Can Perceptions of Supervisor-Related Ethical Climate Influence How High-Impression Managers Admit Past Unethical Behavior?

In this study, we investigated how the perceptions of ethical climate as it relates to supervisor behavior and impression management are related to admission of past unethical behavior in a sample of Canadian Army personnel. We expected that among respondents who perceive less ethical supervisor-related climate, the relationship between Impression Management (IM) and the admission of past unethical behavior should be significant and positive. In contrast, among respondents who perceive a more ethical supervisor-related climate, the relationship between IM and self-report past unethical behavior should be weak or nonsignificant, and the frequency of admission of past unethical behavior should be low. Although moderation occurred, it was not as hypothesized. IM predicted admission of having obeyed, or witnessed others obey an unlawful command when perceptions of supervisor-related ethical climate were low, and not when perceptions of supervisor-related ethical climate were high. However, higher (vs. lower) impression managers admitted less past unethical behavior, regardless of their perceptions of supervisor-related ethical climate. These results suggest that high impression managers do not admit to having obeyed or witnessed others obey an unlawful command in the past, regardless of their perceptions of the ethical climate as it relates to supervisor behavior.     

Geschichte und Perspektiven der Psychotherapie-Richtlinie

This article gives an historical review of the 48 years of development of the psychotherapy guidelines for outpatient treatment by the statutory health insurance (GKV). Furthermore, some plans for further developments of psychotherapy are discussed.     

The Lazy Person's Approach to Depiction

It has been argued (for example, by Nelson Goodman and John Hyman) that ‘depicts’ and similar terms such as ‘is a picture of’ and ‘represents’ are semantically ambiguous: sometimes they are two‐place predicates expressing a relation, and sometimes they are not. This article takes issue with this claim and develops an alternative theory according to which the ambiguity in question is pragmatic rather than semantic.     

What logical pluralism cannot be

Logical Pluralists maintain that there is more than one genuine/true logical consequence relation. This paper seeks to understand what the position could amount to and some of the challenges faced by its formulation and defence. I consider in detail Beall and Restall’s Logical Pluralism—which seeks to accommodate radically different logics by stressing the way that they each fit a general form, the Generalised Tarski Thesis (GTT)—arguing against the claim that different instances of GTT are admissible precisifications of logical consequence. I then consider what it is to endorse a logic within a pluralist framework and criticise the options Beall and Restall entertain. A case study involving many-valued logics is examined. I next turn to issues of the applications of different logics and questions of which logic a pluralist should use in particular contexts. A dilemma regarding the applicability of admissible logics is tackled and it is argued that application is a red herring in relation to both understanding and defending a plausible form of logical pluralism. In the final section, I consider other ways to be and not to be a logical pluralist by examining analogous positions in debates over religious pluralism: this, I maintain, illustrates further limitations and challenges for a very general logical pluralism. Certain less wide-ranging pluralist positions are more plausible in both cases, I suggest, but assessment of those positions needs to be undertaken on a case-by-case basis.     

The Linguistic Territoriality Principle — A Critique

In this essay, I develop a critique of the linguistic territoriality principle, which states that, for reasons related to the value of language identity, language groups should be territorially accommodated. While I acknowledge the desirability of implementing a linguistic territoriality principle in some specific cases, I claim that this principle is in general inappropriate for the ‘post‐Westphalian’ linguistic world in which we live. I identify, analyze and reject two distinct justifications for the linguistic territoriality principle: the Linguistic Context justification and the Language Survival justification. Finally, I argue for different means of giving political recognition to the fact that most people value their language as an importance source of identity. This alternative theory sets out to officially recognize multiple languages in a given territory.