Diferencias individuales en cognición: una nueva aproximación a la inteligencia

RESUMEN

El hecho de las diferencias individuales en el funcionamiento mental es una realidad. Su amplitud y naturaleza tiene unas consecuencias tan importantes en nuestra cultura que hace que la sociedad demande una forma de medir la inteligencia. No obstante algunos psicólogos opinan que los tests de inteligencia son un instrumento de medida que no representa adecuadamente un modelo formal de la dinámica de los procesos de pensamiento. Este artículo consiste en una serie de argumentos teóricos y empíricos contra la separación de los tests y las teorías cognitivas. Se piensa, en este artículo, que se pueden producir substanciales beneficios del acercamiento entre el psicólogo experimental y el psicómetra; los datos disponibles indican cómo se puede producir este acercamiento.     

Speech Intelligibility and Recall of Spoken Material Heard at Different Signal‐to‐noise Ratios and the Role Played by Working Memory Capacity

We studied speech intelligibility and memory performance for speech material heard under different signal‐to‐noise (S/N) ratios. Pre‐experimental measures of working memory capacity (WMC) were taken to explore individual susceptibility to the disruptive effects of noise. Thirty‐five participants first completed a WMC‐operation span task in quiet and later listened to spoken word lists containing 11 one‐syllable phonetically balanced words presented at four different S/N ratios (+12, +9, +6, and +3). Participants repeated each word aloud immediately after its presentation, to establish speech intelligibility and later on performed a free recall task for those words. The speech intelligibility function decreased linearly with increasing S/N levels for both the high‐WMC and low‐WMC groups. However, only the low‐WMC group had decreasing memory performance with increasing S/N levels. The memory of the high‐WMC individuals was not affected by increased S/N levels. Our results suggest that individual differences in WMC counteract some of the negative effects of speech noise. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Intending or Pretending? Automatic Evaluations of Goal Cues Discriminate True and False Intentions

This research presents a novel approach to discriminating between true and deceptive statements about intended future behavior. Arguing that true intentions are goal‐directed, we predict that people who genuinely intend to pursue a reported goal will implicitly evaluate goal‐relevant cues positively, whereas people who do not intend to pursue the goal will not. Participants in an experiment were instructed to tell the truth about a planned future behavior (true intention) or to falsely report that same behavior to mask their actual mock‐criminal intention (false intention). As predicted, an evaluative priming task showed that participants with true intention exhibited implicit positive evaluations of cues relevant to the reported goal, whereas participants with false intention did not. Subsequent analyses showed that implicit positivity significantly discriminated between true and false intentions. The findings are discussed in terms of theoretical contributions and implications for the development of future detection tools. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Revisions and Regret: The Cost of Changing your Mind

Decision reversals often imply improved decisions. Yet, people show a strong resistance against changing their minds. These are well‐established findings, which suggest that changed decisions carry a subjective cost, perhaps by being more strongly regretted. Three studies were conducted to explore participants' regret when making reversible decisions and to test the hypothesis that changing one's mind will increase post‐outcome regret. The first two studies employed the Ultimatum game and the Trust game. The third study used a variant of the Monty Hall problem. All games were conducted by individual participants playing interactively against a computer. The outcomes were designed to capture a common characteristic of real‐life decisions: they varied from rather negative to fairly positive, and for every outcome, it was possible to imagine both more and less profitable outcomes. In all experiments, those who changed their minds reported much stronger post‐outcome regret than those who did not change, even if the final outcomes were equally good (Experiments 2 and 3) or better (Experiment 1).This finding was not because of individual differences with respect to gender, tendency to regret, or tendency to maximize. Previous studies have found that those who change from a correct to wrong option regret more than those who select a wrong option directly. This study indicates that this finding is a special case of a more general phenomenon: changing one's mind seems to come with a cost, even when one ends up with favorable outcomes. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Can > Will: Predictions of What Can Happen are Extreme,but Believed to be Probable

Predictions of uncertain events are often described in terms of what can or what will happen. How are such statements used by speakers, and what are they perceived to mean? Participants in four experiments were presented with distributions of variable product characteristics and were asked to generate natural, meaningful sentences containing either will or can. Will was typically associated with either low or intermediate numeric values, whereas can consistently suggested high (maximum) values. For instance, laptop batteries lasting from 1.5 to 3.5 hours will last for 1.5 hours or for 2.5 hours, but they can last for 3.5 hours. The same response patterns were found for positive and negative events. In will‐statements, the most frequent scalar modifiers were at least and about, whereas in can‐statements, the most frequent modifier included up to. A fifth experiment showed that will indicates an outcome that may be certain but more often simply probable. Can means possible, but even can‐statements are perceived to imply probable outcomes. This could create a communication paradox because most speakers use can to describe outcomes that because of their extremity are at the same time quite unlikely. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A history of my animus dreaming,waking

In a recent episode of the TV series Star Trek: The Next Generation, Captain Jean-Luc Picard and the crew of the starship Enterprise land surreptitiously on a distant planet. When they are discovered by the humanoid inhabitants, who have webbed feet and toes and a raised ridge on their foreheads, the human invaders explain that their mission is to assist planetary cultures like theirs when they are ready to begin space travel.     

An account of the relationship between fluid intelligence and complex learning in considering storage capacity and executive attention

Although fluid intelligence and complex learning are conceptualized differently and assessed by apparently different measures, both theoretical accounts and empirical evidence suggest a relationship between the two constructs. In this study, major working memory aspects including the storage capacity and executive attention were proposed to account for the relationship between fluid intelligence and complex learning. A sample of 184 participants completed fluid intelligence and complex learning scales, as well as working memory measures that each included two or three treatment levels differing in the demands on capacity or executive control. The differences among the treatment levels provided a favorable precondition for employing fixed-links models to separate the core processes of storage capacity or executive attention from the auxiliary processes. Results indicated that both storage capacity and executive attention contributed significantly to fluid intelligence and complex learning. A further analysis showed that the two working memory aspects, particularly the storage capacity, accounted for most of the shared variance between fluid intelligence and complex learning.     

A CHRISTIAN NATURALISM: DEVELOPING THE THINKING OF GORDON KAUFMAN

This essay develops a theological naturalism using Gordon Kaufman's nonpersonal idea of God as serendipitous creativity in contrast to the personal metaphorical theology of Sallie McFague. It then develops a Christian theological naturalism by using Kaufman's idea of historical trajectories, specifically Jesus trajectory₁ and Jesus trajectory₂. The first is the trajectory in the early Christian church assuming a personal God in the framework of Greek philosophy that results in the Trinity. The second is the naturalistic‐humanistic trajectory of creativity (God) that evolves from nonpersonal interactions in the universe and life to creativity in persons and is manifested in Jesus as love. This is elaborated further with Dean Keith Simonton's Darwinian understanding of genius and Marcus Borg's analysis of Jesus as Jewish mystic, teacher of alternative wisdom, and nonviolent resister to the domination system of the Roman Empire. What makes Jesus a religious genius is his exemplifying unconditional, universal love—a new mode of creativity (God) that has evolved from nonhuman to a human form.