Unemployed Adults’ Career Thoughts,Career Self‐Efficacy,and Interest: Any Similarity to College Students?

Little empirical knowledge about unemployed adults exists during a time when this group needs substantial career assistance. Because there is greater empirical understanding of college student career development compared with what is known about unemployed adults, a chi square and analyses of covariance were used to compare the career thinking, self‐efficacy, and interests of 169 unemployed adults seeking public job center assistance with that of 200 college students. Additionally, a diverse sample of 2,444 unemployed adults is demographically reviewed. Unemployed adults reported a higher level of Realistic interests and similar levels of negative career thinking and career decision‐making self‐efficacy compared with college students.     

Goal relevance moderates evaluative conditioning effects

An important process by which preferences emerge is evaluative conditioning, defined as a change in the evaluation of a stimulus by pairing it repeatedly and consistently with an affective stimulus. The current research focuses on the role of motivation in this learning process. Specifically, it was investigated whether a conditioning procedure that is relevant to an individual's current goals is more effective than an irrelevant procedure. To this end, beverages were conditioned with either disgusted faces (relevant) or fearful faces (irrelevant). The results showed that thirsty(rather than non-thirsty) participants’ choice and evaluation of beverages were influenced by pairing beverages with disgust but not with fear. As similar results were obtained under optimal and suboptimal presentation of the conditioned stimuli, it is suggested that goals can affect automatic, associative learning, adding to the emerging body of research demonstrating that goals unconsciously affect evaluative processes.     

On Categories and A Posteriori Necessity: A Phenomenological Echo

This article argues for two related theses. First, it defends a general thesis: any kind of necessity, including metaphysical necessity, can only be known a priori. Second, however, it also argues that the sort of a priori involved in modal metaphysical knowledge is not related to imagination or any sort of so‐called epistemic possibility. Imagination is neither a proof of possibility nor a limit to necessity. Rather, modal metaphysical knowledge is built on intuition of philosophical categories and the structures they form.     

Changing minds in a changing world

I defend a general rule for updating beliefs that takes into account both the impact of new evidence and changes in the subject??s location. The rule combines standard conditioning with a ??shifting?? operation that moves the center of each doxastic possibility forward to the next point where information arrives. I show that well-known arguments for conditioning lead to this combination when centered information is taken into account. I also discuss how my proposal relates to other recent proposals, what results it delivers for puzzles like the Sleeping Beauty problem, and whether there are diachronic constraints on rational belief at all.