Making remembering more memorable*

Memory retrieval is a cognitive operation that itself can be remembered or forgotten, with potentially important consequences. To study memory for prior remembering, we had participants first study target words (e.g., bark) alongside semantically related cue words (e.g., dog). Then, on Test 1, participants retrieved targets in response to either the study cue or a changed cue that was semantically related to a homograph of the target (e.g., birch). Finally, on Test 2, participants retrieved all targets in response to the original study cues, and participants judged whether targets were previously retrieved on Test 1. As in previous research, cue change on Test 1 rendered target retrievals less memorable, suggesting context changes harm memory for prior remembering. We hypothesised that the negative effect of context change could be ameliorated by reminding participants of the original study cues during Test 1. We had participants either retrieve (Experiments 1 and 3, Ns?=?46 and 62) or view (Experiment 2, N?=?118) the study cue following each target retrieval. Reminding significantly reduced the negative effect of cue change, with self-generation being especially potent. This indicates that reminding can make remembering more memorable in the face of context change.     

Performance-based and parent ratings of attention in children treated for a brain tumor: The significance of radiation therapy and tumor location on outcome

Children are at increased risk for cognitive difficulties following the diagnosis and treatment of a brain tumor. Radiation therapy (RT) and tumor location are commonly-cited predictors of neurocognitive functioning. Disruptions to foundational neurocognitive processes such as attention, working memory, and processing speed underlie declines on measures of general intellectual functioning. While several studies have examined visual sustained attention in pediatric brain tumor patients, auditory sustained attention has yet to be examined. This study employs a longitudinal design to examine performance-based and parent ratings of attention in children undergoing surgical resection of a brain tumor (n = 29) and treated with (n = 11) or without (n = 18) RT at 6.79 months post-surgery (baseline) and then again at 30.56 months post-surgery (follow-up). The measures include an auditory continuous performance test (CPT) and parent ratings of attention and hyperactivity on a behavior rating scale. Ultimately, children treated with and without RT performed similarly on performance-based and parent ratings of attention. However, the performance on the auditory CPT differed according to tumor location, with children with infratentorial tumors committing more inattention and inhibitory control errors compared to children with supratentorial tumors. Parent ratings did not differ according to tumor location, and parent ratings and auditory sustained attention performance are not significantly correlated. The findings are interpreted in the context of neurocognitive and brain development.     

The Difficulties with Groundlessness

In On Certainty, §166, Wittgenstein mentions the difficulty of realizing the “groundlessness of our believing.” In the course of reviewing what makes this realization so difficult, I examine a certain way of understanding one of Wittgenstein's techniques for getting us to realize it, his use of the “hinge” metaphor. It implies that hinge‐propositions possess that status inherently; for some commentators, this is because of their connection to instinctive and habitual behaviours. I offer an alternative interpretation of the remarks that have been used to support this understanding that better explains their role in Wittgenstein's response to scepticism and other epistemological problems.     

What Makes an Idea Risky? The Relations between Perceptions of Idea Novelty,Usefulness, and Risk

Individuals and organizations frequently tout creative ideas as a desirable goal, and yet, creative ideas are frequently rejected. Creativity researchers have often suggested that creative ideas are rejected because they are perceived as riskier due to their inherent novelty or originality. Although this assumption is prevalent, we are unaware of any empirical research directly examining the relations between perceptions of novelty and risk. We provide an empirical test of this assumption in two studies in which participants rate the novelty, usefulness, and riskiness of ideas. Across both studies, we find consistent support for the idea that usefulness, rather than novelty, has the strongest relation with risk perceptions. We also find some evidence that novelty and usefulness interact to predict perceptions of risk. Additionally, in Study 2, we find that usefulness has the strongest relation with willingness to invest and buy a product. The findings of this study suggest that the bias against creativity may be driven by the perceived usefulness of an idea, rather than its novelty, such that ideas with lower usefulness are perceived to be riskier.     

Defining Creativity: Don't We Also Need to Define What Is Not Creative?

I argue that any attempt to define creative ideas cannot fully succeed without also defining uncreative ideas. This argument begins by defining three parameters that characterize a potentially creative thought: the idea's initial probability (p), the final utility (u), and the creator's prior knowledge of that utility (v). The three parameters then lead to a three‐criterion multiplicative definition of personal creativity, namely, c = (1 ? p)u(1 ? v), where the first factor indicates originality and the third factor surprise. Although creativity can only maximize as originality, utility, and surprise all approach unity, the same definition indicates that there are seven different ways that creativity can minimize. These alternatives were identified as (a) routine, reproductive, or habitual ideas, (b) fortuitous response bias, (c) irrational perseveration, (d) problem finding, (e) rational suppression, (f) irrational suppression, and (g) blissful ignorance. If the third parameter v is omitted, then the number of creative and noncreative outcomes reduces to just four, making creativity indistinguishable from irrational suppression. The alternative outcomes are then illustrated using the classic two‐string problem. Besides providing a more finely differentiated conception of creativity failures, the definition has critical implications regarding the processes and procedures required to generate highly creative ideas.