Creativity,Problem Solving,and Solution Set Sightedness: Radically Reformulating BVSR

Too often, psychological debates become polarized into dichotomous positions. Such polarization may have occurred with respect to Campbell's (1960) blind variation and selective retention (BVSR) theory of creativity. To resolve this unnecessary controversy, BVSR was radically reformulated with respect to creative problem solving. The reformulation began by defining (a) potential solution sets consisting of k possible solutions each described by their respective probability and utility values, (b) a set sightedness metric that gauges the extent to which the probabilities correspond to the utilities, and (c) a solution creativity index based on the joint improbability and utility of each solution. These definitions are then applied to representative cases in which simultaneous or sequential generate‐and‐test procedures scrutinize solution sets of variable size and with representative patterns of probabilities and utilities. The principal features of BVSR theory were then derived, including the implications of superfluity and backtracking. Critically, it was formally demonstrated that the most creative solutions must emerge from solution sets that score extremely low in sightedness. Although this preliminary revision has ample room for further development, the demonstration proves that BVSR's explanatory value does not depend on any specious association with Darwin's theory of evolution.     

Emerging narrative discourse skills 18 months after traumatic brain injury in early childhood

This study examined the longer term effect of traumatic brain injury (TBI), approximately 18 months post-injury, on emerging narrative discourse skills of 85 children with orthopaedic injury (OI), 43 children with moderate TBI, and 19 children with severe TBI who were between 3 years and 6 years 11 months at injury. Children with TBI performed worse than children with OI on most discourse indices. Children with severe TBI were less proficient than children with moderate TBI at identifying unimportant story information. Age and pragmatic skills were predictors of discourse performance.     

Sexting,Mobile Porn Use,and Peer Group Dynamics: Boys' and Girls' Self-Perceived Popularity,Need for Popularity,and Perceived Peer Pressure

There is considerable concern about adolescents producing, consuming, and distributing sexual materials via mobile phone communication. The purpose of this study was to examine key aspects of peer influence and the peer context in relation to two such practices: sexting and mobile porn use. The results of a high-school survey study (N = 1,943) revealed that 6% of Flemish teens (11–20 years of age) have sent a sext, while 9% use mobile porn. Teens who were more popular with the other sex and with a greater need for popularity were more likely to report both behaviors. Boys' mobile porn use was also predicted by perceived peer pressure. Same-sex popularity was unrelated to boys' sexting behavior and mobile porn use; for girls, a negative relationship was found.     

The gaze-contingent moving window in reading: Development and review

The development of the gaze-contingent moving window paradigm (McConkie & Rayner, 1975, 1976) is discussed and the results of the earliest research are reviewed. The original work suggested that the region from which readers can obtain useful information during an eye fixation in reading, or the perceptual span, was asymmetric around the fixation point, and extended from 3–4 letter spaces to the left of fixation to about 14–15 letter spaces to the right of fixation. Subsequent research which substantiated these findings is discussed. Then more recent research using the moving window paradigm to investigate the following topics (1) effects of reading speed, (2) effects of reading skill, (3) effects of the writing system, (4) effects due to age, (5) effects related to deafness, and (5) effects related to schizophrenia is discussed. Finally, some extensions of gaze-contingent paradigms to areas other than reading are discussed.     

What do we want? Critical psychotherapy and counselling! When do we want it? Now,now, now! A critical review of a critical issue

This review offers a critical commentary on the contributions to this issue. It outlines four aspects to a critical approach and uses them to read horizontally across all five papers.     

Does Anselm beg the question?

Saint Anselm’s ontological argument for the existence of God, formulated nearly a millennium ago, continues to bedevil philosophers. There is no consensus about what, if anything, is wrong with it. Some philosophers insist that the argument is invalid. Others concede its validity but insist that it is unsound. A third group of philosophers maintain that Anselm begs the question. It has been argued, for example, that Anselm’s use of the name “God” in a premise assumes (or presupposes) precisely what has to be proved, namely, that God exists. Another tack is to argue that the premise that God is possible implies or presupposes the conclusion that God exists, or perhaps that, in order to know that God is possible, one must know that God exists. Just as no consensus has emerged about what, if anything, is wrong with Anselm’s argument, no consensus has emerged about whether the argument begs the question. In this essay, I focus on the second type of claim made by the third group of philosophers—the claim that Anselm’s argument begs the question by assuming, as a premise, that God is possible. In particular, I focus on the argument of the contemporary analytic philosopher William Rowe, who has claimed, since at least 1975, that Anselm’s ontological argument begs the question. I argue that Rowe’s argument fails.     

Sluggish Cognitive Tempo in Abnormal Child Psychology: An Historical Overview and Introduction to the Special Section

There has recently been a resurgence of interest in Sluggish Cognitive Tempo (SCT) as an important construct in the field of abnormal child psychology. Characterized by drowsiness, daydreaming, lethargy, mental confusion, and slowed thinking/behavior, SCT has primarily been studied as a feature of Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), and namely the predominately inattentive subtype/presentation. Although SCT is strongly associated with ADHD inattention, research increasingly supports the possibility that SCT is distinct from ADHD or perhaps a different mental health condition altogether, with unique relations to child and adolescent psychosocial adjustment. This introductory article to the Special Section on SCT provides an historical overview of the SCT construct and briefly describes the contributions of the eight empirical papers included in the Special Section. Given the emerging importance of SCT for abnormal psychology and clinical science, there is a clear need for additional studies that examine (1) the measurement, structure, and multidimensional nature of SCT, (2) SCT as statistically distinct from not only ADHD-inattention but also other psychopathologies (particularly depression and anxiety), (3) genetic and environmental contributions to the development of SCT symptoms, and (4) functional impairments associated with SCT. This Special Section brings together papers to advance the current knowledge related to these issues as well as to spur research in this exciting and expanding area of abnormal psychology.     

Rational Hypocrisy: A Bayesian Analysis Based on Informal Argumentation and Slippery Slopes

Moral hypocrisy is typically viewed as an ethical accusation: Someone is applying different moral standards to essentially identical cases, dishonestly claiming that one action is acceptable while otherwise equivalent actions are not. We suggest that in some instances the apparent logical inconsistency stems from different evaluations of a weak argument, rather than dishonesty per se. Extending Corner, Hahn, and Oaksford's (2006) analysis of slippery slope arguments, we develop a Bayesian framework in which accusations of hypocrisy depend on inferences of shared category membership between proposed actions and previous standards, based on prior probabilities that inform the strength of competing hypotheses. Across three experiments, we demonstrate that inferences of hypocrisy increase as perceptions of the likelihood of shared category membership between precedent cases and current cases increase, that these inferences follow established principles of category induction, and that the presence of self‐serving motives increases inferences of hypocrisy independent of changes in the actions themselves. Taken together, these results demonstrate that Bayesian analyses of weak arguments may have implications for assessing moral reasoning.     

A Psychometric Evaluation of the Cognitive-Behavioral Avoidance Scale in Women with Major Depressive Disorder

The Cognitive-Behavioral Avoidance Scale (CBAS; Ottenbreit & Dobson, Behaviour Research and Therapy, 42, 292–313; 2004) is a multidimensional self-report measure designed to assess the construct of dispositional avoidance. Although findings to date support the reliability and validity of the CBAS within student samples, no study has yet evaluated the psychometric properties of the CBAS in a clinical sample of depressed individuals. The primary purpose of the present study was to examine the psychometric properties of the CBAS within a sample of 60 women diagnosed with Major Depressive Disorder. Results supported the internal consistency and 4-month test-retest reliability of the scale. As predicted, the CBAS total scale and subscales were correlated with convergent measures of avoidance as well as depressive symptoms. The results of this study provide support for the psychometric properties of the CBAS in samples of clinically depressed individuals. Study limitations and future research directions are discussed.     

The role of moral knowledge in everyday immorality: What does it matter if I know what is right?

In contrast to other well-known cognitive models of moral decision-making, social cognitive theory posits that individuals can disengage from their own moral standards thereby allowing themselves to commit immoral acts. While previous research largely supports the general premise of moral disengagement, we suggest that direct tests of moral disengagement processes and the commensurate diminished role of moral knowledge are conspicuously absent. In five studies, we use multiple methods to capture both knowledge of the immorality of an act and theorized in situ processes of moral disengagement. Ultimately, we find no evidence of the proposed processes associated with moral disengagement. Furthermore, our data suggests that moral knowledge is a key driver of moral behavior in everyday situations and is not easily set aside. We conclude by discussing the implications of this research for theory and practice.