A Psychometric Evaluation of the Cognitive-Behavioral Avoidance Scale in Women with Major Depressive Disorder

The Cognitive-Behavioral Avoidance Scale (CBAS; Ottenbreit & Dobson, Behaviour Research and Therapy, 42, 292–313; 2004) is a multidimensional self-report measure designed to assess the construct of dispositional avoidance. Although findings to date support the reliability and validity of the CBAS within student samples, no study has yet evaluated the psychometric properties of the CBAS in a clinical sample of depressed individuals. The primary purpose of the present study was to examine the psychometric properties of the CBAS within a sample of 60 women diagnosed with Major Depressive Disorder. Results supported the internal consistency and 4-month test-retest reliability of the scale. As predicted, the CBAS total scale and subscales were correlated with convergent measures of avoidance as well as depressive symptoms. The results of this study provide support for the psychometric properties of the CBAS in samples of clinically depressed individuals. Study limitations and future research directions are discussed.     

Rational Hypocrisy: A Bayesian Analysis Based on Informal Argumentation and Slippery Slopes

Moral hypocrisy is typically viewed as an ethical accusation: Someone is applying different moral standards to essentially identical cases, dishonestly claiming that one action is acceptable while otherwise equivalent actions are not. We suggest that in some instances the apparent logical inconsistency stems from different evaluations of a weak argument, rather than dishonesty per se. Extending Corner, Hahn, and Oaksford's (2006) analysis of slippery slope arguments, we develop a Bayesian framework in which accusations of hypocrisy depend on inferences of shared category membership between proposed actions and previous standards, based on prior probabilities that inform the strength of competing hypotheses. Across three experiments, we demonstrate that inferences of hypocrisy increase as perceptions of the likelihood of shared category membership between precedent cases and current cases increase, that these inferences follow established principles of category induction, and that the presence of self‐serving motives increases inferences of hypocrisy independent of changes in the actions themselves. Taken together, these results demonstrate that Bayesian analyses of weak arguments may have implications for assessing moral reasoning.     

The role of moral knowledge in everyday immorality: What does it matter if I know what is right?

In contrast to other well-known cognitive models of moral decision-making, social cognitive theory posits that individuals can disengage from their own moral standards thereby allowing themselves to commit immoral acts. While previous research largely supports the general premise of moral disengagement, we suggest that direct tests of moral disengagement processes and the commensurate diminished role of moral knowledge are conspicuously absent. In five studies, we use multiple methods to capture both knowledge of the immorality of an act and theorized in situ processes of moral disengagement. Ultimately, we find no evidence of the proposed processes associated with moral disengagement. Furthermore, our data suggests that moral knowledge is a key driver of moral behavior in everyday situations and is not easily set aside. We conclude by discussing the implications of this research for theory and practice.     

What Makes an Idea Risky? The Relations between Perceptions of Idea Novelty,Usefulness, and Risk

Individuals and organizations frequently tout creative ideas as a desirable goal, and yet, creative ideas are frequently rejected. Creativity researchers have often suggested that creative ideas are rejected because they are perceived as riskier due to their inherent novelty or originality. Although this assumption is prevalent, we are unaware of any empirical research directly examining the relations between perceptions of novelty and risk. We provide an empirical test of this assumption in two studies in which participants rate the novelty, usefulness, and riskiness of ideas. Across both studies, we find consistent support for the idea that usefulness, rather than novelty, has the strongest relation with risk perceptions. We also find some evidence that novelty and usefulness interact to predict perceptions of risk. Additionally, in Study 2, we find that usefulness has the strongest relation with willingness to invest and buy a product. The findings of this study suggest that the bias against creativity may be driven by the perceived usefulness of an idea, rather than its novelty, such that ideas with lower usefulness are perceived to be riskier.     

Individual Differences in Testosterone Predict Persistence in Men

Persistence is an important predictor of future successes. The present research addresses the relationship between testosterone and persistence in men. One hundred eighteen men were randomly assigned to win or lose a competitive number tracing task against a confederate or complete the task alone in a non‐competitive control condition. Saliva samples were collected prior to and after the competition or control conditions. Participants were then given a maximum time of 30 min to spend attempting to solve unsolvable puzzles, with the option to quit at any time. In contrast to our prediction, changes in testosterone concentrations in response to the competitive interaction did not predict persistence behaviour. However, individual differences in testosterone concentrations (pre‐competition/non‐competition) were positively correlated with persistence. These findings are the first to examine associations between neuroendocrine function and persistence behaviour in people and suggest that testosterone should also be considered when predicting persistence‐related outcomes. Copyright © 2014 European Association of Personality Psychology     

The (un)reliability of item-level semantic priming effects

Many researchers have tried to predict semantic priming effects using a myriad of variables (e.g., prime–target associative strength or co-occurrence frequency). The idea is that relatedness varies across prime–target pairs, which should be reflected in the size of the priming effect (e.g., cat should prime dog more than animal does). However, it is only insightful to predict item-level priming effects if they can be measured reliably. Thus, in the present study we examined the split-half and test–retest reliabilities of item-level priming effects under conditions that should discourage the use of strategies. The resulting priming effects proved extremely unreliable, and reanalyses of three published priming datasets revealed similar cases of low reliability. These results imply that previous attempts to predict semantic priming were unlikely to be successful. However, one study with an unusually large sample size yielded more favorable reliability estimates, suggesting that big data, in terms of items and participants, should be the future for semantic priming research.