Mixed matters: fluency impacts trust ratings when faces range on valence but not on motivational implications

Facial features that resemble emotional expressions influence key social evaluations, including trust. Here, we present four experiments testing how the impact of such expressive features is qualified by their processing difficulty. We show that faces with mixed expressive features are relatively devalued, and faces with pure expressive features are relatively valued. This is especially true when participants first engage in a categorisation task that makes processing of mixed expressions difficult and pure expressions easy. Critically, we also demonstrate that the impact of categorisation fluency depends on the specific nature of the expressive features. When faces vary on valence (i.e. sad to happy), trust judgments increase with their positivity, but also depend on fluency. When faces vary on social motivation (i.e. angry to sad), trust judgments increase with their approachability, but remain impervious to disfluency. This suggests that people intelligently use fluency to make judgments on valence-relevant judgment dimensions – but not when faces can be judged using other relevant criteria, such as motivation. Overall, the findings highlight that key social impressions (like trust) are flexibly constructed from inputs related to stimulus features and processing experience.     

The Impact of Deep Muscle Training on the Quality of Posture and Breathing

Postural control and breathing are mechanically and neuromuscularly interdependent. Both systems– of spinal stability and respiration– involve the diaphragm, transversus abdominis, intercostal muscles, internal oblique muscles and pelvic floor muscles. The aim of the study was to evaluate the effect of exercises activating deep stabilizer muscles on postural control and quality of breathing movements. Eighteen volunteers (25,7 ± 3,5) were recruited from the general population. All the subjects implemented an exercise program activating deep muscles. Head, pelvic and trunk positions in the sagittal and frontal planes were assessed with the photogrammetric method. Breathing movements were estimated with the respiratory inductive plethysmography. The results indicate that the use of deep muscle training contributed to a significant change in the position of the body in the sagittal plane (p = 0.008) and the increase in the amplitude of breathing (p = 0.001).     

Environmentalism as a trait: gauging people's prosocial personality in terms of environmental engagement

According to Hardin (1968), environmental deterioration stems from self-interest undermining people's resource conservation in the collective interest. Not surprisingly, selfless prosocial motives, such as personal feelings of moral obligation, have often been recognized as a key force behind people's environmentalism. In our research, we anticipated that environmentalists-people with an inclination for pro-environmental engagement-would possess a propensity to generally act prosocially. In an extension of previous work, we expected that a well-established self-report measure of past conservation behavior would predict people's active participation in a psychological experiment. Based on subjects' degree of environmental engagement, originally established in 2003, we re-contacted a sample of 502 persons in 2005. Of these 502 (68.5% low, 31.5% high in environmentalism), 131 showed up for the announced experiment. Among those participants, we found that environmentalists' prosocial personalities were additionally reflected in their social value orientations. Ninety percent of the environmentalists turned out to be prosocials, whereas only 65% of the less environmentally engaged subjects were prosocials. Overall, our findings lend credit to a notion of environmentalism as an indicator of even subtle quantitative differences in a person's prosocial trait level. By and large, environmentalists acted more prosocially even in mundane activities unrelated to environmental conservation. Additional evidence comes from the commons dilemma experiment in which the participants partook. There, we generally found comparatively more cooperation with others for the collective good from people high in environmentalism. Our findings represent circumstantial evidence for a prosocial propensity dimension along which people differ, and which is also reflected in people's pro-environmental behavioral performance. If, however, environmentalism has to be regarded as indicative of a prosocial trait rather than a state-like motive, high hopes for moral norms and other prosocial motives in environmental conservation do not seem warranted.     

Ginet on the Problem of Action Externalization

Two questions have been discussed within the context of the action individuation debate. First, the question of action individuation proper - how many actions have been performed when one kills someone by shooting, for example. Second, the question of action externalization - what are the spatial and temporal boundaries of the killing and of the shooting. The internalists (Davidson, Hornsby) argue that the boundaries of actions do not reach beyond the skin of the individual. The externalists (e.g. Ginet) argue that the boundaries of actions do extend beyond the individual. The main problem for the externalists is to explain why so conceived actions are actions. In the paper I evaluate Ginet??s response to this question but find it ultimately unsatisfactory.     

The dud-alternative effect in memory for associations: Putting confidence into local context

When participants are asked to provide confidence judgments for each provided alternative in a multiple-choice memory task, such judgments are inflated if the assessed alternatives are accompanied by an implausible (dud) alternative. This finding, termed the dud-alternative effect, has been recently documented in a memory setting with a lineup procedure (Charman, Wells, & Joy, Law & Human Behavior 35:479–500 2011). In the present study, we developed a novel paradigm to investigate the dud-alternative effect in memory. The paradigm utilizes a multiple-choice associative recognition task in which dud alternatives can be rejected on the basis of their unfamiliarity. In two experiments, we demonstrated a reliable dud-alternative effect with our novel procedure. The results demonstrated that the dud-alternative effect in episodic memory is not limited to tasks based on perceptual factors, but is a general phenomenon concerning confidence judgments.     

Feeling of knowing and restudy choices

Feeling-of-knowing judgments (FOK-Js) reflect people’s confidence that they would be able to recognize a currently unrecallable item. Although much research has been devoted to the factors determining the magnitude and accuracy of FOK-Js, much less work has addressed the issue of whether FOK-Js are related to any form of metacognitive control over memory processes. In the present study, we tested the hypothesis that FOK-Js are related to participants’ choices of which unrecallable items should be restudied. In three experiments, we showed that participants tend to choose for restudy items with high FOK-Js, both when they are explicitly asked to choose for restudy items that can be mastered in the restudy session (Exps. 1a and 2) and when such specific instructions are omitted (Exp. 1b). The study further demonstrated that increasing FOK-Js via priming cues affects restudy choices, even though it does not affect recall directly. Finally, Experiment 2 showed the strategy of restudying unrecalled items with high FOK-Js to be adaptive, because the efficacy of restudy is greater for these items than for items with low FOK-Js. Altogether, the present findings underscore an important role of FOK-Js for the metacognitive control of study operations.     

On a Neg‐Raising Fallacy in Determining Enthymematicity: If She Did not Believe or Want …

Many arguments that show p to be enthymematic (in an argument for q) rely on claims like “if one did not believe that p, one would not have a reason for believing that q.” Such arguments are susceptible to the neg‐raising fallacy. We tend to interpret claims like “X does not believe that p” as statements of disbelief (X's belief that not‐p) rather than as statements of withholding the belief that p. This article argues that there is a tendency to equivocate in arguments for the enthymematicity of arguments (e.g., Lewis Carroll's paradox, Hume's problem) as well as in arguments for the enthymematicity of action explanations (e.g., arguments for psychologism and for explanatory individualism). The article concludes with a warning, because the equivocation is often helpful in teaching and because neg‐raising verbs include philosophically vital verbs: desire, want, intend, think, suppose, imagine, expect, feel, seem, appear.     

Health performance of individuals within the Campbell paradigm

In this paper, we developed a comprehensive health performance measure that formally links individual health attitudes with the likelihood of engaging in a wide variety of health‐related behaviours from various domains such as sustenance, hygiene, and physical exercise. Within what Kaiser, Byrka, and Hartig (2010) call the Campbell paradigm, we equated general health attitude with what a person does to retain or promote his or her health. Thus, health behaviours, on one hand, were expected to form a homogeneous, transitively ordered class of behaviours. On the other hand, the very behavioural class was in turn thought to be the basis from which an individual's health attitude could be directly assessed. A sample of 391 adults provided us with survey data containing different sets of health behaviours as well as variables and personality measures that had been corroborated as health‐behaviour relevant in previous research. We found that self‐reports of 50 behaviours and expressions of appreciation for 20 of these behaviours from various domains formed a transitively ordered class of activities. In contrast to the conventional view in health psychology, in which attitudes are regarded as a psychological cause behind individual behaviour, and in contrast to conventional findings in health psychology, where behaviours appear to fall into numerous sets of more or less distinct domains of health‐enhancing activities (e.g., exercising or avoiding risks), our findings speak of the psychological and formal unity of health behaviour. Inevitably, attitude measures grounded in the Campbell paradigm gauge individual attitudes, and just as much, they measure the health performance of individuals.     

Cognitive Consistency Theory in Social Psychology: A Paradigm Reconsidered

Abstract

From the 1950s onward, psychologists have generally assumed that people possess a general need for cognitive consistency, whose frustration by an inconsistency elicits negative affect. We offer a novel perspective on this issue by introducing the distinction between epistemic and motivational impact of consistent and inconsistent cognitions. The epistemic aspect is represented by the updated expectancy of the outcome addressed in such cognitions. The motivational aspect stems from value (desirability) of that outcome. We show that neither the outcome’s value nor its updated expectancy is systematically related to cognitive consistency or inconsistency. Consequently, we question consistency’s role in the driving of affective responses and the related presumption of a universal human need for cognitive consistency.