A tale of two processes: On Joseph Henrich’s the secret of our success: How culture is driving human evolution,domesticating our species,and making us smarter

We situate Henrich’s book in the larger research tradition of which it is a part and show how he presents a wide array of recent psychological, physiological, and neurological data as supporting the view that two related but distinct processes have shaped human nature and made us unique: cumulative cultural evolution and culture-driven genetic evolution. We briefly sketch out several ways philosophers might fruitfully engage with this view and note some implications it may have for current philosophic debates in moral and political theory and over the nature of extended cognition. We end by noting how Henrich’s view of the source of cultural design and innovation, and the prominence of place he gives to the extended process of cultural evolution, cuts against a cluster of broad but common views about human minds, recasting putative bugs as features and indicating that many of the distinctive features of our individual minds evolved to allow them to be effective cogs in the larger, more productive cultural machine.     

Emotions,Attitudes, and Reasons

Our emotional faculties respond to successes, gains, advantages, threats, losses, obstacles, and other personally significant objects or situations, producing positive or negative evaluations of them according to their perceived import. Being an evaluative response is a feature that emotions share with paradigm attitudes (beliefs, intentions, judgments, etc.). However, recently philosophers have been reluctant to treat emotions as attitudes. The usual reasons given have to do with the automaticity of emotions and their occasional recalcitrance. In this article, I argue that these things shouldn't disqualify emotions from counting as genuine attitudes. Our emotions do bear the kind of relationship with our reasons that is characteristic of our attitudes.     

Candidate Vulnerability and Exposure to Counterattitudinal Information: Evidence From Two U.S. Presidential Elections

Politically motivated selective exposure has traditionally been understood through the lens of long‐standing attitudes and beliefs, but the role of environment in shaping information exposure practices merits further consideration. Citizens might respond to the political environment in their information‐seeking behavior for numerous reasons. Citizens who believe their position is politically vulnerable have specific cognitive and affective needs that may make them uniquely attuned to counterattitudinal information. In the context of a presidential election, this means that as the defeat of a supported candidate appears more likely, attention to counterattitudinal content will increase. Data collected in the 2008 and 2012 U.S. Presidential elections support this prediction, although this relationship was observed primarily among supporters of the Republican candidate in both elections.     

Are high levels of religiosity inconsistent with a high valuation of science? Evidence from the United States,China and Iran

We asked whether high levels of religiosity are inconsistent with a high valuation of science. We explored this possibility in three countries that diverge markedly in the relation between the state and religion. Parents in the United States (n = 126), China (n = 234) and Iran (n = 77) completed a survey about their personal and parental stance towards science. The relation between religiosity and the valuation of science varied sharply by country. In the U.S. sample, greater religiosity was associated with a lower valuation of science. A similar but weaker negative relation was found in the Chinese sample. Parents in the Iranian sample, by contrast, valued science highly, despite high levels of religiosity. Given the small size of our United States and Iranian samples, and the non-probabilistic nature of our samples in general, we caution readers not to generalise our findings beyond the current samples. Despite this caveat, these findings qualify the assumption that religiosity is inconsistent with the valuation of science and highlight the role of sociocultural context in shaping adults' perception of the relation between religion and science.     

Using the shifting standards model of stereotype-based judgments to examine the impact of race on compensation decisions

The Shifting Standards Model (SSM) of stereotypic judgments is presented as a model of implicit bias that produces a psychological mechanism contributing to continued racial wage disparities. The SSM is used to explain race-based differences in subjective evaluations of compensation decisions. We report three experimental studies in which research participants made compensation decisions for either a White or Black employee. Across three studies, participants judged a Black employee's raise as subjectively better than a comparably described White employee's raise. Participants who work in Human Resources fields (Study 3) and those with experience making compensation decisions (Study 2) were as likely as other participants to show evidence of the shifting standards effect. The findings are discussed in the context of individual implicit biases contributing to continued wage disparities and potential organizational practices to ameliorate these influences.     

Affect and emotions in placebo and nocebo effects: What do we know so far?

Once considered nuisance variance in clinical trials, placebo effects and nocebo effects are now widely recognized as important and mutable psychobiological contributors to mental and physical health. Psychological theory explaining these effects emphasizes associative learning and conscious expectations. It has long been suggested, however, that affective states such as moods, emotions, and distress could play a significant role. In this paper, we draw together and review the empirical data linking affective states to placebo and nocebo effects. To organize this disparate literature, three questions are addressed: (1) Does pre‐existing state and trait affect modulate placebo and nocebo effects? (2) Does administering placebo and nocebo treatments change affective states, and if so, does the resulting affect causally influence placebo and nocebo effects? Finally, (3) Can placebo treatments be successfully employed as a regulation strategy to modulate different affective states? In reviewing the evidence in relation to these three questions, it is clear that affect does play a key role in placebo and nocebo effects in many circumstances, and further, there may be a reciprocal dynamic at play between a treatment event, affect, and placebo/nocebo effects. The paper concludes by discussing implications for theory and intervention and recommends future research priorities.     

Defending truth values for indicative conditionals

Philosophical Studies - There is strong disagreement about whether indicative conditionals have truth values. In this paper, I present a new argument for the conclusion that indicative conditionals...     

Editorial: Shaping Ethical Futures in Brain-Based and Artificial Intelligence Research

Science and Engineering Ethics -