Positive Emotions Speed Recovery from the Cardiovascular Sequelae of Negative Emotions

Two studies tested the hypothesis that certain positive emotions speed recovery from the cardiovascular sequelae of negative emotions. In Study 1, 60 subjects (Ss) viewed an initial fear-eliciting film, and were randomly assigned to view a secondary film that elicited: (a) contentment; (b) amusement; (c) neutrality; or (d) sadness. Compared to Ss who viewed the neutral and sad secondary films, those who viewed the positive films exhibited more rapid returns to pre-film levels of cardiovascular activation. In Study 2, 72 Ss viewed a film known to elicit sadness. Fifty Ss spontaneously smiled at least once while viewing this film. Compared to Ss who did not smile, those who smiled exhibited more rapid returns to pre-film levels of cardiovascular activation. We discuss these findings in terms of emotion theory and possible health-promoting functions of positive emotions.     

The influence of only on syntactic processing of "long" relative clause sentences

We report an eye movement experiment investigating the influence of the focus operator only on syntactic processing of "long" relative clause sentences. Paterson, Liversedge, and Underwood (1999) found that readers were garden pathed by "short" reduced relative clause sentences containing the focus operator only . They argued that due to thematic differences between "short" and "long" relative clause sentences, garden path effect might not occur when "long" reduced relative clause sentences are read. Eye-tracking data show that garden path effects found during initial processing of the disambiguating verb of "long" reduced sentences without only were absent or delayed in the case of counterparts with only . We discuss our results in terms of current theories of sentence processing.     

Successive negative contrast in one-way avoidance learning in rats

In three experiments, successive negative contrast was examined in one-way avoidance learning. Reward magnitude in first (pre-shift) and second (post-shift) phases was manipulated by time spent in the safe compartment. Experiment 1 demonstrated that when time in the danger compartment was held constant, a group shifted from a large reward--30 sec spent in the safe compartment--to a small reward--1 sec--showed poor performance and longer response latency than a group conditioned with the small reward in both phases. Experiment 2 replicated this effect with a less intense shock and also demonstrated that a group shifted from large to small reward performed more poorly than a group exposed to large reward--30 sec--in both phases. Finally, Experiment 3 showed that changes in intertrial interval, defined as total time spent in the safe compartment and the danger compartment before the onset of the warning signal, were not responsible for this contrast effect. These results suggest that time spent in a safe place can act as appetitive incentive during one-way avoidance learning.     

Book reviews

Arnold, M. Memory and the brain. Hillsdale, N. J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 1984. Pp. 532. ISBN 0-89859-290-9. £47.90.

Green, T. R. G., Payne, S. P. and van der Veer, G. C. (Eds.). The psychology of computer use.. London: Academic Press. 1983. Pp. 225. ISBN 0-12-2974204. $9.50.

Stunkard, A. J. and Stellar, E. (Eds.). Eating and its disorders. New York: Raven Press. 1984. Pp. 302. ISBN 0-89004-891-6. $58.50.

Spillmann, L. and Wooten, B. R. (Eds.) Sensory experience, adaptation, and perception: Festschrift for Zero Kohler. Hillsdale, N. J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 1984. Pp. xxvii + 748. ISBN 0 8985-3-218-6. £70.85.

Geschwind, N. and Galaburda, A. M. (Eds.)Cerebral dominance: The biological foundations. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1984. Pp. 232. ISBN 0-674-10658-X. £24.35.

Annett, M. Left, right, hand and brain: The right shift theory. 1985. London and Hillsdale, N. J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Pp. xiii + 474. ISBN 0-86377418-5 £29.95.

Ericsson, K. A. and Simon, H. A. Protocol analysis: Verbal reports as data. Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press. 1984. Pp. 426. ISBN 0-262-05029-3. £28.95.     

AQUINAS'S ARGUMENT AGAINST SELF-HATRED

Aquinas's argument against the possibility of genuine self‐hatred runs counter to modern intuitions about self‐hatred as an explanatorily central notion in psychology, and as an effect of alienation. Aquinas's argument does not deny that persons experience hatred for themselves. It can be read either as the claim that the self‐hater mistakes what she feels toward herself as hatred, or that, though she hates what she believes is her “self,” she actually hates only traits of herself. I argue that the argument fails on both readings. The first reading entails that all passions are really self‐love, and so is incompatible with Aquinas's own “cognitivist” view of what it is that distinguishes specific passions in experience. The second reading entails that persons have no phenomenal access to “self,” rendering self‐reference—how it is that the self can be an intentional object of conscious mental states—a mystery. Augustine's claim, which Aquinas accepts on authority, that all sin originates in inordinate self‐love seems to entail the impossibility of genuine self‐hatred because both thinkers fail to distinguish between two distinct forms of self‐love: amor concupiscentiae and amor benevolentiae.