IV. Logic and truth‐finding in society and sociology

The question of sociological truth‐finding is posed in the light of the view that logical formalizations, along with other arguments, only acquire relevance in illocutionary contexts, where it is not so much the abstract correctness of a sentence as the stating of it that counts. In order to become a counterfactual an argument requires its antecedent to be recognized as being contrary to the ‘facts’. To this extent there is a clear link with ‘reality’ or with a view of the world that is taken as factually given. Social science develops on the basis not only of generalizations but also of historical facts and political requirements. The question arises: in terms of what world‐view or purpose can we unambiguously declare a conditional to be a counterfactual ‐ and a significant or non‐trivial one at that? Further, can Elster's clarifications help identify political agents and the proper entities within and through which political action is performed? Finally, the problem‐solving capacity of the concept of closeness of one possible world to another or to the actual world, especially with regard to counterfactuals and causality, is questioned.     

Kant and Hegel on freedom: Two new interpretations

Can Kant's theory of freedom be defended in contemporary ‘incompatibilist’ terms, as Henry Allison believes, or is it vulnerable to Hegelian criticisms of the ‘compatibilist’ sort that Allen Wood presents? I argue that the answer to both of these questions is negative, and that there is a third option, namely that Kant's real theory of freedom is not as well off as Allison contends, nor as weak as Wood claims. Allison tries to save Kant's theory of freedom from both what he takes to be traditional and improper interpretations ‐ notably including Hegel's and Wood's ‐ of what that theory means, as well as from traditional and improper objections to its defensibility. I argue in part with Wood (and Hegel) against Allison on the issue of the meaning of Kant's theory, and in part with Allison against Wood (and Hegel) on the issue of the defensibility of Kant's theory.     

Changes in Skin Potentials During the Psychogalvanic Reflex

Researchers have shown that working memory is related to a variety of high-level cognitive processes. However, the results of recent research have suggested that may be because of its role in attentional control. In the present experiment, the authors investigated that hypothesis by using an attentional interference task with musical stimuli. Listeners were asked to monitor one ear for either a clarinet or violin tone and to ignore any information in the other ear. On some of the trials, they heard only one tone and on other trials, either the same instrument in both ears or different instruments. Individual differences were measured in working memory and musical experience. The results showed more attentional interference in the different-instrument condition for participants with lower working memory scores, which suggested that working memory involves the ability to control attention to inhibit irrelevant information.     

Are lies more wrong than errors? Accuracy judgments of inaccurate statements

People are often mistaken when estimating and predicting quantities, and sometimes they report values that they know are false: they lie. There exists, however, little research devoted to how such deviations are being perceived. In four vignette studies, participants were asked to rate the accuracy of inaccurate statements about quantities (prices, numbers and amounts). The results indicate that overstatements are generally judged to be more inaccurate than understatements of the same magnitude; self-favorable (optimistic) statements are considered more inaccurate than unfavorable (pessimistic) statements, and false reports (lies) are perceived to be more inaccurate than equally mistaken estimates. Lies about the future did not differ from lies about the past, but own lies were perceived as larger than the same lies attributed to another person. It is suggested that estimates are judged according to how close they come to the true values (close estimates are more correct than estimates that are less close), whereas lies are judged as deviant from truth, with less importance attached to the magnitude of the deviation.     

Overt naming fMRI pre- and post-TMS: Two nonfluent aphasia patients, with and without improved naming post-TMS

Two chronic, nonfluent aphasia patients participated in overt naming fMRI scans, pre- and post-a series of repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) treatments as part of a TMS study to improve naming. Each patient received 10, 1-Hz rTMS treatments to suppress a part of R pars triangularis. P1 was a ‘good responder’ with improved naming and phrase length; P2 was a ‘poor responder’ without improved naming.Pre-TMS (10 years poststroke), P1 had significant activation in R and L sensorimotor cortex, R IFG, and in both L and R SMA during overt naming fMRI (28% pictures named). At 3 mo. post-TMS (42% named), P1 showed continued activation in R and L sensorimotor cortex, R IFG, and in R and L SMA. At 16 mo. post-TMS (58% named), he also showed significant activation in R and L sensorimotor cortex mouth and R IFG. He now showed a significant increase in activation in the L SMA compared to pre-TMS and at 3 mo. post-TMS (p < .02; p < .05, respectively). At 16 mo. there was also greater activation in L than R SMA (p < .08). At 46 mo. post-TMS (42% named), this new LH pattern of activation continued. He improved on the Boston Naming Test from 11 pictures named pre-TMS, to scores ranging from 14 to 18 pictures, post-TMS (2–43 mo. post-TMS). His longest phrase length (Cookie Theft picture) improved from three words pre-TMS, to 5–6 words post-TMS.Pre-TMS (1.5 years poststroke), P2 had significant activation in R IFG (3% pictures named). At 3 and 6 mo. post-TMS, there was no longer significant activation in R IFG, but significant activation was present in R sensorimotor cortex. On all three fMRI scans, P2 had significant activation in both the L and R SMA. There was no new, lasting perilesional LH activation across sessions for this patient. Over time, there was little or no change in his activation. His naming remained only at 1–2 pictures during all three fMRI scans. His BNT score and longest phrase length remained at one word, post-TMS.Lesion site may play a role in each patient’s fMRI activation pattern and response to TMS treatment. P2, the poor responder, had an atypical frontal lesion in the L motor and premotor cortex that extended high, near brain vertex, with deep white matter lesion near L SMA. P2 also had frontal lesion in the posterior middle frontal gyrus, an area important for naming (Duffau et al., 2003); P1 did not. Additionally, P2 had lesion inferior and posterior to Wernicke’s area, in parts of BA 21 and 37, whereas P1 did not.The fMRI data of our patient who had good response following TMS support the notion that restoration of the LH language network is linked in part, to better recovery of naming and phrase length in nonfluent aphasia.     

The self-importance of moral identity

Recent theorizing in moral psychology extends rationalist models by calling attention to social and cultural influences (J. Haidt, 2001). Six studies using adolescents, university students, and adults measured the associations among the self-importance of moral identity, moral cognitions, and behavior. The psychometric properties of the measure were assessed through an examination of the underlying factor structure (Study 1) and convergent, nomological, and discriminant validity analyses (Studies 2 and 3). The predictive validity of the instrument was assessed by examinations of the relationships among the self-importance of moral identity, various psychological outcomes, and behavior (Studies 4, 5, and 6). The results are discussed in terms of models of moral behavior, social identity measurement, and the need to consider moral self-conceptions in explaining moral conduct.     

Aussagenlogik im Mittelalter

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Self‐regulation of Group Members: The Case of Regulatory Focus

For a long time, research on motivation and (inter)group behaviour mainly focused on needs and motives, but did not take self‐regulation (i.e., the processes underlying motivated action) into account. Similarly, self‐regulation research concentrated on the regulation of the personal self, but did not study the regulation of the social self. The current article summarizes work applying self‐regulation approaches to intergroup behaviour. Within this approach, it has been shown (a) that the social self is regulated based on the same mechanisms as the personal self, (b) that intergroup contexts impact on group members’ self‐regulation strategies, and (c) that the fit between an individual's self‐regulation strategy and the behavioural options provided by the group impact on group liking and potentially also on the integration of the group into the self‐concept. The relation between current and earlier approaches to motivation in groups and further avenues for research on group‐based self‐regulation are discussed.     

Priming of semantic classifications by novel subliminal prime words

Four experiments demonstrate category congruency priming by subliminal prime words that were never seen as targets in a valence-classification task (Experiments 1, 2, and 4) and a gender-classification task (Experiment 3). In Experiment 1, overlap in terms of word fragments of one or more letters between primes and targets of different valences was larger than between primes and targets of the same valence. In Experiments 2 and 3, the sets of prime words and target words were completely disjoint in terms of used letters. In Experiment 4, pictures served as targets. The observed subliminal priming effects for novel primes cannot be driven by partial analysis of primes at the word-fragment level; they suggest instead that primes were processed semantically as whole words contingent upon prime duration.