How do people react to negative procedures? On the moderating role of authority’s biased attitudes

The authors focus on the effects an authority’s apparent inconsistency between persons on judgments of relational treatment and procedural justice following negative procedures (i.e., procedures that people commonly regard as unfair). In Experiment 1, participants responded most negatively following a procedure that denied them, but granted another participant, an opportunity to voice an opinion when the intergroup context raised suspicions of bias (i.e., when both the experimenter and another participant were outgroup members). In Experiment 2, participants responded most negatively when the experimenter had expressed biased attitudes in favor of another participant, but this effect occurred only following procedures that denied participants a voice opportunity. We conclude that authority’s biased attitudes help people to make sense of negative procedure information.     

Procedural justice and intragroup status: Knowing where we stand in a group enhances reactions to procedures

The current research investigates the role of relative intragroup status as a moderator of people’s reactions to procedural justice. Based on a review of the procedural justice literature, the authors argue that information about intragroup status influences people’s reactions to variations in procedural justice. In correspondence with predictions, two experiments show that reactions of people who have been informed about their intragroup status position (either low, average, or high) are influenced more strongly by voice as opposed to no-voice procedures than people who are not informed about their intragroup status. It is concluded that knowing where we stand in a group enhances reactions to procedural justice.     

Women and Counseling: A Vision for the Future

The authors who worked to prepare this special issue on women and counseling (N. L. Kees, L. A. Carlson, R. Parmley, P. Dahlen, K. Evans, A. F. Marbley, et al., 2005) offer a vision for a just, equitable, and sustainable future for all. Recommendations for individual and systemic change needed to realize this future vision are offered. Implications for the American Counseling Association and members of the counseling profession are highlighted.     

Spatial balance of color triads in the abstract art of Piet Mondrian

We examined the interactive contribution of the color and size of the three areas occupied by the primary colors red, yellow, and blue in adaptations of abstract compositions by Mondrian to the perceived weight of the areas and the location of the balance centers of the compositions. Thirty-six art stimuli were created by experimentally changing the colors in the three areas of six original works so that the resulting five variations and the original constituted the six possible spatial arrangements of the three colors in the three locations. In experiment 1, design-trained and untrained participants determined the location of the balance center of each composition seen on a computer screen and rated the apparent weight or heaviness of each color area. In experiment 2, untrained participants determined the location of the balance centers of the compositions when projected to their actual size. It was found that, for both trained and untrained participants, the perceived weight of a color, especially red and yellow, varied as a function of the size of the area it occupied. Furthermore, participants in both experiments perceived shifts in the locations of the balance centers between the originals and their altered versions. Only the trained participants, however, perceived significant shifts in balance centers among the five variations of the compositions, demonstrating their superior sensitivity to the contribution of color to balance structure. Taken together, the findings demonstrate the existence of a color-area-weight relationship among color triads in abstract displays and the influence of this relationship on color balance in abstract compositions.     

Fairness heuristic theory is an empirical framework: a reply to Arnadóttir

In this article on fairness heuristic theory, we point out some important flaws in Arnadóttir's (2002) claim that fairness heuristic theory is "not empirical," by which Arnadóttir meant that theory's predictions are knowable a priori, and are not contingent upon circumstances. To this end, we demonstrate that empirically testing effects predicted by fairness heuristic theory was and is important because this showed that the theory's propositions are not necessarily knowable a priori and are contingent upon circumstances. This implies that, according to Arnadóttir's definition, fairness heuristic theory clearly is an empirical framework. It would have been helpful if Arnadóttir had studied the fairness literature more thoroughly (as this would have easily revealed fairness heuristic theory to be not knowable a priori and to be contingent upon circumstances) and also if she had pointed out which of our studies fail to follow her line of reasoning. Our reply was written not as an attempt to defend fairness heuristic theory as we applaud, indeed are honored by, attempts to scrutinize our work in progress. Our only aim here was to point at some important flaws in the Arnadóttir article, because we think these will hamper rather than advance the science of psychology of justice.     

The inaction effect in the psychology of regret

Previous research showed that decisions to act (i.e., actions) produce more regret than decisions not to act (i.e., inactions). This previous research focused on decisions made in isolation and ignored that decisions are often made in response to earlier outcomes. The authors show in 4 experiments that these prior outcomes may promote action and hence make inaction more abnormal. They manipulated information about a prior outcome. As hypothesized, when prior outcomes were positive or absent, people attributed more regret to action than to inaction. However, as predicted and counter to previous research, following negative prior outcomes, more regret was attributed to inaction, a finding that the authors label the inaction effect. Experiment 4, showing differential effects for regret and disappointment, demonstrates the need for emotion-specific predictions.     

Procedural justice and status: status salience as antecedent of procedural fairness effects

The current article explores status as an antecedent of procedural fairness effects (the findings that perceived procedural fairness affects people's reactions, e.g., their relational judgments). On the basis of the literature, the authors proposed that salience of the general concept of status leads people to be more attentive to procedural fairness information and that, as a consequence, stronger procedural fairness effects should be found. In correspondence with this hypothesis, Experiment 1 showed stronger procedural fairness effects on people's relational treatment evaluations in a status salient condition compared with a control condition. Experiment 2 replicated this effect and, in further correspondence with the hypothesis, showed that status salience led to increased cognitive accessibility of fairness concerns. Implications for the psychology of procedural justice are discussed.     

Cognitive Response Repertoires to Child Noncompliance by Mothers of Aggressive Boys

Cognitive response repertoires to videotaped child noncompliance episodes were examined in mothers of aggressive (MAs) and nonaggressive 4–6-year-old boys. Mothers provided open-ended solutions to three subtypes of child noncompliance under conditions of time pressure, or after they waited for 15 s to consider alternatives. Solutions were coded as assistance/facilitation, coercion, deference, or explanation/clarification. Compared with controls, MAs offered fewer explanation/clarification responses, more coercive responses, and fewer unique solutions during pressured responding. Two to 6 weeks later, mothers were videotaped while participating with their sons in a challenging block-building task. Maternal responses to the vignettes predicted conflict escalation during block building, even after rates of concurrent and past child noncompliance were partialled out. Implications for parent-training models are considered.     

Exposure and response prevention in the natural environment: A comparison with obsessive-compulsive patients

Thirteen obsessive-compulsive clients were treated with different methods of response prevention. Four experimental conditions were obtained through a 2 × 2 factorial design, in which the two main variables were varied: (1) gradual treatment vs flooding; and (2) modeling vs no-modeling. Clients were treated at their homes, three times weekly. Each session lasted 2 hr. Results at the post-test revealed, that modeling was superior to no-modeling (p < 0.05) on avoidance-other compulsions, therapist-rating only. On anxiety-main compulsions, clients rating the gradual method of treatment had been superior to flooding (p < 0.05). No other significant differences were found.