Cybernetics and mind‐body problems 1

It is asked to what extent answers to such questions as ‘Can machines think?’, ‘Could robots have feelings?’ might be expected to yield insight into traditional mind‐body questions. It has sometimes been assumed that answering the first set of questions would be the same as answering the second. Against this approach other philosophers have argued that answering the first set of questions would not help us to answer the second. It is argued that both of these assessments are mistaken. It is then claimed, although not argued in detail, that the following three approaches to the first set of questions are mistaken: (1) machines (and robots) obviously cannot think, feel, create, etc., since they do only what they are programmed to do; (2) on the basis of ah analysis of the meaning of the words ‘machine’ ('robot’, ‘think’, ‘feel’, etc.) we can see that in principle it would be impossible for machines (or robots) to think, feel, create, etc.; (3) machines (and robots) obviously can (or could) think, feel, etc., since they do certain things which, if we were to do them, would require thought, feeling, etc. It is argued that, once it is seen why approach (2) is mistaken, it becomes desirable to decline ‘in principle’ approaches to the first set of questions and to favor ‘piecemeal investigations’ where attention is centered upon what is actually taking place in machine technology, the development of new programming techniques, etc. Some suggestions are made concerning the relevance of current computer simulation studies to traditional mind‐body questions. A new set of questions is proposed as a substitute for the first set of questions. It is hoped that attempts to answer these may provide us with new and detailed portraits of the mind‐body relationship.     

Exposure to moral relativism compromises moral behavior

Across two studies we investigated the relationship between moral relativism versus absolutism and moral behavior. In Experiment 1, we found that participants who read a relativist argument for tolerating female genital mutilation were more likely to cheat to win an incentivized raffle than participants who read an absolutist argument against female genital mutilation, or those in a control condition. In Experiment 2, participants who read a definition of morality phrased in absolutist terms expressed less willingness to engage in petty theft than those who read a definition of morality phrased in relativist terms, or those in a control condition. Experiment 2 also provided evidence that effects were not due to absolutist arguments signaling that fewer behaviors are morally permissible, nor to relativist arguments defending more disagreeable moral positions. Rather, the content of the philosophical positions themselves—the fact that relativism describes morality as subjective and culturally-historically contingent, whereas absolutism describes morality as objective and universal—makes individuals more likely to engage in immoral behaviors when exposed to moral relativism compared to moral absolutism.     

Mental simulation and sexual prejudice reduction: the debiasing role of counterfactual thinking

Reducing prejudice is a critical research agenda, and never before has counterfactual priming been evaluated as a potential prejudice‐reduction strategy. In the present experiment, participants were randomly assigned to imagine a pleasant interaction with a homosexual man and then think counterfactually about how an incident of sexual discrimination against him might not have occurred (experimental condition) or to imagine a nature scene (control condition). Results demonstrated a significant reduction in sexual prejudice from baseline levels in the counterfactual simulation group. Importantly, whereas intergroup anxiety and motivation to control prejudice were not predictive factors, number of counterfactual thoughts generated independently predicted variance in prejudice reduction. Mechanisms for, and implications of, prejudice‐reduction strategies including counterfactual thinking are discussed.     

The Parable of the Puzzle: Fitting Together the Pieces of Psychological Research

Poised at the threshold of a new century, new millennia, and perhaps a New Age, psychologists may wish to revisit this century's major developments in psychological inquiry. A parable is offered as one means of gaining a new perspective about the current status of psychological research. I hope the parable will stimulate lively debate and raise questions as to how psychology may best contribute in the century ahead.     

Upright and left out: Posture moderates the effects of social exclusion on mood and threats to basic needs

Adopting a powerful posture leads individuals to feel more confident and dominant. Social exclusion can strongly impact individuals' mood and basic social needs. The current research combines these bodies of research, investigating the effects of dominant and submissive poses on responses to social exclusion and inclusion. In two experiments, participants held a slouching or upright pose and were either socially included or excluded using the Cyberball social exclusion manipulation. Social exclusion only affected participants' mood when individuals took a powerful posture: Excluded participants in powerful postures had more negative mood after exclusion than included power‐posing participants, but effects of exclusion and inclusion did not differ among submissive‐posing participants (Experiments 1 and 2). Similarly, it was also found that social exclusion affected basic needs only when participants' adopted powerful poses (Experiment 2). Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.