Relevance reviewed: The case of argumentum ad hominem

This article aims tt providing some conceptual tools for dealing adequately with relevance in argumentative discourse. For this purpose, argumentative relevance is defined as a functional interactional relation between certain elements in the discourse. In addition to the distinction between interpretive and evaluative relevance that can be traced in the literature, analytic relevance is introduced as an intermediary concept. In order to classify the various problems of relevance arising in interpreting, analyzing and evaluating argumentative discourse, a taxonomy is proposed in which the concept of relevance is differentiated along three co-ordinate dimensions: object, domain and aspect. With the help of this taxonomy, it can be shown that the problems of evaluative relevance with which the standard approach to fallacies cannot satisfactory deal can be more systematically approached within a pragma-dialectical framework. This is demonstrated for the argumentum and hominem, which is erroneously treated as a homogenous type of relevance fallacy in logico-centric analyses, so that cases where this is not justified must be treated as ad hoc exceptions.     

Creating new memories that are quickly accessed and confidently held

In two experiments involving a total of 542 subjects, a series of slides depicting a burglary was shown. After the initial event, subjects were exposed to one or more narratives about the event that contained some misinformation or neutral information about four critical details. Finally, subjects were tested on their memories of what they saw, and their reaction times and confidence levels were measured. When subjects took a standard test in which the misinformation item was a possible response option, they responded very quickly and confidently when making this incorrect choice. Misled subjects responded as quickly and confidently to these "unreal" memories as they did to their genuine memories. It does not seem, then, that the misinformation effect arises from a large proportion of subjects who must resolve a conflict between two memories when they are tested, a conflict that would be expected to take time. When subjects took a modified test in which the misinformation item was not a possible response, misled subjects were as accurate as were controls, but they responded more slowly, regardless of whether they ultimately chose the right or wrong option. These findings indicate that misinformation does introduce some form of interference not detected by a simple test of accuracy.     

Are words represented by nodes?

Semantic priming in a lexical decision task was investigated with concurrent pretarget and posttarget primes. The posttarget prime also served as a pattern mask of the lexical decision target. Forward priming is defined as the presence of a semantically related pretarget prime and an unrelated posttarget prime. Backward priming is defined as the presence of a semantically related posttarget prime and an unrelated pretarget prime. Forward and backward priming were compared both when the nonword foils were "legal" and when they were "illegal" with respect to English orthography. Predictions were derived for two general approaches to word recognition: spreading-activation and expectancy-set theories. Both approaches assume that word representations occupy distinct, nonoverlapping locations in memory. Backward-prime facilitation was equivalent to forward-prime facilitation when nonword foils were illegal; however, backward-prime facilitation was not significant when nonword foils were legal. These results challenge both approaches. The proposed solution uses semantic-space (distributed) representations that are functionally unitized by a resonant matching (verification) process.     

Generativity and Erikson's “belief in the species”

Generativity is the concern for guiding and promoting the next generation through such creative behavior as parenting, teaching, mentoring, leading, and generating products and outcomes that benefit others. Erikson (1963) has argued that in order to be generative in adulthood, people must have a fundamental “belief in the species” or a faith that human progress is possible and worth working toward. The present study focuses on hope and trust concerning the self and others (Erikson's “belief in the species”). In addition, however, the study examines the relation between generativity and personality traits, in this case, dominance, leadership, self-absorption, and nurturance. A sample of 70 adults was administered (1) a series of self-report questionnaires converging on Erikson's idea of belief in the species, (2) a self-report scale assessing generativity, (3) measures of personality traits, and (4) two open-ended measures of generativity requiring subjects to describe life commitments and creative endeavors. The results provide modest support for Erikson's claim of a link between belief in the species and generativity, with significant positive correlations obtained (1) between self-report generativity and two measures of belief in species and (2) between generativity assessed through life commitments and one measure of belief in the species. In addition, the personality trait of nurturance was positively related to all three generativity measures. Problems and issues in the assessment of generativity are discussed.     

Age differences in the acculturation process

Age differences were assessed in a conceptual model that seeks to explain how acculturation affects psychological well-being among Mexican Americans. The data were from a national probability sample of 859 persons of Mexican decent. It was hypothesized that low acculturation creates financial stress. Moreover, low acculturation and financial stress were in turn predicted to erode feelings of personal control and self-esteem. Finally, diminished feelings of control and low self-esteem were hypothesized to exert a negative impact on psychological well-being. When data from respondents of all ages was assessed, empirical support was found for all of the hypotheses except the linkage between acculturation and financial stress. However, few age differences emerged in the model. The authors conclude that older Mexican Americans may not be more vulnerable to the stressors associated with acculturation.     

Memories of a bicycle tour

One person's memories of a 47-day bicycle tour of Scandinavia were tested 3–4 months later. The tests assessed frequency, spatial, and temporal knowledge of events. Results indicated that frequency judgements were based on some combination of counts of discrete event memories and a general impression of the tour. Episodic memories showed clear variation as a function of where events had occurred, and judged and actual locations of episodes were strongly related. In fact, knowledge of the week in which something had happened appeared to hinge on where in a sequence of locations it was thought to have taken place. The apparent dependence of temporal judgements on spatial information is consistent with other findings in the literature indicating that temporal memories about past events are derived from a variety of other associated information, much of which is temporally referenced.     

Acquired affective-evaluative value: conservative but not unchangeable

In a previous study on Evaluative Conditioning it was found that unlike signal-learning, evaluative learning is resistant to extinction. In the present experiment we tried to replicate and corroborate this finding. In addition, we investigated the effectiveness of a counterconditioning procedure to alter acquired evaluative value. On a within-subject base (n = 30), it was found that the mere contingent presentation of neutral with (dis)liked pictures of human faces was sufficient to change the affective-evaluative tone of the originally neutral stimuli in (negative) positive direction. Next, we replicated the finding that an extinction procedure does not have any influence on the acquired evaluative value of the originally neutral stimuli, and this even in subjects fully aware of the extinction presentations. We demonstrated the effectiveness of a counterconditioning procedure to alter acquired evaluative value, and in addition, found some evidence that awareness of the counterconditioning manipulations is not a prerequisite for its effectiveness. The theoretical consequences of these findings are phrased in terms of a fundamental distinction between signal-learning and evaluative learning, and some important implications for the behavioral treatment of affective-emotional disorders are suggested.