Predicting others’ actions: evidence for a constant time delay in action simulation

Recent evidence indicates that humans can precisely predict the outcome of occluded actions. It has been suggested that these predictions arise from a mental simulation which might run in real-time. The present experiments aimed to specify the time course of this simulation process. Participants watched transiently occluded point-light actions and the temporal outcome after occlusion was manipulated. Participants were instructed to judge the temporal coherence of the action after a short (Experiment 1) and a long occlusion period (Experiment 2). Both experiments revealed a comparable negative point of subjective equality (PSE), indicating that action simulation took constantly longer than the observed action itself. Such a temporal error was not present when inverted actions were used, (Experiment 3) ruling out a pure visually driven effect. The results suggest that the temporal error is due to costs arising from a switch from action perception to an internal simulation process involving motor representations.     

Movement kinematics affect action prediction: comparing human to non-human point-light actions

The influence of movement kinematics on the accuracy of predicting the time course of another individual's actions was studied. A human point-light shape was animated with human movement (natural condition) and with artificial movement that was more uniform regarding velocity profiles and trajectories (artificial condition). During brief occlusions, the participants predicted the actions in order to judge after occlusion whether the actions were continued coherently in time or shifted to an earlier or later frame. Error rates and reaction times were increased in the artificial compared to the natural condition. The findings suggest a perceptual advantage for movement with a human velocity profile, corresponding to the notion of a close interaction between observed and executed movement. The results are discussed in the framework of the simulation account and alternative interpretations are provided on the basis of correlations between the velocity profiles of natural and artificial movements with prediction performance.     

Are lies more wrong than errors? Accuracy judgments of inaccurate statements

People are often mistaken when estimating and predicting quantities, and sometimes they report values that they know are false: they lie. There exists, however, little research devoted to how such deviations are being perceived. In four vignette studies, participants were asked to rate the accuracy of inaccurate statements about quantities (prices, numbers and amounts). The results indicate that overstatements are generally judged to be more inaccurate than understatements of the same magnitude; self-favorable (optimistic) statements are considered more inaccurate than unfavorable (pessimistic) statements, and false reports (lies) are perceived to be more inaccurate than equally mistaken estimates. Lies about the future did not differ from lies about the past, but own lies were perceived as larger than the same lies attributed to another person. It is suggested that estimates are judged according to how close they come to the true values (close estimates are more correct than estimates that are less close), whereas lies are judged as deviant from truth, with less importance attached to the magnitude of the deviation.     

APOLOGIZING WITHOUT REGRET

A common belief about the nature of agent regret is that regretting some event E is closely linked to being sorry for the occurrence of E. Or more specifically, that if one is sorry for E then she must regret E. I will call this ‘the sorry‐regret hypothesis’. My contention is that one may be sorry for some action but not regret it. I take the rejection of this ‘truism’ to be a positive development. I offer two lines of argument for rejecting the sorry‐regret hypothesis. One line of argument is based on counterexamples. The second attacks the validity of a reconstructed argument for the sorry‐regret hypothesis. It is desirable to reject the sorry‐regret hypothesis since there is a component of regret that many will not wish to be saddled with as a condition of apologizing. To regret an act, one must wish that she had not performed that act. Since a person is the person she is (speaking loosely) because of the actions she has performed, for many actions, if one regrets an action, then she wishes that she were a different person. This is a worrisome consequence.     

Lasting effects of alcohol: Subliminal alcohol cues,impairment expectancies,and math performance

Many people believe that drinking alcohol reduces cognitive performance, and prior research has shown such expectancy‐related impairment even when people merely thought that the (non‐alcoholic) drink they consumed contained alcohol. This study tested whether subliminal priming with alcohol‐related cues would similarly result in expectancy‐consistent cognitive performance decrements. Additionally, the moderating role of alcohol use was examined. After assessing participants' baseline math performance, participants were primed with alcohol‐related or neutral words and then completed a post‐treatment math task. Whereas impairment expectancies had no influence on math performance in control participants, expectancies predicted math performance for participants primed with alcohol‐related words. As hypothesized, expectancy‐consistent impairment in performance was only observed among high alcohol users. The current findings suggest that, in the presence of alcohol‐related cues in the environment, some people may perform less on cognitive tasks even in the absence of actual or assumed alcohol consumption and without being aware of it. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The rationalism in Anil Gupta’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Empiricism and Experience</Emphasis>

In these comments I briefly discuss three aspects of the empiricist account of the epistemic role of experience that Anil Gupta develops in his Empiricism and Experience. First, I discuss the motivations Gupta offers for the claim that the given in experience should be regarded as reliable. Second, I discuss two different ways of conceiving of the epistemic significance of the phenomenology of experience. And third, I discuss whether Gupta’s account is able to deliver the anti-skeptical results he intends it to. I close by suggesting that, once fully fleshed out, Gupta’s account is best understood in terms of the fusion of certain core ideas within both the empiricist and the rationalist traditions.     

CALLING: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A SCALE MEASURE

This study clarifies the definition of calling—a consuming, meaningful passion people experience toward a domain—and develops a 12‐item scale measure of calling. Drawing on multiwave longitudinal, 2‐wave longitudinal, and cross‐sectional data from 1,500 participants (2,278 observations) in 4 separate domains, music, art, business, and management, we demonstrate the scale's reliability and unidimensional structure across contexts and over time. We establish the scale's convergent validity and discriminant validity. We determine criterion‐related validity through the scale's relationship to satisfaction with the calling domain, career‐related self‐efficacy, clarity of professional identity, career insight, attending a calling‐oriented college program, professional pursuit of the calling domain, and differences across the 4 domains. We discuss implications of this reliable, valid measure for theory and research on calling, meaning of work, and careers.     

Therapeutic alliance and progress in couple therapy: multiple perspectives

Therapeutic alliance research in couple therapy using multiple perspectives and longitudinal data has been sparse. This study used structural equation modelling to explore relationships between changes in alliance and in progress from clients' and therapists' perspective in a fairly large sample of couples (N=195) during the initial stage of therapy at an on‐campus training clinic. Self‐rated alliance was measured after sessions 2 through 4 with the Working Alliance Inventory. There was very little change in alliance over the early sessions of therapy, and changes in alliance did not always account for changes in relationship satisfaction. Husbands' perceptions of satisfaction and alliance seem to play an important role in the dynamics of the therapeutic process. Findings suggest a reciprocal relationship between perceptions of alliance and progress in therapy when combining perceptions of therapists and couple clients. Clinical implications and future research are discussed.