Philosophy of Education in a Poor Historical Moment: A Personal Account

Under the post-metaphysical sky “old” humanistic-oriented education is possible solely at the cost of its transformation into its negative, into a power that is determined to diminish human potentials for self-exaltation. Nothing less than total metamorphosis is needed to rescue the core of humanistic genesis: the quest for edifying Life and resistance to the call for “home-returning” into the total harmony that is promised to us within nothingness.     

Human social defeat and approach–avoidance: Escalating social-evaluative threat and threat of aggression increases social avoidance

Basic research on avoidance by Murray Sidman laid the foundation for advances in the classification, conceptualization and treatment of avoidance in psychological disorders. Contemporary avoidance research is explicitly translational and increasingly focused on how competing appetitive and aversive contingencies influence avoidance. In this laboratory investigation, we examined the effects of escalating social-evaluative threat and threat of social aggression on avoidance of social interactions. During social-defeat learning, 38 adults learned to associate 9 virtual peers with an increasing probability of receiving negative evaluations. Additionally, 1 virtual peer was associated with positive evaluations. Next, in an approach–avoidance task with social-evaluative threat, 1 peer associated with negative evaluations was presented alongside the peer associated with positive evaluations. Approaching peers produced a positive or a probabilistic negative evaluation, while avoiding peers prevented a negative evaluation (and forfeited a positive evaluation). In an approach–avoidance task with social aggression, virtual peers gave and took money away from participants. Escalating social-evaluative threat and aggression increased avoidance, ratings of feeling threatened and threat expectancy and decreased ratings of peer favorableness. These findings underscore the potential of coupling social defeat and approach–avoidance paradigms for translational research on the neurobehavioral mechanisms of social approach–avoidance decision-making and anxiety.     

Pre‐registration is a Game Changer. But,Like Random Assignment,it is Neither Necessary Nor Sufficient for Credible Science

We identify 15 claims Pham and Oh (2020) make to argue against pre‐registration. We agree with 7 of the claims, but think that none of them justify delaying the encouragement and adoption of pre‐registration. Moreover, while the claim they make in their title is correct—pre‐registration is neither necessary nor sufficient for a credible science—this is also true of many our science’s most valuable tools, such as random assignment. Indeed, both random assignment and pre‐registration lead to more credible research. Pre‐registration is a game changer.     

Pre‐registration: Why and How

In this article, we (1) discuss the reasons why pre‐registration is a good idea, both for the field and individual researchers, (2) respond to arguments against pre‐registration, (3) describe how to best write and review a pre‐registration, and (4) comment on pre‐registration’s rapidly accelerating popularity. Along the way, we describe the (big) problem that pre‐registration can solve (i.e., false positives caused by p‐hacking), while also offering viable solutions to the problems that pre‐registration cannot solve (e.g., hidden confounds or fraud). Pre‐registration does not guarantee that every published finding will be true, but without it you can safely bet that many more will be false. It is time for our field to embrace pre‐registration, while taking steps to ensure that it is done right.     

Gamma is a Measure of the Accuracy of Predicting Performance on One Item Relative to Another Item,not of the Absolute Performance on an Individual Item Comments on Schraw (1995)

The recent paper by Schraw ( Measures of feeling-of-knowing accuracy: a new look at an old problem , Applied Cognitive Psychology, 1995, 9, 321—332) is flawed by several inaccuracies and by Schraw's failure to distinguish between two fundamentally different aspects of the accuracy of metacognitive predictions: (1) calibration (aka absolute accuracy, defined in terms of whether the predicted value assigned to a single item is followed by the occurrence of that value on the criterion test), and (2) resolution (aka relative accuracy, defined in terms of whether the predicted performance on one item relative to another item is followed by the occurrence of that ordering of the two items on the criterion test). Because of these (and other) problems, his recommendations seem misleading and counterproductive.