Two types of debunking arguments

Debunking arguments are arguments that seek to undermine a belief or doctrine by exposing its causal origins. Two prominent proponents of such arguments are the utilitarians Joshua Greene and Peter Singer. They draw on evidence from moral psychology, neuroscience, and evolutionary theory in an effort to show that there is something wrong with how deontological judgments are typically formed and with where our deontological intuitions come from. They offer debunking explanations of our emotion-driven deontological intuitions and dismiss complex deontological theories as products of confabulatory post hoc rationalization. Through my discussion of Greene and Singer’s empirically informed debunking of deontology, I introduce the distinction between two different types of debunking arguments. The first type of debunking argument operates through regular undercutting defeat, whereas the second type relies on higher-order evidence. I argue that the latter type of debunking argument, of which the argument from confabulation is an example, is objectionably sloppy and therefore inadmissible in academic discussion.     

Autobiographical remembering regulates emotions: a functional perspective

Emotional deviation has been considered an essential factor in emotion regulation, in that, attempts to compensate for the deviation is reflected on cognitive processes. In the present study, we focused on autobiographical remembering and tested the functional role of memory on emotion regulation. We specifically examined the congruence effect in individuals’ subsequent memory reports after recalling emotional events. Individuals were randomly assigned to three groups to report either sadness or anger evoking events or emotionally unspecified events that they experienced in the last five years. Results supported mood-incongruence, but only for the emotional memory groups. Despite highly negative memories reported in the initial recall, individuals in anger- and sad-memory groups revealed an up-regulation trend in subsequent recall. Furthermore, sadness and anger induction affected phenomenological features of the subsequently reported memory. Overall, our findings supported for the emotion regulation function of remembering that serves counter-regulation of the negative emotion. We discuss potential mechanisms in the light of explanations by a functional approach to autobiographical memory.     

Naïve and Robust: Class‐Conditional Independence in Human Classification Learning

Humans excel in categorization. Yet from a computational standpoint, learning a novel probabilistic classification task involves severe computational challenges. The present paper investigates one way to address these challenges: assuming class‐conditional independence of features. This feature independence assumption simplifies the inference problem, allows for informed inferences about novel feature combinations, and performs robustly across different statistical environments. We designed a new Bayesian classification learning model (the dependence‐independence structure and category learning model, DISC‐LM) that incorporates varying degrees of prior belief in class‐conditional independence, learns whether or not independence holds, and adapts its behavior accordingly. Theoretical results from two simulation studies demonstrate that classification behavior can appear to start simple, yet adapt effectively to unexpected task structures. Two experiments—designed using optimal experimental design principles—were conducted with human learners. Classification decisions of the majority of participants were best accounted for by a version of the model with very high initial prior belief in class‐conditional independence, before adapting to the true environmental structure. Class‐conditional independence may be a strong and useful default assumption in category learning tasks.     

Generalized Information Theory Meets Human Cognition: Introducing a Unified Framework to Model Uncertainty and Information Search

Searching for information is critical in many situations. In medicine, for instance, careful choice of a diagnostic test can help narrow down the range of plausible diseases that the patient might have. In a probabilistic framework, test selection is often modeled by assuming that people's goal is to reduce uncertainty about possible states of the world. In cognitive science, psychology, and medical decision making, Shannon entropy is the most prominent and most widely used model to formalize probabilistic uncertainty and the reduction thereof. However, a variety of alternative entropy metrics (Hartley, Quadratic, Tsallis, Rényi, and more) are popular in the social and the natural sciences, computer science, and philosophy of science. Particular entropy measures have been predominant in particular research areas, and it is often an open issue whether these divergences emerge from different theoretical and practical goals or are merely due to historical accident. Cutting across disciplinary boundaries, we show that several entropy and entropy reduction measures arise as special cases in a unified formalism, the Sharma–Mittal framework. Using mathematical results, computer simulations, and analyses of published behavioral data, we discuss four key questions: How do various entropy models relate to each other? What insights can be obtained by considering diverse entropy models within a unified framework? What is the psychological plausibility of different entropy models? What new questions and insights for research on human information acquisition follow? Our work provides several new pathways for theoretical and empirical research, reconciling apparently conflicting approaches and empirical findings within a comprehensive and unified information‐theoretic formalism.     

Stability and Change in Domain‐specific Self‐esteem and Global Self‐esteem

A notable uptick of interest in the stability of self‐esteem has been observed over the past few years. Most researchers, however, have focused on unidimensional rather than multidimensional conceptualizations of self‐esteem. The paucity of empirical research is surprising given conflicting theoretical perspectives on the stability of self‐esteem. The goal of the present study was to thoroughly disentangle different conceptualizations of self‐esteem and test opposing classical theories on (i) the stability and (ii) the direction of mutual influence of these different forms of self‐esteem. We analysed two‐year longitudinal data from participants (N = 644 at T1, N = 241 at T2) with an average age of 47.0 years (SD = 12.4). Analyses using a latent variable approach revealed that the domains of self‐esteem were relatively stable in terms of rank order and mean levels. In fact, the size of the stability coefficients was comparable to that of other trait measures that have been reported in the literature and paralleled the stability observed for global self‐esteem. Results did not provide support for either top‐down or bottom‐up effects between domain‐specific and global self‐esteem. These findings have important theoretical and practical implications regarding the stability and development of self‐esteem in adulthood and advance the understanding of self‐esteem in personality theory. © 2018 European Association of Personality Psychology     

The Effect of Emotional Valence on Auditory Word Recognition Memory in English as a Foreign Language

Journal of Psycholinguistic Research - The present study investigated the effect of emotional valence on auditory word recognition memory in English as a foreign language. Participants included 48...     

Irritability and Emotional Impulsivity as Core Feature of ADHD and ODD in Children

The categorical approach of diagnosing mental disorders entails the problem of frequently occurring comorbidities, suggesting a more parsimonious structure of psychopathology. In this study, we therefore aim to assess how affective dysregulation (AD) is associated with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and oppositional defiant disorder (ODD) in children. To assess AD in children aged 8–12 years (n?=?391), we employed the parent version of a newly constructed parent rating scale. Following item reduction, we conducted exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses to establish a factorial structure of AD. One core dimension was identified, comprising irritability and emotional impulsivity, and two smaller dimensions, comprising positive emotionality and exuberance. Subsequently, we examined five different latent factor models – a unidimensional model, a first-order correlated factor model, a second-order correlated factor model, a traditional bifactor model, and a bifactor S-1 model, in which the first-order factor AD-Irritability/Emotional Impulsivity (II) was modeled as the general reference factor. A bifactor S-1 model with the a priori defined general reference domain AD-II provided the best fit to our data and was straightforward to interpret. This model showed excellent model fit and no anomalous factor loadings. This still held true, when comparing it to bifactor S-1 models with ADHD/ODD-related reference factors. Differential correlations with emotion regulation skills and the established Parent Proxy Anger Scale validate the interpretation of the different dimensions. Our results suggest that irritability/emotional impulsivity might be a common core feature of ADHD and ODD.

     

Correction to: Irritability and Emotional Impulsivity as Core Feature of ADHD and ODD in Children

Journal of Psychopathology and Behavioral Assessment -     

Medical Technologies Past and Present: How History Helps to Understand the Digital Era

Journal of Medical Humanities - This article explores the relationship between medicine’s history and its digital present through the lens of the physician-patient relationship. Today the...