A warm heart and a clear head. The contingent effects of weather on mood and cognition

Prior studies on the association between weather and psychological changes have produced mixed results. In part, this inconsistency may be because weather's psychological effects are moderated by two important factors: the season and time spent outside. In two correlational studies and an experiment manipulating participants' time outdoors (total N = 605), pleasant weather (higher temperature or barometric pressure) was related to higher mood, better memory, and "broadened" cognitive style during the spring as time spent outside increased. The same relationships between mood and weather were not observed during other times of year, and indeed hotter weather was associated with lower mood in the summer. These results are consistent with findings on seasonal affective disorder, and suggest that pleasant weather improves mood and broadens cognition in the spring because people have been deprived of such weather during the winter.     

Discrete-trial alternation in the rat

The acquisition and maintenance by rats of single alternation, double alternation, and four other repeating patterns of reinforced and non-reinforced trials was studied in a discrete-trial lever-pressing situation. The rats learned all these patterns in a small number of experimental sessions. Single alternation was learned more rapidly than the more complex patterns. Rate of learning single and double alternation decreased moderately as inter-trial interval increased. Abrupt changes in the scheduling of trials, either by doubling the inter-trial interval or by shifting from fixed to variable trial spacing, temporarily disrupted the patterned performance. Two hypotheses concerned with the means by which the rats could have learned to conform to the pattern were examined: (1) “timing” of the interval between successive reinforcements; and (2) control of responding on a trial by the outcome of preceding trials, depending on the consistency with which these outcomes were associated with reinforced or non-reinforced trials in the pattern and on how many trials back these outcomes occurred. The second hypothesis accounted for the relative frequency of errors on trials at various locations in the sequences, and predicted most of the changes in error frequency observed in experiments in which “inter-trial stimuli” were added to the sequences.     

Light-aversion in the white rat

The Psychological Record -     

Beyond Protection Motivation: An Integrative Theory of Health Appeals

We develop an integrated theory of health communication by combining protection motivation theory (PMT; Rogers, 1983) with the stages of change described in the transtheoretical model (Prochaska & DClemente, 1982). Our study challenges the assumption implicit in PMT that perceptions of vulnerability, severity, response efficacy, and self-efficacy are equally weighted across individuals. Rather, we propose that people at different stages of readiness to change are differentially affected by levels of these predictor variables. Results from our experiment confirm that vulnerability, severity, and efficacy (response and self) are the main motivators to change behavior during the precontemplation, contemplation, and action stages, respectively. Furthermore, we explore how specific categories of beliefs identified by the transtheoretical model are associated with perceptions of vulnerability, severity, response efficacy, and self-efficacy.     

The problem of evil and the attributes of God

In discussions of the probabilistic argument from evil, some defenders of theism have recently argued that evil has no evidential force against theism. They base their argument on the claim that there is no reason to think that we should be able to discern morally sufficient reasons which God presumably has for permitting the evil which occurs. In this paper I try to counter this argument by discussing factors which suggest that we should generally be able to discern why God permits evil events. I close by suggesting that the theist use the evidential force which evil does have as a reason to question her understanding of the divine attributes.