Rigidity of the far‐right? Motivated social cognition in a nationally representative sample of Hungarians on the eve of the far‐right breakthrough in the 2010 elections

We investigated the “rigidity of the right” hypothesis in the context of the far‐right breakthrough in the 2010 Hungarian parliamentary elections. This hypothesis suggests that psychological characteristics having to do with need for security and certainty attract people to a broad‐based right‐wing ideology. A nationally representative sample (N = 1000) in terms of age, gender and place of residence was collected by means of the random walking method and face‐to‐face interviews. Voters of JOBBIK (n = 124), the radically nationalist conservative far‐right party, scored lower on System Justifying Belief, Belief in a Just World (Global) and higher on Need for Cognition than other voters. Our results contradict the “rigidity of the right” hypothesis: JOBBIK voters scored, on many measures, opposite to what the hypothesis would predict.     

Using a bad tool with good intention: young children's imitation of adults' questionable choices

We present three studies exploring 2- to 4-year-olds’ imitation on witnessing a model whose questionable tool use choices suggested her untrustworthiness. In Study 1, children observed the model accidentally select a physically optimal tool for a task and then intentionally reject it for one that was functionally nonaffordant. When asked to perform the task for her, children at all ages ignored the model’s intentional cues and selected the optimal tool. Study 2 found that when the model’s nonaffordant tool choice was emphasized by claims about its design, 3-year-olds increased imitation. They also imitated, as did 2-year-olds, when the model selected a suboptimal rather than nonaffordant tool. The 4-year-olds consistently avoided imitation. Study 3 replicated these findings with new tools and participants. Additional measures indicated that knowledge about artifact design predicted children’s tendency to ignore the model. These results shed light on developmental trends in the social and cognitive functions of imitation.     

JUDGMENTS OF LEARNING AT DELAYS:

Abstract— Nelson and Dunlosky (1991) found that judgment-of-leaning (JOL) accuracy (measured using G) was nearly perfect if the JOL was made several minutes after study (the delayed-JOL effect ). However, over time, the distribution of judgments changed radically. When JOLs were made immediately, subjects typically used the middle of the scale, after a delay, more than 50% of judgments were made using the ends of the scale (Dunlosky & Nelson, 1994, Experiment 1). We replicated the delayed-JOL effect and found a similar rating shift. Is the delayed-JOL effect an artifact produced by this shift, or does it reflect true metamemory improvement? Monte Carlo simulations allowed us to separate these effects. Shifting judgments to ends of the scale did inflate JOL accuracy somewhat. The bulk of the delayed-JOL effect, however, resulted form increases in calibration. We conclude that the delayed-JOL effect reflects true metamemory improvement.     

The Human Function Compunction: Teleological explanation in adults

Research has found that children possess a broad bias in favor of teleological - or purpose-based - explanations of natural phenomena. The current two experiments explored whether adults implicitly possess a similar bias. In Study 1, undergraduates judged a series of statements as “good” (i.e., correct) or “bad” (i.e., incorrect) explanations for why different phenomena occur. Judgments occurred in one of three conditions: fast speeded, moderately speeded, or unspeeded. Participants in speeded conditions judged significantly more scientifically unwarranted teleological explanations as correct (e.g., “the sun radiates heat because warmth nurtures life”), but were not more error-prone on control items (e.g., unwarranted physical explanations such as “hills form because floodwater freezes”). Study 2 extended these findings by examining the relationship between different aspects of adults’ “promiscuous teleology” and other variables such as scientific knowledge, religious beliefs, and inhibitory control. Implications of these findings for scientific literacy are discussed.     

British and American children's preferences for teleo-functional explanations of the natural world

Teleological-functional explanations account for objects by reference to their purpose. They are a fundamental aspect of adults' explanatory repertoire. They also play a significant role in children's reasoning although prior findings indicate that, in contrast to adults, young children broadly extend teleological explanation beyond artifacts (e.g. chairs) and biological properties (e.g. eyes) to the properties of non-living natural phenomena (e.g. clouds, rocks). The present study extends earlier work with American children to explore British children's application of teleological explanation. The motivation is that while Britain and America are, culturally, as close to a minimal pair as the global context affords, there are differences in the religiosity of the two nations such that British children might be less inclined to endorse purpose-based explanation. Results reveal that young British children also possess a promiscuous teleology although they differ in the kinds of purposes that they attribute. Additional findings include a replication of earlier effects using a modified task with young American children.     

Processing similarity does not improve metamemory: evidence against transfer-appropriate monitoring

The transfer-appropriate monitoring (TAM) hypothesis of metamemory predicts that judgment of learning (JOL) accuracy should improve when conditions during JOLs closely match conditions of the memory test. The authors devised 5 types of delayed JOLs for paired associates and varied them along with the type of memory test (cued recall or recognition). If the TAM hypothesis is correct, JOL and test type should interact to influence metamemory. Contrary to TAM, metamemory accuracy did not improve when JOL and test conditions matched but instead tended to vary according to whether the answer was apparent at time of JOL. Memory test scores and JOL magnitude were both greater when the correct target was evident during JOLs. Overall, the results are largely consistent with a monitoring retrieval view of delayed JOLs and do not support TAM as a viable account of JOL accuracy.