When is an easy task difficult and vice versa? A reply to lane

Lane has argued that kantowitz and Knight incorrectly predicted an interaction between primary and secondary task difficulty for the variable-allocation model of attention. It is shown that such an interaction is indeed obtained if task-performance difficulty is defined in terms of capacity and only reasonable transformations of data are permitted. This interaction holds for any set of monotonic resource operating characteristics.     

The effects of observation on emotional arousal and affiliation

This study assessed the influence of anticipated experimenter surveillance during the performance of a painful or potentially embarrassing act on affiliative preferences before engaging in that act. As predicted, there was an overall preference for isolation when the act to be performed was embarrassing, and this tendency increased with anticipated surveillance. There was an overall preference for affiliation under fear arousal, and this preference also increased with anticipated surveillance. Contrary to previous research, whether or not the potential affiliate was a subject in the experiment (i.e., in a similar or dissimilar emotional state) did not affect these tendencies. Possible ways of accounting for these findings are discussed.     

Signal value and preliminary processes in or elicitation

The evoked cardiac response (ECR) of heart rate deceleration, respiratory pause, the peripheral pulse amplitude response (PPAR) of vascular constriction, and the galvanic skin response (GSR) were recorded from 20 subjects presented with a series of brief target and nontarget stimuli in a random order. Prestimulus vigilance was equivalent for the two types of stimuli since each had to be identified as target or nontarget before being processed, or ignored, respectively. This difference in signal value following identification affected only the GSR, supporting a conceptualization of preliminary processes in orienting response (OR) elicitation rather than Sokolov’s unitary OR concept.     

Framework for formal ontology

The discussions which follow rest on a distinction, first expounded by Husserl, between formal logic and formal ontology. The former concerns itself with (formal) meaning-structures; the latter with formal structures amongst objects and their parts. The paper attempts to show how, when formal ontological considerations are brought into play, contemporary extensionalist theories of part and whole, and above all the mereology of Leniewski, can be generalised to embrace not only relations between concrete objects and object-pieces, but also relations between what we shall call dependent parts or moments. A two-dimensional formal language is canvassed for the resultant ontological theory, a language which owes more to the tradition of Euler, Boole and Venn than to the quantifier-centred languages which have predominated amongst analytic philosophers since the time of Frege and Russell. Analytic philosophical arguments against moments, and against the entire project of a formal ontology, are considered and rejected. The paper concludes with a brief account of some applications of the theory presented.     

Cognitive advantage in sport: the nature of perceptual structures

To extend and clarify the nature of the perceptual processes used by sport experts to perceive schematic sport information, two experiments used schematic football diagrams that varied in structure (structured vs. unstructured) and complexity (complex vs. easy). The primary objective was to examine and characterize the nature of the perceptual structures (chunks) that are initially encoded, stored, and subsequently retrieved. In Experiment 1, compared with nonexperts, experts recalled larger perceptual structures following the initial stimulus presentation of structured stimuli only, replicating the recall findings of previous research in other skill domains. Experiment 2 used a long-term memory recognition task and a sorting task. Experts had superior recall and recognition of structured stimuli only, along with more discriminating sorting criteria of perceptual structures within long-term memory. This suggests that experts possess a highly refined semantic network or organized, structured schematic information. This research extends and clarifies the similarities between the perceptual processes of experts in sport (i.e., football) and experts in skill domains that require obvious cognitive involvement (i.e., chess). The results are discussed with reference to the perceptual and conceptual chunking hypotheses. It is proposed that sport experts' knowledge of a conceptual category enables them to retrieve elements using a "generate-and-test process."     

Self-Consciousness and Strategic Self-Presentation

ABSTRACT People who are publicly self-conscious have been characterized as being especially concerned about their social identities and oriented toward gaining approval and avoiding disapproval. In two experiments, it was found that “pure publics” (i.e., those high in public and low in private self-consciousness) were the most concerned about matching their deeds and words. These subjects presented themselves to a partner consistently with their publicly known, prior performance on a supposedly valid test of social sensitivity. However, they presented themselves in a uniformly positive manner if the test could be dismissed as invalid and/or if their performance was unknown. In contrast, subjects low in public or high in private self-consciousness did not display these strategic patterns and presented themselves positively in all cases. Pure publics are thus the most likely to engage in patterns of self-presentation that have been shown to maximize approval and minimize disapproval in social interactions.     

German philosophy: Language and style

Conclusion Why, then, has so much of German philosophy for so long and so intensively felt itself bound to texts and authorities? And why is philosophy in Germany so often a matter of philosophizing through an author (whether Kant or Hegel or Heidegger)? Why is German philosophy to such a large extent a philosophy wherein questions such as What problems are you dealing with, then ? or Is what you say here true ? or What, then, is your own view on this matter? are unable to gain a foothold?The textual orientation of the mainstream of German philosophy is certainly in part dictated by the fact that this philosophy was always, in the middle ages as also in the modern era, to a very high degree a product of the universities. The most important philosophical movements in England, in contrast (as also in France), arose initially against the opposition of the universities. German-speaking university philosophers were thereby able to take over the teaching forms and methods of their scholastic predecessors in unbroken continuity, and the commentary, whether spoken or written, was in German philosophy faculties a prescribed form until as late as 1800. Even Kant gave lectures always in the form of commentary on other works, never on his own philosophy.Gradually, of course, philosophy came to be a matter for the universities in the Anglo-Saxon countries as well. The teaching of philosophy in these countries has however to a much greater extent than on the Continent been tied not to the formalized lecture(-commentary) but rather to tutorials and seminars involving comparatively small numbers of active participants. The job of philosophizing is learned thereby in Anglo-Saxon universities principally through the activity of argument and discussion.In German universities, in contrast, philosophy continues to be learned, in general, through lectures or homilies involving little or no discussion, so that the student of philosophy is rarely called upon to become active in his philosophizing. This is marked in the fact that in German one still refers to those enrolled in a lecture course as hearers (Hörer), whereby one often gains the impression that the hearers of lectures in philosophy are not in fact familiar with the desire to understand the content of what they hear.Even the teaching of the history of philosophy becomes impossible under such conditions, at least if this is understood in the Anglo-Saxon sense as an objective and as it were atomistic treatment of the ideas and arguments and problems which have arisen at different times and places. Rather we have an outcome in which philosophy, history of philosophy and textual commentary have become fused together into a single whole. To philosophize is to insert oneself into this whole, in order to contribute thereby to its further growth. Sometimes there will come along a philosopher (Hegel, Gentile, Heidegger) who will conceive it as his task to bring this development to a climax. The whole enterprise may thereby from time to time acquire a certain vital teleology. On the other hand, however, the conception of philosophy as a slowly growing textual mass can on occasion skid out of control, as the dadaistic posturings of Derrida et al. have made all too abundantly clear.