What student psychotherapists want from an experiential group

A study of four thirty-week experiential groups, involving two group conductors and forty-one other group members showed that 90 per cent of students' expectations of change were exceeded, indicating increase in interpersonal learning and, over a longer period, emotional change. the culture of the groups was consistently positive and expressive. There was some evidence that conductors had a similar style which corresponded to that predicted by the group analytic method, and that both showed behaviours which were indicators of ‘good quality' therapy. There were substantial correlations between a positive culture and better than expectation outcome at the end of term one, and good psychodynamic practice by the conductors and outcome at the end of the course.     

“There is Nothing Good About this Work:” Identity and Unhappiness Among Nicaraguan Female Sex Workers

In a study of life satisfaction in Nicaragua, Cox (2012) found that female sex workers had dramatically low subjective well-being (SWB) relative to other marginalized groups in Nicaragua. Moreover, the SWB of these female sex workers was possibly the lowest recorded in the life satisfaction literature. A novel theory linking life satisfaction with life stories is proposed, and a method not heretofore used in SWB research is employed, the life story interview, in order to better understand the dramatic unhappiness of this sample. Seeing life satisfaction as an identity invoking process, the sample’s dramatically low life satisfaction judgments are framed within the larger context of narrative identity. Thematic analysis of the stories revealed a prototypical narrative arc: early family conflict, departure from home, a series of unsuccessful romantic relationships, birth of multiple children, dire economic crises, entry into sex work, and hope for a future exit from sex work. The life stories of these participants provided an identity and life course context to understand the dramatic unhappiness of this sample.     

The floor effect: Impoverished spatial memory for elevator buttons

People typically remember objects to which they have frequently been exposed, suggesting that memory is a by-product of perception. However, prior research has shown that people have exceptionally poor memory for the features of some objects (e.g., coins) to which they have been exposed over the course of many years. Here, we examined how people remember the spatial layout of the buttons on a frequently used elevator panel, to determine whether physical interaction (rather than simple exposure) would ensure the incidental encoding of spatial information. Participants who worked in an eight-story office building displayed very poor recall for the elevator panel but above-chance performance on a recognition test. Performance was related to how often and how recently the person had used the elevator. In contrast to their poor memory for the spatial layout of the elevator buttons, most people readily recalled small distinctive graffiti on the elevator walls. In a more implicit test, the majority were able to locate their office floor and the eighth floor button when asked to point toward these buttons when in the actual elevator, with the button labels covered. However, identification was very poor for other floors (including the first floor), suggesting that even frequent interaction with information does not always lead to accurate spatial memory. These findings have implications for understanding the complex relationships among attention, expertise, and memory.     

Spatial frequency filtering and the direct control of fixation durations during scene viewing

The present study employed a saccade-contingent change paradigm to investigate the effect of spatial frequency filtering on fixation durations during scene viewing. Subjects viewed grayscale scenes while encoding them for a later memory test. During randomly chosen saccades, the scene was replaced with an alternate version that remained throughout the critical fixation that followed. In Experiment 1, during the critical fixation, the scene could be changed to high-pass and low-pass spatial frequency filtered versions. Under both conditions, fixation durations increased, and the low-pass condition produced a greater effect than the high-pass condition. In subsequent experiments, we manipulated the familiarity of scene information during the critical fixation by flipping the filtered scenes upside down or horizontally. Under these conditions, we observed lengthening of fixation durations but no difference between the high-pass and low-pass conditions, suggesting that the filtering effect is related to the mismatch between information extracted within the critical fixation and the ongoing scene representation in memory. We also conducted control experiments that tested the effect of changes to scene orientation (Experiment 2a) and the addition of color to a grayscale scene (Experiment 2b). Fixation distribution analysis suggested two effects on the distribution fixation durations: a fast-acting effect that was sensitive to all transsaccadic changes tested and a later effect in the tail of the distribution that was likely tied to the processing of scene information. These findings are discussed in the context of theories of oculomotor control during scene viewing.     

Cybernetics and mind‐body problems 1

It is asked to what extent answers to such questions as ‘Can machines think?’, ‘Could robots have feelings?’ might be expected to yield insight into traditional mind‐body questions. It has sometimes been assumed that answering the first set of questions would be the same as answering the second. Against this approach other philosophers have argued that answering the first set of questions would not help us to answer the second. It is argued that both of these assessments are mistaken. It is then claimed, although not argued in detail, that the following three approaches to the first set of questions are mistaken: (1) machines (and robots) obviously cannot think, feel, create, etc., since they do only what they are programmed to do; (2) on the basis of ah analysis of the meaning of the words ‘machine’ ('robot’, ‘think’, ‘feel’, etc.) we can see that in principle it would be impossible for machines (or robots) to think, feel, create, etc.; (3) machines (and robots) obviously can (or could) think, feel, etc., since they do certain things which, if we were to do them, would require thought, feeling, etc. It is argued that, once it is seen why approach (2) is mistaken, it becomes desirable to decline ‘in principle’ approaches to the first set of questions and to favor ‘piecemeal investigations’ where attention is centered upon what is actually taking place in machine technology, the development of new programming techniques, etc. Some suggestions are made concerning the relevance of current computer simulation studies to traditional mind‐body questions. A new set of questions is proposed as a substitute for the first set of questions. It is hoped that attempts to answer these may provide us with new and detailed portraits of the mind‐body relationship.     

Exposure to moral relativism compromises moral behavior

Across two studies we investigated the relationship between moral relativism versus absolutism and moral behavior. In Experiment 1, we found that participants who read a relativist argument for tolerating female genital mutilation were more likely to cheat to win an incentivized raffle than participants who read an absolutist argument against female genital mutilation, or those in a control condition. In Experiment 2, participants who read a definition of morality phrased in absolutist terms expressed less willingness to engage in petty theft than those who read a definition of morality phrased in relativist terms, or those in a control condition. Experiment 2 also provided evidence that effects were not due to absolutist arguments signaling that fewer behaviors are morally permissible, nor to relativist arguments defending more disagreeable moral positions. Rather, the content of the philosophical positions themselves—the fact that relativism describes morality as subjective and culturally-historically contingent, whereas absolutism describes morality as objective and universal—makes individuals more likely to engage in immoral behaviors when exposed to moral relativism compared to moral absolutism.     

Mental simulation and sexual prejudice reduction: the debiasing role of counterfactual thinking

Reducing prejudice is a critical research agenda, and never before has counterfactual priming been evaluated as a potential prejudice‐reduction strategy. In the present experiment, participants were randomly assigned to imagine a pleasant interaction with a homosexual man and then think counterfactually about how an incident of sexual discrimination against him might not have occurred (experimental condition) or to imagine a nature scene (control condition). Results demonstrated a significant reduction in sexual prejudice from baseline levels in the counterfactual simulation group. Importantly, whereas intergroup anxiety and motivation to control prejudice were not predictive factors, number of counterfactual thoughts generated independently predicted variance in prejudice reduction. Mechanisms for, and implications of, prejudice‐reduction strategies including counterfactual thinking are discussed.     

The Parable of the Puzzle: Fitting Together the Pieces of Psychological Research

Poised at the threshold of a new century, new millennia, and perhaps a New Age, psychologists may wish to revisit this century's major developments in psychological inquiry. A parable is offered as one means of gaining a new perspective about the current status of psychological research. I hope the parable will stimulate lively debate and raise questions as to how psychology may best contribute in the century ahead.