Relationships among health factors and everyday problem solving in african americans.

This study examined whether measures of health status enhance the prediction of performance on everyday problem solving in adult African Americans. The sample consisted of 209 community-dwelling African American adults with a mean age of 66.82 years (SD=7.95). The following variables were included in the analysis: Everyday Problems Test (EPT), summary index of chronic illnesses (cardiovascular disease, hypertension, arthritis, stroke, and diabetes), self-rated health (current health, health in the past month, health compared with others, health compared with 5 years ago), and demographic information. Using hierarchical regression and follow-up communality analysis, the authors found that the number of chronic illnesses and self-rated health as compared with 5 years prior were significant and unique predictors of performance on the EPT but did not account for all of the demographic-related variance. The results indicate that health indices contribute to the variability in everyday cognition in this understudied population.     

Personal and social knowledge

This paper is an investigation of the relation between personal and social conditions of knowledge. A coherence theory of knowledge and justification is assumed, according to which incoming information is evaluated in terms of background information. The evaluation of incoming information in terms of background information is a higher order or metamental activity. Personal knowledge and justification is based on the coherent integration of individual information. Social knowledge and justification is based on the coherent aggregation of social information, that is, the information of individuals belonging to the social group. Personal justification and consensual justification are based upon personal and consensual probabilities respectively. Consensual and personal probabilities may differ, but under salient conditions personal probabilities will coincide with consensual probabilities and consensual probabilities will coincide with truth.Research on this paper was supported by a fellowship from the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation and a grant from the National Science Foundation. I am indebted to F. Schmitt for his critical comments on the penultimate draft.     

The irrelevance of the No Best Possible World Defense

Conclusion Certainly NBPW can justify metaphysical evil, which is all Leibniz intended it to do. Probably, as suggested by Bruce Reichenbach, NBPW can rebut an atheistic argument from the non-existence of the best possible world. It could even augment a GGD by defending against a divine obligation to have created a “larger” world. But NBPW by itself cannot serve to derail the logical problem of evil in any way whatsoever; theists must find refuge in a GGD if they are to find it at all. Lacking a GGD, NBPW is irrelevant; given a GGD, NBPW is superfluous.