Aussagenlogik im Mittelalter

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Revisions and Regret: The Cost of Changing your Mind

Decision reversals often imply improved decisions. Yet, people show a strong resistance against changing their minds. These are well‐established findings, which suggest that changed decisions carry a subjective cost, perhaps by being more strongly regretted. Three studies were conducted to explore participants' regret when making reversible decisions and to test the hypothesis that changing one's mind will increase post‐outcome regret. The first two studies employed the Ultimatum game and the Trust game. The third study used a variant of the Monty Hall problem. All games were conducted by individual participants playing interactively against a computer. The outcomes were designed to capture a common characteristic of real‐life decisions: they varied from rather negative to fairly positive, and for every outcome, it was possible to imagine both more and less profitable outcomes. In all experiments, those who changed their minds reported much stronger post‐outcome regret than those who did not change, even if the final outcomes were equally good (Experiments 2 and 3) or better (Experiment 1).This finding was not because of individual differences with respect to gender, tendency to regret, or tendency to maximize. Previous studies have found that those who change from a correct to wrong option regret more than those who select a wrong option directly. This study indicates that this finding is a special case of a more general phenomenon: changing one's mind seems to come with a cost, even when one ends up with favorable outcomes. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Disfluency data of German preschool children who stutter and comparison children

This study compared the disfluencies of German-speaking preschool children who stutter (CWS, N = 24) with those produced by age- and sex-matched comparison children who do not stutter (CWNS, N = 24). In accordance with Yairi and Ambrose's [Yairi, E., & Ambrose, N. (1992). A longitudinal study of stuttering in children: A preliminary report. Journal of Speech and Hearing Research, 35, 755-760] guidelines the CWS group had a narrow age range (2-5 years) and were seen close to the reported time of their stuttering onset (average of 8 months). Furthermore, over 95% of the CWS group had not received any type of speech therapy intervention. Consistent with previous findings for English-speaking preschool children, 'stuttering-like' disfluencies (prolongations, blocks, part- and one-syllable word repetitions) were significantly more frequent in CWS (mean = 9.2%) than in CWNS (mean = 1.2%), whereas no significant group differences occurred with respect to 'normal' disfluencies. The number of iterations in stuttering-like disfluencies was also significantly higher in CWS (mean = 1.28 iterations) than in CWNS (mean = 1.09 iterations). In contrast to previous findings, a sub-group of children who have been stuttering for a shorter time (1-5 months) did not differ from a sub-group who had stuttered for a longer period (8-22 months). EDUCATIONAL OBJECTIVES: The reader will be able to: (1) describe how German-speaking preschool children who stutter and who do not stutter display stuttering-like and normal disfluencies including number of iterations; (2) explain how powerful classification measures for the diagnosis of stuttering are for German-speaking preschool children; (3) discuss how disfluency patterns of native English- and German-speaking children close to onset of stuttering differ.     

Evidence for an implicit influence of memory on future thinking

The capacity to think about specific events that one might encounter in the future—episodic future thought— involves the flexible (re)organization of memory. The present study demonstrates that implicit processes play an important role here. In two experiments (N = 180), participants were asked to generate a personal event that they expected to plausibly occur in the following week. The content of the participants’ responses was biased (i.e., primed) by recent thoughts about a specific category of experiences. For instance, participants who had recently been induced to think about social experiences, in the context of an ostensibly unrelated task, were more likely than nonprimed participants to generate similar events occurring in their immediate future. Importantly, the participants were unaware of this unintentional influence of memory. The theoretical and practical implications of these findings for understanding episodic future thought and its relation to memory are discussed.     

Transposition asymmetry in immediate serial recall

When participants confuse the position of items in immediate serial recall, they tend to recall transposed items too early rather than too late. This asymmetry of transposition errors was observed in four experiments. It increased as a function of list length, but was independent of report order, output position, cueing condition, and recall mode. The transposition asymmetry is consistent with error patterns in free recall and in regular speech production where transpositions are usually forward‐looking. The asymmetry of transposition errors is discussed in terms of models of serial memory.     

Different Types of Religious/Spiritual Well-Being in Relation to Personality and Subjective Well-Being

In this study the authors attempt to present different types of Religious/Spiritual Well-Being (RSWB) and discuss their relation to personality and psychological well-being. The Multidimensional Inventory for Religious/Spiritual Well-Being 48 is employed for this study, which consists of 6 subscales. To find different types of RSWB, an agglomerative cluster analysis on these subscales was performed based on the responses obtained in a nonclinical adult sample (n = 463). A 4-cluster solution was accepted. The clusters were labeled as Religious/Spiritual High, Religiously Oriented, Existentially Oriented, and Religious/Spiritual Low, and were found to be substantially related to Sense of Coherence (n = 263) and Six Factors of Personality (n = 200) in two different subsamples. By presenting a first empirical model for a 4-field typology of RSWB, we hope to further contribute to the ongoing discussion on how to deal with religious/spiritual issues in personality research.     

II. Mathematical modelling of election predictions: Comments to Simon's reply

Herbert A. Simon's reply (Inquiry, Vol. 25, No. 3) to my criticism of his 1954 paper is not to the point. He fails to respond to some of my arguments and misconceives others. One of his misconceptions is that any mathematical deduction from empirical premises which are formulated mathematically will necessarily lead to empirically valid conclusions. This claim is particularly unwarrantable in Simon's case since his mathematical premise, the continuity of the reaction function, is empirically meaningless.