Good or Bad,We Want it Now: Fixed‐cost Present Bias for Gains and Losses Explains Magnitude Asymmetries in Intertemporal Choice

Intertemporal tradeoffs are ubiquitous in decision making, yet preferences for current versus future losses are rarely explored in empirical research. Whereas rational‐economic theory posits that neither outcome sign (gains vs. losses) nor outcome magnitude (small vs. large) should affect delay discount rates, both do, and moreover, they interact: in three studies, we show that whereas large gains are discounted less than small gains, large losses are discounted more than small losses. This interaction can be understood through a reconceptualization of fixed‐cost present bias, which has traditionally described a psychological preference for immediate rewards. First, our results establish present bias for losses—a psychological preference to have losses over with now. Present bias thus predicts increased discounting of future gains but decreased (or even negative) discounting of future losses. Second, because present bias preferences do not scale with the magnitude of possible gains or losses, they play a larger role, relative to other motivations for discounting, for small magnitude intertemporal decisions than for large magnitude intertemporal decisions. Present bias thus predicts less discounting of large gains than small gains but more discounting of large losses than small losses. The present research is the first to demonstrate that the effect of outcome magnitude on discount rates may be opposite for gains and losses and also the first to offer a theory (an extension of present bias) and process data to explain this interaction. The results suggest that policy efforts to encourage future‐oriented choices should frame outcomes as large gains or small losses. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Decision Strategies and the Confidence–Accuracy Relationship in Face Recognition

The decision strategy used to select a choice set from an array of alternative options is known to affect the composition of the final choice set. Specifically, individuals incorporate more answers into their choice set when it is created by eliminating implausible items than when the set is created through the inclusion of plausible options. This difference is accounted for in a decision framework that posits a general reluctance to change the status quo (i.e., actively include or exclude an item). We extended this work to investigate, not only the decisions themselves, but also metacognitive judgments (i.e., confidence in the accuracy of the choice set). In two face recognition experiments, we tested the impact of decision strategy (Experiment 1) and confidence judgment strategy (Experiment 2) on the confidence–accuracy relationship. In Experiment 1, participants completed two blocks of recognition trials, one under inclusion (marking previously seen faces) and one under elimination (marking previously unseen faces) instructions. We observed superior resolution (i.e., discrimination between correct and incorrect) for inclusion trials, but only when they were completed prior to use of the elimination strategy. In Experiment 2, all participants completed face recognition trials under inclusion instructions, but we manipulated the strategy used to assess confidence. Again, we observed a significant impact of strategy on confidence–accuracy resolution. Thus, we observed that both the strategy employed to reach a decision and that employed to assess confidence affected the confidence–accuracy relationship. We discuss theoretical and applied (particularly for eyewitness identification and multiple‐choice testing) implications. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

True Overconfidence in Interval Estimates: Evidence Based on a New Measure of Miscalibration

Overconfidence is often regarded as one of the most prevalent judgment biases. Several studies show that overconfidence can lead to suboptimal decisions of investors, managers, or politicians. Recent research, however, questions whether overconfidence should be regarded as a bias and shows that standard “overconfidence” findings can easily be explained by different degrees of knowledge of agents plus a random error in predictions. We contribute to the current literature and ongoing research by extensively analyzing interval estimates for knowledge questions, for real financial time series, and for artificially generated charts. We thereby suggest a new method to measure overconfidence in interval estimates, which is based on the implied probability mass behind a stated prediction interval. We document overconfidence patterns, which are difficult to reconcile with rationality of agents and which cannot be explained by differences in knowledge as differences in knowledge do not exist in our task. Furthermore, we show that overconfidence measures are reliable in the sense that there exist stable individual differences in the degree of overconfidence in interval estimates, thereby testing an important assumption of behavioral economics and behavioral finance models: stable individual differences in the degree of overconfidence across people. We do this in a “field experiment,” for different levels of expertise of subjects (students on the one hand and professional traders and investment bankers on the other hand), over time, by using different miscalibration metrics, and for tasks that avoid common weaknesses such as a non‐representative selection of trick questions. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

First and second language in the brain: Neuronal correlates of language processing and spelling strategies

This study explores oscillatory brain activity by means of event-related synchronization and desynchronization (%ERS/ERD) of EEG activity during the use of phonological and orthographic-morphological spelling strategies in L2 (English) and L1 (German) in native German speaking children. EEG was recorded while 33 children worked on a task requiring either phonological or orthographic-morphological spelling strategies. L2 processing elicited more theta %ERS than L1 processing (particularly at bilateral frontal and right posterior parietal sites) which might suggest a stronger involvement of semantic encoding and retrieval of the less familiar L2. The highest level of theta %ERS was revealed for the orthographic-morphological strategy in L2 which might indicate a more intense way of lexical retrieval compared to the phonological strategy in L2 and the orthographic-morphological strategy in L1. Analyses moreover revealed that phonological processing (both in L1 and L2) was associated with comparatively strong left-hemispheric %ERD in the upper alpha frequency band.     

Moral Foundations and Heterogeneity in Ideological Preferences

Scholars have documented numerous examples of how liberals and conservatives differ in considering public policy. Recent work in political psychology has sought to understand these differences by detailing the ways in which liberals and conservatives approach political and social issues. In their moral foundations theory, Haidt and Joseph contend the divisions between liberals and conservatives are rooted in different views of morality. They demonstrate that humans consistently rely on five moral foundations. Two of these foundations—harm and fairness—are often labeled the individualizing foundations, as they deal with the role of individuals within social groups; the remaining three foundations—authority, ingroup loyalty, and purity—are the binding foundations as they pertain to the formation and maintenance of group bonds. Graham, Haidt, and Nosek demonstrate that liberals tend to disproportionately value the individualizing foundations, whereas conservatives value all five foundations equally. We extend this line of inquiry by examining whether different types of liberals and conservatives value the moral foundations to varying degrees. Using survey data (n = 745), we rely on a mixed‐mode latent class analysis and identify six ideological classes that favor unique social and fiscal policy positions. While most of the respondents belonging to these classes self‐identify as conservative, they endorse the moral foundations in varying degrees. Since our findings demonstrate considerable heterogeneity with respect to ideology and moral preferences, we conclude by encouraging scholars to consider this heterogeneity in detailing the motivational and psychological foundations of ideological belief.     

Keyboard Gangsters: Analysis of Incidence and Correlates of Cyberbullying in a Large Urban Student Population

The prevalence and pervasive nature of technology has fundamentally changed how individuals interact. Social networking has significantly altered communication and interaction patterns and created a dynamic venue for perpetration and victimization of bullying. A large population of middle and high school students was surveyed on perceptions and engagement in drug and alcohol usage, school violence, social networking usage, and cyberbullying victimization and perpetration. Findings indicate that although cyberbullying has many similarities to traditional bullying, there are important differences. Participation in school violence and usage of alcohol, tobacco, and illegal drugs predict both victimization and perpetration of cyberbullying.     

The World Wide Wait: Exploring Physiological and Behavioral Effects of Download Speed

ABSTRACT

When people use humorous media content, their behavior and assessments of the content may depend on the emotional expressions (e.g., laughter) of those around them. In a laboratory experiment in which 80 participants watched a movie clip with a confederate who either laughed or remained silent, we identified two parallel processes. The confederate’s laughter induced behavioral responses in our participants (laughing or smiling). Through those responses, a corresponding appraisal of the media content was generated: The content was rated funnier in comparison to situations in which the confederate did not laugh. This effect corresponds to emotional contagion processes and was especially pronounced in introverts. Additionally, participants who were low in conscientiousness directly elevated their funniness ratings (more than their own emotional expressions would suggest) when the confederate laughed. Those who were high in conscientiousness, however, lowered their ratings of the content’s funniness in the presence of a laughing confederate. This finding suggests the existence of an additional cognitive process that links confederate’s laughter and participant’s content ratings beyond automatic contagion. Participants with low conscientiousness use the confederate’s laughter as a heuristic cue for the content’s funniness, while highly conscientious participants discount the confederate’s laughter as a cue for content funniness.     

Reproducibility of functional network metrics and network structure: A comparison of task-related BOLD, resting ASL with BOLD contrast, and resting cerebral blood flow

Network analysis is an emerging approach to functional connectivity in which the brain is construed as a graph and its connectivity and information processing estimated by mathematical characterizations of graphs. There has been little to no work examining the reproducibility of network metrics derived from different types of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data (e.g., resting vs. task related, or pulse sequences other than standard blood oxygen level dependent [BOLD] data) or of measures of network structure at levels other than summary statistics. Here, we take up these questions, comparing the reproducibility of graphs derived from resting arterial spin-labeling perfusion fMRI with those derived from BOLD scans collected while the participant was performing a task. We also examine the reproducibility of the anatomical connectivity implied by the graph by investigating test–retest consistency of the graphs’ edges. We compare two measures of graph-edge consistency both within versus between subjects and across data types. We find a dissociation in the reproducibility of network metrics, with metrics from resting data most reproducible at lower frequencies and metrics from task-related data most reproducible at higher frequencies; that same dissociation is not recapitulated, however, in network structure, for which the task-related data are most consistent at all frequencies. Implications for the practice of network analysis are discussed.     

Foreign accent strength and listener familiarity with an accent codetermine speed of perceptual adaptation

We investigated how the strength of a foreign accent and varying types of experience with foreign-accented speech influence the recognition of accented words. In Experiment 1, native Dutch listeners with limited or extensive prior experience with German-accented Dutch completed a cross-modal priming experiment with strongly, medium, and weakly accented words. Participants with limited experience were primed by the medium and weakly accented words, but not by the strongly accented words. Participants with extensive experience were primed by all accent types. In Experiments 2 and 3, Dutch listeners with limited experience listened to a short story before doing the cross-modal priming task. In Experiment 2, the story was spoken by the priming task speaker and either contained strongly accented words or did not. Strongly accented exposure led to immediate priming by novel strongly accented words, while exposure to the speaker without strongly accented tokens led to priming only in the experiment’s second half. In Experiment 3, listeners listened to the story with strongly accented words spoken by a different German-accented speaker. Listeners were primed by the strongly accented words, but again only in the experiment’s second half. Together, these results show that adaptation to foreign-accented speech is rapid but depends on accent strength and on listener familiarity with those strongly accented words.