-based formalizations of belief revision, syntactic and model-theoretic representations of belief states, and performance models of human deduction. Principles by which some types of sentences might be more “entrenched” than others in the face of contradiction are also discussed from the perspective of induction and theory revision.