Evidence for an error deadzone in compensatory tracking

Humans and monkeys show intermittent arm movements while tracking moving targets. This intermittency has been explained by postulating either a psychological refractory period after each movement and/or an error deadzone, an area surrounding the target within which movements are not initiated. We present a technique to detect and quantify the size of this deadzone, using a compensatory tracking paradigm that distinguishes it from a psychological refractory period. An artificial deadzone of variable size was added around a visual target displayed on a computer screen. While the subject was within this area, he received visual feedback that showed him to be directly on target. The presence of this artificial deadzone could affect tracking performance only if it exceeded the size of his intrinsic deadzone. Therefore, the size of artificial deadzone at which performance began to be affected revealed the size of the intrinsic deadzone. Measured at the subjects' eye, the deadzone was found to vary between 0.06 and 0.38 degrees, depending on the tracking task and viewing conditions; on the screen, this range was 1.3 mm to 3.3 mm. It increased with increasing speed of the target, with increasing viewing distance, and when the amplitude of the movement required was reduced. However, the deadzone size was not significantly correlated with the subjects' level of performance. We conclude that an intrinsic deadzone exists during compensatory tracking, and we suggest that its size is set by a cognitive process not simply related to the difficulty of the tracking task.     

Recovery of Locomotion in Monkeys With Spinal Cord Lesions

This study reanalyzes kinematically (via film) the pre- and postoperative locomotor behavior of 4 of the 10 monkeys with partial spinal cord lesions (T8) briefly described by Eidelberg, Walden, and Nguyen (1981). The behavior of the remaining 6 monkeys is qualitatively described. The analysis reveals that 5 of the animals initially exhibited unilateral hind limb stepping. Hind and forelimb cycle durations often differed postoperatively; the hind limbs commonly showed increased values, whereas forelimb cycle durations were reduced: ipsilateral interlimb phase values were usually inconsistent. A review of prior studies of primate spinal cord lesions indicates that sparing of the ventrolateral quadrant may not be essential for locomotor recovery (cf. Eidelberg, Walden, & Nguyen, 1981). Furthermore, this review as well as the kinematic analysis indicates that primates with very significant spinal lesions can stilI exhibit locomotor movements. Thus, although the primate's spinal cord seems less able than other mammals' to readily organize locomotor movements (Eidelberg, Walden, & Nguyen, 1981), the total absence of stepping in primates with completely transected cords is unexpected and warrants further research.     

Affect, personality, and social activity.

These studies examined relations between social activity and state and trait measures of Positive and Negative Affect. In Study 1 Ss completed scales relevant to 3-factor models of personality and a weekly mood and social activity questionnaire for 13 weeks. In Study 2 Ss completed measures of the 5-factor model of personality and a daily mood and social activity survey for 6-7 weeks. In within- and between-Ss analyses, socializing correlated significantly with state measures of Positive Affect and with trait measures of Extraversion/Positive Emotionality. These relations were relatively general across various types of positive affect and social events; however, specific types of social events also were differentially related to affect. In contrast, social activity had no consistent association with measures of Negative Affect or the other personality dimensions. The results support a temperamental view of Extraversion.     

Future-event schemas and certainty about the future: automaticity in depressives' future-event predictions.

The proposition was tested that depressives make predictions about the future based on a pessimistic future-event schema. Participants varying in depression predicted whether positive and negative events would happen to them (or to an average person) in the future by pressing yes or no at a computer terminal as quickly as possible, either under a concurrent attentional load or under no such load. As hypothesized, depressives predicted more negative events and fewer positive events than did mild depressives or nondepressives and showed greater automaticity in their predictions. That is, the attentional load did not increase depressives' response latencies for either negative or positive events, even though it did so reliably for both mildly depressed and nondepressed individuals. Depressives may thus possess a highly developed future-event schema that operates efficiently in enabling future-event predictions.     

Mood effects on attitude judgments: independent effects of mood before and after message elaboration.

This study investigated the independent effects of induced mood on the encoding of persuasive messages and on the assessment of attitude judgments. In Experiment 1, positive or negative mood was induced either before the encoding of a counterattitudinal message or before the assessment of attitude judgments. When mood was induced before message presentation, Ss in a bad mood were more persuaded by strong than by weak arguments, whereas Ss in a good mood were equally persuaded by strong and by weak arguments. When Ss encoded the message in a neutral mood, however, the advantage of strong over weak arguments was more pronounced when Ss were in a good rather than in a bad mood at the time of attitude assessment. In Experiment 2, Ss exposed to a counterattitudinal message composed of either strong or weak arguments formed either a global evaluation or a detailed representation of the message. Positive, negative, or neutral mood was then induced. Ss in a good mood were most likely and Ss in a negative mood least likely to base their reported attitudes on global evaluations.     

Why do people need self-esteem? Converging evidence that self-esteem serves an anxiety-buffering function.

Three studies were conducted to assess the proposition that self-esteem serves an anxiety-buffering function. In Study 1, it was hypothesized that raising self-esteem would reduce anxiety in response to vivid images of death. In support of this hypothesis, Ss who received positive personality feedback reported less anxiety in response to a video about death than did neutral feedback Ss. In Studies 2 and 3, it was hypothesized that increasing self-esteem would reduce anxiety among individuals anticipating painful shock. Consistent with this hypothesis, both success and positive personality feedback reduced Ss' physiological arousal in response to subsequent threat of shock. Thus, converging evidence of an anxiety-buffering function of self-esteem was obtained.     

Repression at encoding: discrete appraisals of emotional stimuli.

In previous research, the emotions associated with repressors' memorial representations were found to be more discrete than those associated with nonrepressors'. In each of the 3 experiments reported here, repressive discreteness was apparent in repressors' appraisals of emotional stimuli at the time they were encoded. In 1 experiment, Ss appraised individual facial expressions of emotion. Repressors judged the dominant emotions in these faces as no less intense than did nonrepressors, but they appraised the blend of nondominant emotions as less intense than did nonrepressors. In the remaining 2 experiments, Ss appraised crowds of emotional faces as well as crowds of geometric shapes. In both crowd experiments, the repressive discreteness was evident in appraisals of crowds of emotional faces but not in appraisals of crowds of geometric shapes. The repressive discreteness effect did not appear to reflect a general repressor-nonrepressor difference in the appraisal of stimulus features. Rather, the results suggested that repressive discreteness may be constrained to appraisals of emotions.     

Does memory contaminate test-retest reliability?

The Wonderlic Personnel Test (1983) was administered twice over a 3-week period under conditions in which the activity of the second test was experimentally manipulated. Data from 302 undergraduates were analyzed. The standard test-retest reliability coefficient, .872, was not significantly different from the coefficients obtained from three other groups that, on the second test, were each given specific instructions: (a) to reason out the answers (pure reassess condition); (b) to use reasoning, memory of their initial responses, or both (reassess and memory); or (c) to take an alternate form of the test (parallel). However, the standard test-retest reliability coefficient was higher, p less than .10, than the coefficient obtained from a condition (pure memory) in which subjects were instructed to duplicate their previous responses, using only memory. Although the subjects in the test-retest and combined reassess and memory conditions reported recalling previous answers for 20-25% of the items on the second test, it was concluded that conscious repetition of specific responses did not seriously inflate the estimate of test-retest reliability.     

Effects of real gender and labeled gender on adults' perceptions of infants.

Three experiments were conducted to discover factors mediating adults' perceptions of male and female infants. In the first experiment, college students were shown 30-s videotapes of four male and four female babies, each of whom was randomly labeled with a male or a female name. Infants labeled as male were perceived as significantly more masculine and stronger than those labeled as female. Discriminant analyses revealed that both rated masculinity and the combination of ratings on male stereotyped traits differentiated infants labeled as male or female. Analyses of real gender revealed that boys were rated as less sensitive and stronger than girls. Discriminant analyses suggested that the combination of less sensitive, more of a problem, more mature, and more playful best differentiated real males from real females. In Experiment 2, the findings of Experiment 1 were confirmed with a sample of mothers of young infants. In Experiment 3 college students' judgments of the sex of the eight babies were correctly predicted from the sensitivity ratings of these babies in Experiment 1. It appears that there is a complex of cues from which adults make judgments of infants' gender and inferences about their characteristics: Boys may appear stronger, more playful, and more of a problem, and girls seem to look more sensitive. Implications for further studies of gender labeling and for sex typing are discussed.     

Rorschach object relations of adolescents who committed homicide.

We investigated the object relations of adolescents who committed homicide. A clinical sample of 55 adolescents who committed homicide did not differ from a comparison group of nonviolent delinquents on Rorschach measures of object differentiation, mutuality of autonomy, and aggressive content. However, the subgroup of adolescents who committed homicides in the context of another crime (e.g., robbery or burglary) did manifest significantly lower object relations (poorer object differentiation and more victim responses) than the subgroup of adolescents whose homicides were committed in the context of an interpersonal conflict or dispute with the victim. These findings support the need for differentiated classification of violent individuals as urged by Megargee (1970) over 20 years ago.