The Impact of Adolescents' News and Action Movie Viewing on Risky Driving Behavior: A Longitudinal Study

Traffic crashes remain an important cause of injury and death among young people. The aim of the current study was to examine whether adolescents' viewing of particular television genres predicted later risky driving. Data were collected with a two‐wave panel survey (N = 426); structural equation modeling was used to examine the relationships between television viewing and self‐reported risky driving. Theoretically, the study was framed within cultivation theory and the theory of planned behavior. In line with the hypotheses, more news viewing appeared to be an indirect negative predictor of reckless driving, whereas more exposure to action programs was associated with more risk taking in traffic. This relationship was mediated by risk‐taking attitudes and intentions. The implications for prevention are discussed.     

A moral justification for killing in self-defence

In the first part of this paper I will argue that for a case to be one of killing in self-defence at least the following three important conditions need to be met: (i) the defender's death must seem to him/her to be imminent; (ii) there must be a choice forced upon the defender between being killed or killing his/her attacker; (iii) the responsibility for (i) and (ii) must be the attacker's. I go on to point out that a lethal use of force which meets conditions (i)—(iii) is thought by most people to be morally permissible. However we believe also that everyone has the right to life and this cannot be taken away under any circumstances. But if this is so, how can we justify one person intentionally killing another? Or to put the point differently: what, in our moral assessment of such cases, are we to claim an attacker has done that is so morally wrong we are prepared to argue that if one of them has to be killed, it is the attacker? I hope to answer this question in the second part of my paper by developing a strand of ethical thought, associated with Kant.     

Eye movements enhance memory for individuals who are strongly right-handed and harm it for individuals who are not

Subjects who make repetitive saccadic eye movements before a memory test subsequently exhibit superior retrieval in comparison with subjects who do not move their eyes. It has been proposed that eye movements enhance retrieval by increasing interaction of the left and right cerebral hemispheres. To test this, we compared the effect of eye movements on subsequent recall (Experiment 1) and recognition (Experiment 2) in two groups thought to differ in baseline degree of hemispheric interaction—individuals who are strongly right-handed (SR) and individuals who are not (nSR). For SR subjects, who naturally may experience less hemispheric interaction than nSR subjects, eye movements enhanced retrieval. In contrast, depending on the measure, eye movements were either inconsequential or even detrimental for nSR subjects. These results partially support the hemispheric interaction account, but demand an amendment to explain the harmful effects of eye movements for nSR individuals.     

“It would have been worse under Saddam:” Implications of counterfactual thinking for beliefs regarding the ethical treatment of prisoners of war

In response to criticism following news of the mistreatment of Iraqis at the US prison in Abu Ghraib, some media personalities and politicians suggested that the treatment of these prisoners “would have been even worse” had former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein still been in power. It was hypothesized that the contemplation of this argument has undesirable consequences because counterfactual thinking can elicit both contrastive and assimilative effects. In the reported study, participants considered how the prisoners at Abu Ghraib would have been worse off under Saddam. The results revealed that generating downward counterfactuals made participants feel better about Abu Ghraib (thereby evidencing contrast), and also lowered ethical standards regarding how the US should treat prisoners of war in the future (thereby evidencing assimilation).     

Comparing clinical and social-personality conceptualizations of narcissism

There is a lack of consensus surrounding the conceptualization of narcissism. The present study compared two measures of narcissism-one used in clinical settings (Personality Diagnostic Questionnaire, PDQ-4+; Hyler, 1994) and one used in social-personality research (Narcissistic Personality Inventory, NPI; Raskin & Terry, 1988)-across two samples. Sample 1 (N=271) was composed of undergraduates, whereas Sample 2 (N=211) was composed of parents of the Sample 1 participants. The scales were significantly interrelated but manifested divergent relations with general personality traits, personality disorders (including expert prototypal ratings of narcissism), recollections of parenting received, and psychological distress and self-esteem. PDQ-4 narcissism captured an emotionally unstable, negative-affect-laden, and introverted variant of narcissism; NPI narcissism captured an emotionally resilient, extraverted form. The clinical and social-personality conceptualizations of narcissism primarily share a tendency to use an antagonistic interpersonal style. Implications for the DSM-V are discussed.     

Why do implicit and explicit attitude tests diverge? The role of structural fit

Implicit and explicit attitude tests are often weakly correlated, leading some theorists to conclude that implicit and explicit cognition are independent. Popular implicit and explicit tests, however, differ in many ways beyond implicit and explicit cognition. The authors examined in 4 studies whether correlations between implicit and explicit tests were influenced by the similarity in task demands (i.e., structural fit) and, hence, the processes engaged by each test. Using an affect misattribution procedure, they systematically varied the structural fit of implicit and explicit tests of racial attitudes. As test formats became more similar, the implicit-explicit correlation increased until it became higher than in most previous research. When tests differ in structure, they may underestimate the relationship between implicit and explicit cognition. The authors propose a solution that uses procedures to maximize structural fit.     

Bayesian generic priors for causal learning

The article presents a Bayesian model of causal learning that incorporates generic priors--systematic assumptions about abstract properties of a system of cause-effect relations. The proposed generic priors for causal learning favor sparse and strong (SS) causes--causes that are few in number and high in their individual powers to produce or prevent effects. The SS power model couples these generic priors with a causal generating function based on the assumption that unobservable causal influences on an effect operate independently (P. W. Cheng, 1997). The authors tested this and other Bayesian models, as well as leading nonnormative models, by fitting multiple data sets in which several parameters were varied parametrically across multiple types of judgments. The SS power model accounted for data concerning judgments of both causal strength and causal structure (whether a causal link exists). The model explains why human judgments of causal structure (relative to a Bayesian model lacking these generic priors) are influenced more by causal power and the base rate of the effect and less by sample size. Broader implications of the Bayesian framework for human learning are discussed.