Emotions,Attitudes, and Reasons

Our emotional faculties respond to successes, gains, advantages, threats, losses, obstacles, and other personally significant objects or situations, producing positive or negative evaluations of them according to their perceived import. Being an evaluative response is a feature that emotions share with paradigm attitudes (beliefs, intentions, judgments, etc.). However, recently philosophers have been reluctant to treat emotions as attitudes. The usual reasons given have to do with the automaticity of emotions and their occasional recalcitrance. In this article, I argue that these things shouldn't disqualify emotions from counting as genuine attitudes. Our emotions do bear the kind of relationship with our reasons that is characteristic of our attitudes.     

Social Anxiety Disorder and Perceived Criticism in Intimate Relationships: Comparisons With Normal and Clinical Control Groups

Individuals with social anxiety disorder (SAD) have difficulties in their romantic relationships, including decreased satisfaction and intimacy, but the reasons for these difficulties are poorly understood. Because fear of negative evaluation is a cardinal feature of SAD, perceived criticism from a romantic partner may play a central role in socially anxious individuals’ relationships. In the present study, we compared levels of perceived, expressed, and observed criticism and reactions to criticism among individuals with SAD and their partners (n = 21), individuals with other anxiety disorders and their partners (n = 35), and couples free of psychopathology (n = 30). Participants rated both global criticism and criticism during a 10-minute problem-solving task, which was also coded for criticism by observers. Individuals with anxiety disorders showed elevated levels of interaction-specific perceived criticism, expressed criticism, and upset and stress due to criticism relative to normal controls; they also reported that the interaction was more stressful. However, there were no group differences on global measures of criticism, and the two anxious groups did not differ on any measures. Findings suggest that the high levels of criticism anxious individuals perceive and their corresponding negative reactions to criticism, though not specific to SAD, may account for some of the relationship difficulties that have been identified in SAD. Results also indicate that anxious individuals may contribute to their relationship difficulties by being highly critical themselves. Overall, our findings point to the need for a clinical focus on decreasing perceived criticism among individuals with anxiety disorders.     

Distinct Activity Patterns of the Human Bed Nucleus of the Stria Terminalis and Amygdala during Fear Learning

Neuropsychology Review - The amygdala and, more recently, also the bed nucleus of the stria terminalis, have been widely implicated in fear and anxiety. Much of our current knowledge is derived...     

Subject–Aux Inversion in Children with SLI

Journal of Psycholinguistic Research - An elicited production study investigated subject–aux inversion in 5-year-old children with specific language impairment (SLI) and 2 control groups,...     

Mitigating Burnout Among High-NA Employees in Health Care: What Can Organizations Do?

The purpose of this study was to examine the extent to which factors in the nursing environment have differential effects on burnout levels among nurses high and low in negative affectivity (NA). Specifically, this field study examined the moderating relationships among role ambiguity, role conflict, and collective efficacy on the NA–burnout relationship among nurses in a hospital setting. Findings suggest that perceived role conflict exacerbates while perceptions of collective efficacy reduce specific dimensions of burnout for nurses high in NA. These results offer some evidence regarding which environmental characteristics may mitigate burnout for high-NA nurses.     

Iterated Belief Revision, Reliability, and Inductive Amnesia

Belief revision theory concerns methods for reformulating an agent's epistemic state when the agent's beliefs are refuted by new information. The usual guiding principle in the design of such methods is to preserve as much of the agent's epistemic state as possible when the state is revised. Learning theoretic research focuses, instead, on a learning method's reliability or ability to converge to true, informative beliefs over a wide range of possible environments. This paper bridges the two perspectives by assessing the reliability of several proposed belief revision operators. Stringent conceptions of minimal change are shown to occasion a limitation called inductive amnesia: they can predict the future only if they cannot remember the past. Avoidance of inductive amnesia can therefore function as a plausible and hitherto unrecognized constraint on the design of belief revision operators.     

An MMPI-based empirical model of malingering and deception

The empirically-based model of malingering and deception described by Rogers (1984b) was operationalized using MMPI and clinical interview data. Subjects (N = 159) were patients committed to an inpatient forensic hospital as ‘Incompetent to Stand Trial’ or ‘Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity’. Inter-rater reliability was acceptable for the 11 criteria used to define response styles. Each subject was categorized into one of five response style groups: ‘Reliable’, ‘Malingering’, ‘Defensive’, ‘Irrelevant’, or ‘Unclassifiable’. Factor analysis of the rating criteria yielded four factors, three of which are comparable to the assigned groups, providing some validation for the constructs underlying these groups.     

Sustained attention to a predictable,unengaging Go/No-Go task shows ongoing development between 6 and 11 years

Response time variability (RTV) is a useful measure of sustained attention; however, little is known about developmental changes in RTV at different temporal frequencies. Thirty-five 6-year-olds, 31 8-year-olds, and 37 10-year-olds completed the fixed-sequence Sustained Attention to Response Task on three occasions, six months apart. Fast Fourier Transform and ex-Gaussian analyses of response time (RT) data assessed momentary fluctuations in RT, gradual changes in RT, and very long responses, thought to reflect attentional control fluctuations, slow-shifting arousal, and infrequent lapses in attention, respectively. A half-by-half analysis measured within-occasion time-on-task effects. The 10-to 11-year-olds performed with less momentary fluctuations in RT, fewer long responses, and fewer commission and omission errors than the younger groups. This group performed well in the first half of the task but showed time-on-task effects on measures of momentary fluctuations in RT, very long responses, target sensitivity (d’), and commission errors. The 6- to 7-year-olds performed less well than the older groups, and showed time-on-task effects, on almost all measures. The 8- to- 9-year-olds mostly performed at an intermediate level compared with the other groups; however, this group performed with a similar level of momentary fluctuations in RT and very long responses as the 6- to 7-year-olds. These findings indicate that there is ongoing maturation of various aspects of sustained attention on a predictable task, with a period of relative stability in performance between 8 and 9 years of age.