Environmentalism as a trait: gauging people's prosocial personality in terms of environmental engagement

According to Hardin (1968), environmental deterioration stems from self-interest undermining people's resource conservation in the collective interest. Not surprisingly, selfless prosocial motives, such as personal feelings of moral obligation, have often been recognized as a key force behind people's environmentalism. In our research, we anticipated that environmentalists-people with an inclination for pro-environmental engagement-would possess a propensity to generally act prosocially. In an extension of previous work, we expected that a well-established self-report measure of past conservation behavior would predict people's active participation in a psychological experiment. Based on subjects' degree of environmental engagement, originally established in 2003, we re-contacted a sample of 502 persons in 2005. Of these 502 (68.5% low, 31.5% high in environmentalism), 131 showed up for the announced experiment. Among those participants, we found that environmentalists' prosocial personalities were additionally reflected in their social value orientations. Ninety percent of the environmentalists turned out to be prosocials, whereas only 65% of the less environmentally engaged subjects were prosocials. Overall, our findings lend credit to a notion of environmentalism as an indicator of even subtle quantitative differences in a person's prosocial trait level. By and large, environmentalists acted more prosocially even in mundane activities unrelated to environmental conservation. Additional evidence comes from the commons dilemma experiment in which the participants partook. There, we generally found comparatively more cooperation with others for the collective good from people high in environmentalism. Our findings represent circumstantial evidence for a prosocial propensity dimension along which people differ, and which is also reflected in people's pro-environmental behavioral performance. If, however, environmentalism has to be regarded as indicative of a prosocial trait rather than a state-like motive, high hopes for moral norms and other prosocial motives in environmental conservation do not seem warranted.     

Dissociable contributions of the left and right posterior medial orbitofrontal cortex in motivational control of goal-directed behavior

Several findings from both human neuroimaging and nonhuman primate studies suggest that the posterior medial orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) may be critical for the motivational control of goal-directed behavior. The present study was conducted to clarify the role of the left and right posterior medial OFC in that function by examining the effects of focal unilateral lesions to this region on the performance on an incentive working memory task. The study covered patients who had undergone surgery for an ACoA aneurysm and normal control subjects (C). The patients were subdivided into three groups: those with resection of the left (LGR+) or right (RGR+) posterior part of the gyrus rectus, and without such a resection (GR−). Participants performed a 2-back working memory task under three motivational conditions (penalty, reward, and no-incentive). The C group performed worse in the penalty condition and better in the reward condition as compared to the no-incentive condition. Similar results were obtained for the GR− group. Performance of the LGR+ group did not depend on incentive manipulations, whereas the RGR+ group performed better in both the penalty and reward conditions than in the no-incentive condition. The results show that the posterior medial OFC is involved in the motivational modulation of working memory performance. Our findings also suggest that the left posterior medial OFC plays a crucial role in this function, whereas the right posterior medial OFC is particularly involved in the processing of the punishing aspect of salient events and it probably mediates in guiding behavior on the basis of negative outcomes of action.     

Ginet on the Problem of Action Externalization

Two questions have been discussed within the context of the action individuation debate. First, the question of action individuation proper - how many actions have been performed when one kills someone by shooting, for example. Second, the question of action externalization - what are the spatial and temporal boundaries of the killing and of the shooting. The internalists (Davidson, Hornsby) argue that the boundaries of actions do not reach beyond the skin of the individual. The externalists (e.g. Ginet) argue that the boundaries of actions do extend beyond the individual. The main problem for the externalists is to explain why so conceived actions are actions. In the paper I evaluate Ginet??s response to this question but find it ultimately unsatisfactory.     

The dud-alternative effect in memory for associations: Putting confidence into local context

When participants are asked to provide confidence judgments for each provided alternative in a multiple-choice memory task, such judgments are inflated if the assessed alternatives are accompanied by an implausible (dud) alternative. This finding, termed the dud-alternative effect, has been recently documented in a memory setting with a lineup procedure (Charman, Wells, & Joy, Law & Human Behavior 35:479–500 2011). In the present study, we developed a novel paradigm to investigate the dud-alternative effect in memory. The paradigm utilizes a multiple-choice associative recognition task in which dud alternatives can be rejected on the basis of their unfamiliarity. In two experiments, we demonstrated a reliable dud-alternative effect with our novel procedure. The results demonstrated that the dud-alternative effect in episodic memory is not limited to tasks based on perceptual factors, but is a general phenomenon concerning confidence judgments.     

Feeling of knowing and restudy choices

Feeling-of-knowing judgments (FOK-Js) reflect people’s confidence that they would be able to recognize a currently unrecallable item. Although much research has been devoted to the factors determining the magnitude and accuracy of FOK-Js, much less work has addressed the issue of whether FOK-Js are related to any form of metacognitive control over memory processes. In the present study, we tested the hypothesis that FOK-Js are related to participants’ choices of which unrecallable items should be restudied. In three experiments, we showed that participants tend to choose for restudy items with high FOK-Js, both when they are explicitly asked to choose for restudy items that can be mastered in the restudy session (Exps. 1a and 2) and when such specific instructions are omitted (Exp. 1b). The study further demonstrated that increasing FOK-Js via priming cues affects restudy choices, even though it does not affect recall directly. Finally, Experiment 2 showed the strategy of restudying unrecalled items with high FOK-Js to be adaptive, because the efficacy of restudy is greater for these items than for items with low FOK-Js. Altogether, the present findings underscore an important role of FOK-Js for the metacognitive control of study operations.     

On a Neg‐Raising Fallacy in Determining Enthymematicity: If She Did not Believe or Want …

Many arguments that show p to be enthymematic (in an argument for q) rely on claims like “if one did not believe that p, one would not have a reason for believing that q.” Such arguments are susceptible to the neg‐raising fallacy. We tend to interpret claims like “X does not believe that p” as statements of disbelief (X's belief that not‐p) rather than as statements of withholding the belief that p. This article argues that there is a tendency to equivocate in arguments for the enthymematicity of arguments (e.g., Lewis Carroll's paradox, Hume's problem) as well as in arguments for the enthymematicity of action explanations (e.g., arguments for psychologism and for explanatory individualism). The article concludes with a warning, because the equivocation is often helpful in teaching and because neg‐raising verbs include philosophically vital verbs: desire, want, intend, think, suppose, imagine, expect, feel, seem, appear.     

Health performance of individuals within the Campbell paradigm

In this paper, we developed a comprehensive health performance measure that formally links individual health attitudes with the likelihood of engaging in a wide variety of health‐related behaviours from various domains such as sustenance, hygiene, and physical exercise. Within what Kaiser, Byrka, and Hartig (2010) call the Campbell paradigm, we equated general health attitude with what a person does to retain or promote his or her health. Thus, health behaviours, on one hand, were expected to form a homogeneous, transitively ordered class of behaviours. On the other hand, the very behavioural class was in turn thought to be the basis from which an individual's health attitude could be directly assessed. A sample of 391 adults provided us with survey data containing different sets of health behaviours as well as variables and personality measures that had been corroborated as health‐behaviour relevant in previous research. We found that self‐reports of 50 behaviours and expressions of appreciation for 20 of these behaviours from various domains formed a transitively ordered class of activities. In contrast to the conventional view in health psychology, in which attitudes are regarded as a psychological cause behind individual behaviour, and in contrast to conventional findings in health psychology, where behaviours appear to fall into numerous sets of more or less distinct domains of health‐enhancing activities (e.g., exercising or avoiding risks), our findings speak of the psychological and formal unity of health behaviour. Inevitably, attitude measures grounded in the Campbell paradigm gauge individual attitudes, and just as much, they measure the health performance of individuals.     

Cognitive Consistency Theory in Social Psychology: A Paradigm Reconsidered

Abstract

From the 1950s onward, psychologists have generally assumed that people possess a general need for cognitive consistency, whose frustration by an inconsistency elicits negative affect. We offer a novel perspective on this issue by introducing the distinction between epistemic and motivational impact of consistent and inconsistent cognitions. The epistemic aspect is represented by the updated expectancy of the outcome addressed in such cognitions. The motivational aspect stems from value (desirability) of that outcome. We show that neither the outcome’s value nor its updated expectancy is systematically related to cognitive consistency or inconsistency. Consequently, we question consistency’s role in the driving of affective responses and the related presumption of a universal human need for cognitive consistency.     

Psychological aspects of the transformations in poland: Changes in the sense of participation in the life of a plant

Abstract

In order to promote innovation, most theorists agree, high levels of participation by all employees in an organization is required. In Eastern Europe nation-wide interventions are underway in some countries to promote participation across all organizations. This article describes one study of this phenomenon.     

Spiritual But Not Religious? Evidence for Two Independent Dispositions

Some psychologists treat religious/spiritual beliefs as a unitary aspect of individual differences. But a distinction between mysticism and orthodox religion has been recognized by scholars as well as laypersons, and empirical studies of "ism" variables and of "spirituality" measures have yielded factors reflecting this distinction. Using a large sample of American adults, analyses demonstrate that subjective spirituality and tradition-oriented religiousness are empirically highly independent and have distinctly different correlates in the personality domain, suggesting that individuals with different dispositions tend toward different styles of religious/spiritual beliefs. These dimensions have low correlations with the lexical Big Five but high correlations with scales (e.g., Absorption, Traditionalism) on some omnibus personality inventories, indicating their relevance for studies of personality.